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Script-path soundness at the commitment level: VerifyTaprootCommitment opens only committed leaves, up to a hash collision or a tweak collision

Proved
BitcoinTapSoundness.commitment_soundness

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip341bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetformal-verificationmerklesoundnesstagged-hashtaproot

For an output key qqq, internal key internal32, parity bit and tree TTT with HonestOutput q internal32 parity T, and any control block of length 33+32k33 + 32k33+32k whose internal-key bytes are internal32 and whose parity bit is parity, and any leaf (v,s)(v, s)(v,s): if verifyTaprootCommitment control q (tapleafHash v s) = true then

tapleafHash v s ∈ T.leaves, or Sha256Collision, or there is a point PPP with liftX (beVal internal32) = some P and TweakCollision q parity P.

If the control block's Merkle root equals the tree's root, script_path_soundness applies. Otherwise the two roots give two tweak hashes tapTweakHash internal32 ·; equal tweak hashes of different roots are a collision (tagged_collision, the internal key being a fixed 32-byte prefix), and different tweak hashes that both pass xonlyTweakAddCheck are a TweakCollision. This is the BIP341 claim that a spender cannot open a leaf the output's creator did not commit to, stated as a reduction to SHA-256 collision resistance and to the hardness of finding two tweaks for one output key.

Deprecated. Superseded by BitcoinTapSoundnessV2.commitment_soundness (revision 2, BitcoinTapSoundnessV2): this revision's collision alternatives were closed propositions (Sha256Collision, and TweakCollision without a length constraint), which are provable by counting and so made the statement trivially true; the V2 declarations name the colliding strings and the two 32-byte tweaks explicitly, computed from the inputs.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTapSoundness
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTaproot
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
open BitcoinTapSoundness BitcoinSer BitcoinTaproot
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinTapSoundness.commitment_soundness (q internal32 : BitcoinSer.Bytes) (parity : Bool)
    (T : BitcoinTapSoundness.TapTree) (hT : BitcoinTapSoundness.HonestOutput q internal32 parity T)
    (control : BitcoinSer.Bytes) (k : Nat)
    (hc : control.length = BitcoinTaproot.TAPROOT_CONTROL_BASE_SIZE + BitcoinTaproot.TAPROOT_CONTROL_NODE_SIZE * k)
    (hkey : BitcoinTapSoundness.controlInternalKey control = internal32) (hpar : BitcoinTapSoundness.controlParity control = parity)
    (v : BitcoinSer.Byte) (s : BitcoinSer.Bytes)
    (h : BitcoinTaproot.verifyTaprootCommitment control q (BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s) = true) :
    BitcoinTaproot.tapleafHash v s ∈ T.leaves ∨ BitcoinTapSoundness.Sha256Collision ∨
      ∃ P, BitcoinSig.liftX (BitcoinSig.beVal internal32) = some P ∧ BitcoinTapSoundness.TweakCollision q parity P := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyTaprootCommitment, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot, ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTapbranchHash (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak, ComputeTapTweakHash (src/pubkey.cpp); secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check; BIP341
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinTapSoundness.commitment_soundness

Statement. Let qqq and KKK ("internal32") be byte strings (finite sequences of 8-bit values; no length hypothesis is stated for either), π\piπ ("parity") a Boolean, and TTT a tap tree (a finite binary tree in which every internal node has exactly two ordered children and every leaf carries a byte and a byte string). Let ccc ("control") be a byte string and kkk a natural number (possibly 000). Let vvv be a byte and sss a byte string (any length). Assume all of the following:

  • (hT) HonestOutput(q,K,π,T)\mathrm{HonestOutput}(q, K, \pi, T)HonestOutput(q,K,π,T), i.e. CheckTapTweak(q,K,hash(T),π)=true\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}\bigl(q, K, \mathrm{hash}(T), \pi\bigr) = \mathrm{true}CheckTapTweak(q,K,hash(T),π)=true;
  • (hc) ∣c∣=33+32 k|c| = 33 + 32\,k∣c∣=33+32k;
  • (hkey) the 32 bytes of ccc at positions 111 through 323232 (zero-based; i.e. drop the first byte, then take 32) equal KKK as byte strings — so under (hc), ∣K∣=32|K| = 32∣K∣=32;
  • (hpar) π=true\pi = \mathrm{true}π=true exactly when the first byte of ccc is odd (i.e. c0 mod 2=1c_0 \bmod 2 = 1c0​mod2=1; if ccc were empty the first byte would default to 000, but (hc) rules this out);
  • (h) VerifyCommit(c,q,LeafHash(v,s))=true\mathrm{VerifyCommit}\bigl(c, q, \mathrm{LeafHash}(v, s)\bigr) = \mathrm{true}VerifyCommit(c,q,LeafHash(v,s))=true.

