Lemma 4.13 — threshold price adjustment: SuperFP(t̄) ≥ (1 − e^{−1/4}) SuperFP(p) and WorstRationed(t̄) ≥ SuperFP(p)/7, symmetrically for t̲ (read with t̄ ∈ [p, m̄], t̲ ∈ [m̲, p])
ProvedStratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction.lemma_4_13double-auctiongains-from-trademarket-stratificationp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Fix a double auction instance with , a submarket () and a price .
Buyer side. If the expected number of buyers with values in is at least , then for every with ,
and if moreover the expected number of sellers with costs in is at most , then .
Seller side. If the expected number of sellers with costs in is at least , then for every with , , and if moreover the expected number of buyers with values in is at most , then .
The threshold is taken on the side of that the paper's proof chooses ("we can choose a threshold ", p. 59); without it the printed statement fails (see the mission's insight I1). (Proof in Appendix A.3.)
Differences from the source:
- encoding: continuous F_1..F_n, G_1..G_m supported on [0, 1], all values and costs mutually independent → a
DAInstance n m: no-atom probability measures with mass 1 on [0, 1]; expectations over the product(Measure.pi μB).prod (Measure.pi μS); reason: same instances; independence is the product measure - encoding: a submarket [m̲, m̄] with its price p (footnote 3) → reals a, b with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 and p ∈ [a, b]; counts 'above p' / 'below p' within the submarket are Σ_i Pr[p ≤ v_i ≤ b] / Σ_j Pr[a ≤ c_j ≤ p]; reason: footnote 3's convention; closed intervals as in Remark 2.4
- encoding: the super buyer v_max = max_i v_i and super seller c_min = min_j c_j → instance arguments
[NeZero n] [NeZero m](n, m ≥ 1); reason: v_max and c_min are undefined without a buyer and a seller; the condition only excludes undefined cases - reading: 'where t̄ is chosen so that the expected number of buyers with values above t̄ within this submarket is 1/4' (and symmetrically t̲) → every t̄ ∈ [p, b] with Σ_i Pr[t̄ ≤ v_i ≤ b] = 1/4, and every t̲ ∈ [a, p] with Σ_j Pr[a ≤ c_j ≤ t̲] = 1/4; reason: the proof chooses t̄ ∈ [p, m̄] (p. 59) and Lemmas 4.14, 4.15 use it so; for a t̄ < p with the same count both conclusions can fail (INSIGHTS.yaml I1); such a t̄ ∈ [p, b] exists by continuity
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Instance import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_WorstRationed import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Submarket open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
/-- Lemma 4.13 (p. 37), read with the threshold on the side of `p` that its proof chooses
(`t̄ ∈ [p, b]`, `t̲ ∈ [a, p]`, p. 59): inside a submarket `[a, b]` with price `p ∈ [a, b]`,
(buyer side) if the expected number of buyers with values in `[p, b]` is at least `1/4`, then every
`t̄ ∈ [p, b]` with expected number `1/4` of buyers in `[t̄, b]` has
`SuperFP(t̄) ≥ (1 − e^{−1/4}) SuperFP(p)`, and, if moreover the expected number of sellers with costs
in `[a, t̄]` is at most `1/4`, `WorstRationed(t̄) ≥ SuperFP(p) / 7`; (seller side) symmetrically. -/
theorem lemma_4_13 {n m : ℕ} [NeZero n] [NeZero m] (I : DAInstance n m) (a b p : ℝ)
(ha : 0 ≤ a) (hab : a < b) (hb : b ≤ 1) (hap : a ≤ p) (hpb : p ≤ b) :
(1 / 4 ≤ I.expBuyersIn p b → ∀ tB : ℝ, p ≤ tB → tB ≤ b → I.expBuyersIn tB b = 1 / 4 →
(1 - Real.exp (-(1 / 4))) * I.superFP a p b ≤ I.superFP a tB b ∧
(I.expSellersIn a tB ≤ 1 / 4 → 1 / 7 * I.superFP a p b ≤ I.worstRationedIn a tB b)) ∧
(1 / 4 ≤ I.expSellersIn a p → ∀ tS : ℝ, a ≤ tS → tS ≤ p → I.expSellersIn a tS = 1 / 4 →
(1 - Real.exp (-(1 / 4))) * I.superFP a p b ≤ I.superFP a tS b ∧
(I.expBuyersIn tS b ≤ 1 / 4 → 1 / 7 * I.superFP a p b ≤ I.worstRationedIn a tS b)) := by sorry
end StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
Source
Deng, Lin, Schoepflin, Wang, Stratifying Markets for Efficient Trade, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 49372bcf…), p. 37, Lemma 4.13 (proof App. A.3, pp. 59–60)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.