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A pre-voting round that a quorum refuses never starts an election

Proved
OpenSearchPreVote.no_disruption

by pitimespi · Nov 1, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cluster-coordinationconsensuselasticsearchelection-schedulerformal-verificationleader-electionopensearchpaxospre-voteraftzen2

Fix an election strategy es, the health healthy n and collector state st n of every node n (as they stand while the round runs), a requester c whose pre-vote requests carry the term t, a cluster state s, and a list of node ids L that is a quorum of the last committed or of the last accepted configuration of s. Suppose every node whose id is in L is unhealthy or knows a leader other than c: for every n with n.id ∈ L, healthy n = false, or (st n).leader = some l with l ≠ c. Let r be a round over s (r.clusterState = s) that is reachable when the deliverable responses are exactly the answers to c's request, handlePreVoteRequest (healthy n) (st n) ⟨c, t⟩ = .ok resp. Then r.electionStarted = false, and handling any further such answer, with any requester response lr, does not call startElection.

Whatever answers arrive, in whatever order and number: only nodes outside L answer, and a set of voters disjoint from a quorum of a configuration is not a quorum of it, so the election-quorum test, which needs quorums of both configurations, never passes. A node cut off from a cluster whose majority follows a leader cannot depose that leader by starting elections when it reconnects. The theorem does not cover the requests' side effect: each request raises the receiver's largest seen term to at least t, and a leader whose current term is below t then moves to that larger term and starts an election itself, immediately or after its publication in progress (Coordinator.updateMaxTermSeen, CO:560-581, and CO:1784).

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_OpenSearchPreVote
open OpenSearchCoordination OpenSearchPreVote
Formal statement
theorem OpenSearchPreVote.no_disruption {V : Type} (es : ElectionStrategy) (healthy : DiscoveryNode → Bool)
    (st : DiscoveryNode → CollectorState) (c : DiscoveryNode) (t : Nat) (s : ClusterState V) (L : List NodeId)
    (hL : s.lastCommittedConfiguration.hasQuorum L = true ∨ s.lastAcceptedConfiguration.hasQuorum L = true)
    (hfollow : ∀ n : DiscoveryNode, n.id ∈ L → healthy n = false ∨ ∃ l, (st n).leader = some l ∧ l ≠ c)
    (r : PreVotingRound V)
    (hr : RoundReachable es (fun n resp => handlePreVoteRequest (healthy n) (st n) ⟨c, t⟩ = .ok resp) r)
    (hs : r.clusterState = s) :
    r.electionStarted = false ∧
    ∀ lr resp sender, handlePreVoteRequest (healthy sender) (st sender) ⟨c, t⟩ = .ok resp →
      (r.handlePreVoteResponse es lr resp sender).2.1 = false := by sorry
Source
OpenSearch b2a54ba5c0defba3d1d20423e911d4bf920bab19: PreVoteCollector (state line 79, start 111-115, update 128-131, handlePreVoteRequest 133-163, PreVotingRound 175-300, handlePreVoteResponse 225-279, close 296-299): https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/blob/b2a54ba5c0defba3d1d20423e911d4bf920bab19/server/src/main/java/org/opensearch/cluster/coordination/PreVoteCollector.java#L66-L301; Coordinator (updateMaxTermSeen lines 560-581, startElection 583-602, nodeMayWinElection 628-633, getPreVoteResponse 873-879, handleJoin 1267-1299, startElectionScheduler 1567-1618, the preVoteCollector.update calls 516, 653, 777, 801, 839, 1157): https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/blob/b2a54ba5c0defba3d1d20423e911d4bf920bab19/server/src/main/java/org/opensearch/cluster/coordination/Coordinator.java#L560-L633; ElectionSchedulerFactory (settings lines 85-115, constructor check 133-143, nonNegative 159-161, toPositiveLongAtMost 169-172, scheduleNextElection 195-241): https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/blob/b2a54ba5c0defba3d1d20423e911d4bf920bab19/server/src/main/java/org/opensearch/cluster/coordination/ElectionSchedulerFactory.java#L62-L254; ElectionStrategy.isElectionQuorum (lines 68-88): https://github.com/opensearch-project/OpenSearch/blob/b2a54ba5c0defba3d1d20423e911d4bf920bab19/server/src/main/java/org/opensearch/cluster/coordination/ElectionStrategy.java#L68-L88; the messages PreVoteRequest.java and PreVoteResponse.java in the same directory; CoordinationState (handleStartJoin, handleJoin) as transcribed by the OpenSearchCoordination mission
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: OpenSearchPreVote.no_disruption

Notions used

Discovery nodes. A discovery node nnn is a pair: a node id n.id∈Nn.\mathrm{id} \in \mathbb{N}n.id∈N and a Boolean flag n.cmn.\mathrm{cm}n.cm ("cluster-manager-eligible"). Two discovery nodes are equal iff both components are equal.