Then at least one of the following three holds:

  1. LeafHash(v,s)\mathrm{LeafHash}(v, s)LeafHash(v,s) is an element of the list leaves(T)\mathrm{leaves}(T)leaves(T) of leaf hashes of TTT; or
  2. Sha256Collision\mathsf{Sha256Collision}Sha256Collision: there exist byte strings x≠yx \neq yx=y (any lengths, unrelated to the theorem's variables) with SHA256(x)=SHA256(y)\mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y)SHA256(x)=SHA256(y); or
  3. there exists a point P=(Px,Py)P = (P_x, P_y)P=(Px​,Py​) (a pair of natural numbers) such that liftX(be(K))=P\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K)) = PliftX(be(K))=P (the lift succeeds and yields PPP) and TweakCollision(q,π,P)\mathrm{TweakCollision}(q, \pi, P)TweakCollision(q,π,P) holds, i.e. there exist byte strings t1≠t2t_1 \neq t_2t1​=t2​ with TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1)=true\mathrm{TweakCheck}(q, \pi, P, t_1) = \mathrm{true}TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1​)=true and TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2)=true\mathrm{TweakCheck}(q, \pi, P, t_2) = \mathrm{true}TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2​)=true.

Unfolded notions (hashing).

  • SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 is the bundle's own executable implementation of SHA-256, a total function from all finite byte strings to 32-byte strings. utf8(⋅)\mathrm{utf8}(\cdot)utf8(⋅) is UTF-8 encoding, and for a tag string τ\tauτ,
Taggedτ(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m).\mathrm{Tagged}_{\tau}(m) := \mathrm{SHA256}\bigl(\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| m\bigr).Taggedτ​(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m).
  • CS(ℓ)\mathrm{CS}(\ell)CS(ℓ) is the compact-size encoding of ℓ\ellℓ (one byte if ℓ<253\ell < 253ℓ<253; 0xfd0xfd0xfd + 2 little-endian bytes if ℓ≤65535\ell \le 65535ℓ≤65535; 0xfe0xfe0xfe + 4 bytes if ℓ≤232−1\ell \le 2^{32}-1ℓ≤232−1; 0xff0xff0xff + 8 bytes of ℓ mod 264\ell \bmod 2^{64}ℓmod264 otherwise).
  • LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s)\mathrm{LeafHash}(v, s) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapLeaf''}}([v] \| \mathrm{CS}(|s|) \| s)LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”​([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s) (vvv used as given, no masking).
  • ≺\prec≺ is lexicographic order on byte strings (first differing byte decides; a proper prefix is smaller; no string is ≺\prec≺ itself) and BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a)\mathrm{BranchHash}(a, b) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapBranch''}}(\text{if } a \prec b \text{ then } a\|b \text{ else } b\|a)BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”​(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a) (symmetric in a,ba,ba,b).
  • hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s)\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s)) := \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s); hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R))\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R)) := \mathrm{BranchHash}(\mathrm{hash}(L), \mathrm{hash}(R))hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R)). leaves(leaf(v,s)):=[LeafHash(v,s)]\mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s)) := [\mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)]leaves(leaf(v,s)):=[LeafHash(v,s)]; leaves(branch(L,R)):=leaves(L)∥leaves(R)\mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R)) := \mathrm{leaves}(L)\|\mathrm{leaves}(R)leaves(branch(L,R)):=leaves(L)∥leaves(R) (leaf hashes left to right, with repetitions). Disjunct (1) is membership of a 32-byte string in this list, not an assertion that the pair (v,s)(v,s)(v,s) occurs in TTT.
  • Path nodes of ccc: with m:=⌊(∣c∣−˙33)/32⌋m := \lfloor(|c| \mathbin{\dot-} 33)/32\rfloorm:=⌊(∣c∣−˙​33)/32⌋ (−˙\dot-−˙​ truncated subtraction), drop the first 33 bytes of ccc and cut the rest into mmm consecutive 32-byte blocks [n1,…,nm][n_1,\dots,n_m][n1​,…,nm​], ignoring any leftover. Under (hc), m=km = km=k exactly. The Merkle root from ccc and a start hash hhh is the left fold Root(c,h):=BranchHash(⋯BranchHash(BranchHash(h,n1),n2)⋯ ,nm)\mathrm{Root}(c,h) := \mathrm{BranchHash}(\cdots\mathrm{BranchHash}(\mathrm{BranchHash}(h,n_1),n_2)\cdots,n_m)Root(c,h):=BranchHash(⋯BranchHash(BranchHash(h,n1​),n2​)⋯,nm​), equal to hhh when m=0m = 0m=0.
  • TweakHash(K,r):=Tagged“TapTweak”(K∥r)\mathrm{TweakHash}(K, r) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapTweak''}}(K \| r)TweakHash(K,r):=Tagged“TapTweak”​(K∥r).

