Lemma 15.1: the core is nonempty and each bidder's VCG payoff is the largest payoff it receives at any core point
ProvedSupplyChainTheory.vcg_core_lemmaauctionscooperative-gamescoreoperations-researchvcg
Lemma 15.1. For a coalitional value function on the players , the core is nonempty, and for every bidder ,
the VCG payoff is the greatest payoff bidder receives at any point of the core. The book's proof: the vector paying to the auctioneer, to and nothing to the other bidders lies in the core, and any core vector paying more would pay the coalition less than .
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_auctions
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory
theorem vcg_core_lemma {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) (hV : IsCoalitionalValue V) :
(∃ π, InCore V Finset.univ π)
∧ ∀ k : Fin (n + 1), k ≠ 0 →
IsGreatest {x | ∃ π, InCore V Finset.univ π ∧ x = π k} (vcgPayoff V Finset.univ k) := by sorry
end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, p. 606, Sect. 15.4.3, Lemma 15.1 and its proof
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.