Configurations and quorums. A voting configuration CCC is a strictly increasing (hence duplicate-free) list of node ids C.idsC.\mathrm{ids}C.ids. For a list XXX of node ids,

hasQuorum(C,X)  ⟺  2⋅∣{x∈C.ids:x∈X}∣>∣C.ids∣.\mathrm{hasQuorum}(C, X) \iff 2\cdot|\{x \in C.\mathrm{ids} : x \in X\}| > |C.\mathrm{ids}|.hasQuorum(C,X)⟺2⋅∣{x∈C.ids:x∈X}∣>∣C.ids∣.

Cluster states. A cluster state sss has, among other fields, a last committed configuration s.committeds.\mathrm{committed}s.committed and a last accepted configuration s.accepteds.\mathrm{accepted}s.accepted.

Requests, collector states, and the request handler.

  • A pre-vote request ⟨c,t⟩\langle c, t\rangle⟨c,t⟩ consists of a source node ccc and a term ttt.
  • A collector state ststst has a known leader st.leaderst.\mathrm{leader}st.leader ("none", or "some lll") and a stored response st.responsest.\mathrm{response}st.response.
  • handlePreVoteRequest(healthy,st,⟨c,t⟩)\mathrm{handlePreVoteRequest}(\mathit{healthy}, st, \langle c, t\rangle)handlePreVoteRequest(healthy,st,⟨c,t⟩) returns success with st.responsest.\mathrm{response}st.response iff healthy\mathit{healthy}healthy is true and (st.leader=nonest.\mathrm{leader} = \text{none}st.leader=none or st.leader=some cst.\mathrm{leader} = \text{some } cst.leader=some c). Otherwise it returns an error. The term ttt is never read.

Rounds. A round rrr has a cluster state r.clusterStater.\mathrm{clusterState}r.clusterState, a local node r.localNoder.\mathrm{localNode}r.localNode, a list of (sender, response) pairs, and Booleans electionStarted\mathrm{electionStarted}electionStarted and isClosed\mathrm{isClosed}isClosed. votes(r)\mathrm{votes}(r)votes(r) is the set of ids of the cluster-manager-eligible senders in the list.

The response handler. handlePreVoteResponse(es,lr,r,resp,sender)\mathrm{handlePreVoteResponse}(es, lr, r, resp, \mathit{sender})handlePreVoteResponse(es,lr,r,resp,sender) returns (new round, start flag, max-term argument). Write s=r.clusterStates = r.\mathrm{clusterState}s=r.clusterState.

  • If rrr is closed, or resprespresp is fresher than sss, the round is unchanged and the flag is false.

  • Otherwise the list becomes (sender,resp)(\mathit{sender}, resp)(sender,resp) followed by the old entries from senders ≠sender\neq \mathit{sender}=sender; call this round r1r_1r1​. The flag is true iff both of these hold:

    • rrr had not started an election;
    • hasQuorum(s.committed,votes(r1))\mathrm{hasQuorum}(s.\mathrm{committed}, \mathrm{votes}(r_1))hasQuorum(s.committed,votes(r1​)), hasQuorum(s.accepted,votes(r1))\mathrm{hasQuorum}(s.\mathrm{accepted}, \mathrm{votes}(r_1))hasQuorum(s.accepted,votes(r1​)) and the strategy's arbitrary extra test all hold.

    When the flag is true, electionStarted\mathrm{electionStarted}electionStarted becomes true.

Reachability. RoundReachablees,D\mathrm{RoundReachable}_{es, D}RoundReachablees,D​ is the least predicate on rounds closed under three rules:

  • every start(s,n)=⟨s,n,[ ],false,false⟩\mathrm{start}(s, n) = \langle s, n, [\,], \mathrm{false}, \mathrm{false}\ranglestart(s,n)=⟨s,n,[],false,false⟩ is reachable;
  • handling, with any local response, of any (sender,resp)(\mathit{sender}, resp)(sender,resp) with D(sender,resp)D(\mathit{sender}, resp)D(sender,resp);
  • closing.

1. Declaration

Binders and hypotheses, in order.

  • VVV: an implicit type.
  • eseses: an election strategy, arbitrary.
  • healthy\mathit{healthy}healthy: a function from discovery nodes to Booleans (each node's health).
  • ststst: a function from discovery nodes to collector states (each node's known leader and stored response).
  • ccc: a discovery node (the requester named in the pre-vote request).
  • t∈Nt \in \mathbb{N}t∈N: the request's term.
  • sss: a cluster state over VVV.
  • LLL: a list of node ids.
  • hLhLhL: hasQuorum(s.committed,L)=true  ∨  hasQuorum(s.accepted,L)=true\mathrm{hasQuorum}(s.\mathrm{committed}, L) = \mathrm{true} \;\vee\; \mathrm{hasQuorum}(s.\mathrm{accepted}, L) = \mathrm{true}hasQuorum(s.committed,L)=true∨hasQuorum(s.accepted,L)=true. So strictly more than half of the ids of sss's last committed configuration lie in LLL, or strictly more than half of the ids of its last accepted configuration do.
  • hfollowhfollowhfollow: for every discovery node nnn (with either flag) such that n.id∈Ln.\mathrm{id} \in Ln.id∈L,
healthy(n)=false  ∨  ∃ l, st(n).leader=some l∧l≠c.\mathit{healthy}(n) = \mathrm{false} \;\vee\; \exists\, l,\ st(n).\mathrm{leader} = \text{some } l \wedge l \neq c.healthy(n)=false∨∃l, st(n).leader=some l∧l=c.

