Proposition 1, p. 996 — if T = 0, channel coordination requires m* < 0
ProvedChannelRebate.Quantity.proposition1_linear_rebate_losschannel-coordinationlinear-rebatenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contracts
In the setting of the mission, let , , , and let satisfy . Consider the linear rebate , i.e. the target rebate with target . If this contract achieves channel coordination, in the sense that is the retailer's unique optimal order,
then the manufacturer's profit at is negative:
A rebate paid on every unit sold cannot both coordinate the channel and leave the manufacturer a profit; this is the motivation for the target in Theorem 1.
Formalization Note The manufacturer's profit is at ; since almost surely, the rebate term equals .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity
/-- Taylor (2002), Proposition 1, p. 996. If `T = 0` (a linear rebate), then channel
coordination requires `m* < 0`: whenever the retailer's unique optimal order under
`(w, u, 0)` is the integrated-channel quantity `Q̄₀`, the manufacturer's profit at `Q̄₀`
is negative. -/
theorem proposition1_linear_rebate_loss (p c s w u : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
(hsc : s < c) (hu : 0 < u) (D : Demand)
(Qbar0 : ℝ) (hQbar0 : 0 < Qbar0) (hΦbar : Phi D Qbar0 = (p - c) / (p - s))
(hcoord : optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u 0 D) = {Qbar0}) :
manufProfit c w u 0 D Qbar0 < 0 := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 996, Proposition 1; proof p. 1005
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.