Optimal dual solution
DefinitionDSICCompComp_Supplement_IsOptimalDuallp-dualitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization
is an optimal dual solution of the DSIC revenue LP if (the multipliers belong to inequality constraints) and it minimizes the dual function over all nonnegative dual solutions:
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_dualFunction
namespace DSICCompComp
namespace Supplement
/-- `λ*` is an optimal dual solution of the DSIC revenue LP (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Appendix C, pp.35–37 (pdf pp.36–38)): `λ* ≥ 0` (Lagrange multipliers of inequality constraints) and
`λ*` minimizes the dual function `g(λ) = sup_{(x,p) ∈ P(D)} L(λ, x, p)` over all `λ ≥ 0`. -/
def IsOptimalDual {n m : ℕ} (E : FiniteSetting n m)
(lam : (i : Fin n) → ((k : Fin n) → E.S k) → Option (E.S i) → ℝ) : Prop :=
(∀ i v w, 0 ≤ lam i v w) ∧
∀ lam' : (i : Fin n) → ((k : Fin n) → E.S k) → Option (E.S i) → ℝ,
(∀ i v w, 0 ≤ lam' i v w) → dualFunction E lam ≤ dualFunction E lam'
end Supplement
end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Appendix C, pp.35–37 (pdf pp.36–38)