Unfolded notions (curve arithmetic).

  • p:=2256−232−977p := 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977p:=2256−232−977; n:=0xFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C D0364141n := \mathtt{0xFFFFFFFF\,FFFFFFFF\,FFFFFFFF\,FFFFFFFE\,BAAEDCE6\,AF48A03B\,BFD25E8C\,D0364141}n:=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141; G:=(Gx,Gy)G := (G_x, G_y)G:=(Gx​,Gy​) is the fixed secp256k1 base point given by two 256-bit constants.
  • be(b)\mathrm{be}(b)be(b) is the big-endian natural-number value of a byte string bbb of any length (be([])=0\mathrm{be}([]) = 0be([])=0; leading zero bytes do not change the value). be32(x)\mathrm{be}_{32}(x)be32​(x) is the 32-byte big-endian encoding of x mod 2256x \bmod 2^{256}xmod2256.
  • Points are either ∞\infty∞ or pairs of natural numbers (not required to be reduced mod ppp or to lie on the curve). Addition ⊕\oplus⊕: ∞\infty∞ is the identity; for (x1,y1)⊕(x2,y2)(x_1,y_1) \oplus (x_2,y_2)(x1​,y1​)⊕(x2​,y2​), if x1≡x2(modp)x_1 \equiv x_2 \pmod px1​≡x2​(modp) then the result is ∞\infty∞ when y1+y2≡0(modp)y_1 + y_2 \equiv 0 \pmod py1​+y2​≡0(modp) and otherwise the doubling formula with slope λ=3x12⋅(2y1)−1 mod p\lambda = 3x_1^2 \cdot (2y_1)^{-1} \bmod pλ=3x12​⋅(2y1​)−1modp; otherwise the chord formula with slope λ=(y2−y1)(x2−x1)−1 mod p\lambda = (y_2 - y_1)(x_2 - x_1)^{-1} \bmod pλ=(y2​−y1​)(x2​−x1​)−1modp; in both cases x3=λ2−x1−x2 mod px_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2 \bmod px3​=λ2−x1​−x2​modp and y3=λ(x1−x3)−y1 mod py_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \bmod py3​=λ(x1​−x3​)−y1​modp. Inverses are computed by Fermat exponentiation, with the "inverse" of 000 being 000. Scalar multiplication t⋅Pt \cdot Pt⋅P is double-and-add on the binary digits of ttt with a fuel of 257 steps (exact for t<2257t < 2^{257}t<2257), with 0⋅P=∞0 \cdot P = \infty0⋅P=∞.
  • liftX(x)\mathrm{liftX}(x)liftX(x): if x≥px \ge px≥p, undefined (none). Otherwise let y0:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4 mod py_0 := (x^3 + 7)^{(p+1)/4} \bmod py0​:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4modp; if y02≡x3+7(modp)y_0^2 \equiv x^3 + 7 \pmod py02​≡x3+7(modp), the result is (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) with y=y0y = y_0y=y0​ if y0y_0y0​ is even and y=(p−y0) mod py = (p - y_0) \bmod py=(p−y0​)modp otherwise (the even-yyy point with abscissa xxx); if not, undefined.
  • TweakCheck(q,π,P,t)\mathrm{TweakCheck}(q, \pi, P, t)TweakCheck(q,π,P,t) for byte strings q,tq, tq,t (any lengths), Boolean π\piπ, and point PPP: let t^:=be(t)\hat t := \mathrm{be}(t)t^:=be(t). If t^≥n\hat t \ge nt^≥n, false. Otherwise compute Q:=P⊕(t^⋅G)Q := P \oplus (\hat t \cdot G)Q:=P⊕(t^⋅G). If Q=∞Q = \inftyQ=∞, false. Otherwise true exactly when be32(Qx)=q\mathrm{be}_{32}(Q_x) = qbe32​(Qx​)=q as byte strings (so qqq must be exactly 32 bytes) and (QyQ_yQy​ is odd) ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ π\piπ.
  • CheckTapTweak(q,K,r,π)\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}(q, K, r, \pi)CheckTapTweak(q,K,r,π): if liftX(be(K))\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K))liftX(be(K)) is undefined, false; otherwise, with PPP its value, TweakCheck(q,π,P,TweakHash(K,r))\mathrm{TweakCheck}\bigl(q, \pi, P, \mathrm{TweakHash}(K, r)\bigr)TweakCheck(q,π,P,TweakHash(K,r)).
