Theorem 4.1 — the exact all-attacks security bound
ProvedPauliUnclonable531.Pauli.securitycryptographyp2o-batch-stoc27ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quantum-information
For every n≥1 and every information-theoretic pre-key splitting attack with arbitrary nonzero finite output registers B and C, the concrete Section 3 scheme satisfies
The key and challenge bit are independent and exactly uniform. The splitter is an arbitrary CPTP channel, while the local post-key measurements are arbitrary binary POVMs. This is the fixed-(0,1) game of Theorem 4.1 and Remark 2.12; the headline also quantifies over randomized adversarial message pairs.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: finite-dimensional complex Hilbert-space operators and binary strings → complex matrices indexed by finite computational bases, Fin 2 bits, real Born probabilities, Euclidean spectral norm and PSD-difference order; reason: these are the same finite-dimensional objects and conventions after choosing the source basis
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PauliUnclonable531_Pauli_Game open scoped Matrix Matrix.Norms.L2Operator ComplexOrder set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace PauliUnclonable531.Pauli
/-- Theorem 4.1, Eq. (17), p.17, in the fixed-message game of Remark 2.12. -/
theorem security {B C : Type} [Fintype B] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq B] [DecidableEq C]
[Nonempty B] [Nonempty C] (n : ℕ) (hn : 1 ≤ n) (a : Attack n B C) :
win a ≤ 1/2 + (1/2) * Real.sqrt ((2 : ℝ)^n / ((4 : ℝ)^n - 1)) := by sorry
end PauliUnclonable531.Pauli
Source
Prabhanjan Ananth, Seyoon Ragavan, Amit Sahai, STOC 2027 submission #531 (October 2026), Theorem 4.1, p.17, Eq. (17)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.