  • VerifyCommit(c,q,h):=CheckTapTweak(q, c[1..32], Root(c,h), [c0 odd])\mathrm{VerifyCommit}(c, q, h) := \mathrm{CheckTapTweak}\bigl(q,\ c[1..32],\ \mathrm{Root}(c, h),\ [c_0 \text{ odd}]\bigr)VerifyCommit(c,q,h):=CheckTapTweak(q, c[1..32], Root(c,h), [c0​ odd]), where c[1..32]c[1..32]c[1..32] is "drop one byte, take 32" (shorter if ccc is short) and c0c_0c0​ is the first byte of ccc (default 000 if empty). Under (hkey) and (hpar) this is CheckTapTweak(q,K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s)),π)\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}(q, K, \mathrm{Root}(c, \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)), \pi)CheckTapTweak(q,K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s)),π).
  • TweakCollision(q,π,P):=∃ t1,t2∈Bytes.  t1≠t2∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1)=true∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2)=true\mathrm{TweakCollision}(q, \pi, P) := \exists\, t_1, t_2 \in \mathsf{Bytes}.\; t_1 \neq t_2 \wedge \mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,t_1) = \mathrm{true} \wedge \mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,t_2) = \mathrm{true}TweakCollision(q,π,P):=∃t1​,t2​∈Bytes.t1​=t2​∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1​)=true∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2​)=true. The inequality t1≠t2t_1 \neq t_2t1​=t2​ is inequality of byte strings; no length is imposed on t1,t2t_1, t_2t1​,t2​, and the check reads them only through be(⋅)\mathrm{be}(\cdot)be(⋅), which ignores leading zero bytes. Consequently, whenever some ttt passes the check, the strings ttt and 0x00∥t0x00 \| t0x00∥t are two distinct witnesses; in particular, under (h), (hkey), (hpar), the tweak TweakHash(K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s)))\mathrm{TweakHash}(K, \mathrm{Root}(c, \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)))TweakHash(K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s))) passes the check for the point P=liftX(be(K))P = \mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K))P=liftX(be(K)).
  • Sha256Collision\mathsf{Sha256Collision}Sha256Collision is the closed proposition ∃ x,y∈Bytes.  x≠y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y)\exists\, x, y \in \mathsf{Bytes}.\; x \neq y \wedge \mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y)∃x,y∈Bytes.x=y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y); since it concerns a fixed total function from infinitely many inputs to finitely many 32-byte outputs, its truth value is a fixed mathematical fact (such a pair exists by counting), not an assumption.

Edge cases made explicit. Hypotheses (hT) and (h) can only be true when qqq is exactly 32 bytes and be(K)<p\mathrm{be}(K) < pbe(K)<p with liftX\mathrm{liftX}liftX succeeding; otherwise the theorem's hypotheses are unsatisfiable and it holds vacuously. k=0k = 0k=0 is allowed (no path nodes; root =LeafHash(v,s)= \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)=LeafHash(v,s)); no upper bound on kkk is imposed. Under (hT), the same point P=liftX(be(K))P = \mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K))P=liftX(be(K)) is used with tweak TweakHash(K,hash(T))\mathrm{TweakHash}(K, \mathrm{hash}(T))TweakHash(K,hash(T)); under (h), with tweak TweakHash(K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s)))\mathrm{TweakHash}(K, \mathrm{Root}(c, \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)))TweakHash(K,Root(c,LeafHash(v,s))). The conclusion's disjunct (3) quantifies over PPP but fixes it to be the value of liftX(be(K))\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K))liftX(be(K)).

Human review
  • Flagged by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Sha256Collision can be proved, so this holds without any Taproot content

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