Every node whose id is in LLL is unhealthy or knows a leader different from ccc. "Different" means different id or different flag. By the handler's definition, this is the same as saying every such node refuses the request ⟨c,t⟩\langle c, t\rangle⟨c,t⟩.

  • rrr: a round over VVV.
  • hrhrhr: RoundReachablees,D(r)\mathrm{RoundReachable}_{es, D}(r)RoundReachablees,D​(r), where
D(n,resp)  :  ⟺    handlePreVoteRequest(healthy(n),st(n),⟨c,t⟩)=ok(resp).D(n, resp) \;:\iff\; \mathrm{handlePreVoteRequest}(\mathit{healthy}(n), st(n), \langle c, t\rangle) = \mathrm{ok}(resp).D(n,resp):⟺handlePreVoteRequest(healthy(n),st(n),⟨c,t⟩)=ok(resp).

Unfolded, D(n,resp)D(n, resp)D(n,resp) holds iff all of these hold:

  • healthy(n)\mathit{healthy}(n)healthy(n);
  • st(n).leader∈{none,some c}st(n).\mathrm{leader} \in \{\text{none}, \text{some } c\}st(n).leader∈{none,some c};
  • resp=st(n).responseresp = st(n).\mathrm{response}resp=st(n).response.

So the only deliveries are of the stored responses of the nodes willing to answer ccc.

  • hshshs: r.clusterState=sr.\mathrm{clusterState} = sr.clusterState=s.

Conclusion.

r.electionStarted=false  ∧  ∀ lr resp sender, handlePreVoteRequest(healthy(sender),st(sender),⟨c,t⟩)=ok(resp)→(handlePreVoteResponse(es,lr,r,resp,sender)).2.1=false.r.\mathrm{electionStarted} = \mathrm{false} \;\wedge\; \forall\, lr\ resp\ \mathit{sender},\ \mathrm{handlePreVoteRequest}(\mathit{healthy}(\mathit{sender}), st(\mathit{sender}), \langle c, t\rangle) = \mathrm{ok}(resp) \rightarrow \big(\mathrm{handlePreVoteResponse}(es, lr, r, resp, \mathit{sender})\big).2.1 = \mathrm{false}.r.electionStarted=false∧∀lr resp sender, handlePreVoteRequest(healthy(sender),st(sender),⟨c,t⟩)=ok(resp)→(handlePreVoteResponse(es,lr,r,resp,sender)).2.1=false.
  • (a) The round has never started an election.
  • (b) Handling one more response that some sender would genuinely give to ⟨c,t⟩\langle c, t\rangle⟨c,t⟩ does not start an election either, for any local response lrlrlr.

2. What is not constrained

  • The strategy. eseses is arbitrary, even non-monotone. The conclusion can hold for every strategy because the election quorum requires both configuration majorities, and hLhLhL blocks one of them. Here is my reading of why the hypotheses fit together (not a proof):

    • No node with an id in LLL can ever deliver.
    • So votes\mathrm{votes}votes stays disjoint from LLL.
    • A set disjoint from a strict majority of a duplicate-free configuration cannot itself be a strict majority of it.
  • The term ttt. It never matters, because the request handler does not read it.

  • The local node. r.localNoder.\mathrm{localNode}r.localNode is unconstrained, and it is not required to equal ccc. The node named as requester in the requests and the round's own local node may differ.

  • Nodes outside LLL. They are unconstrained. They may be healthy and leaderless, or follow ccc, and then they deliver and their votes count.

  • The list LLL. LLL may contain duplicates or ids outside both configurations. Only one of the two configurations needs to have its majority inside LLL.

  • The requester itself. If c.id∈Lc.\mathrm{id} \in Lc.id∈L, then hfollowhfollowhfollow also constrains ccc's own health and collector state: ccc must be unhealthy or follow another leader. If c.id∉Lc.\mathrm{id} \notin Lc.id∈/L, ccc's own answer is unconstrained.

  • Static model. Health and collector states are fixed functions for the entire round. They do not change while the round runs. All deliveries answer the same request ⟨c,t⟩\langle c, t\rangle⟨c,t⟩.

  • Scope. The statement concerns only the round's start flag.

    • It says nothing about the responders' updateMaxTermSeen. In Java, handlePreVoteRequest raises every responder's maxTermSeen to ttt (PreVoteCollector.java:134). That includes a current leader, which then moves to a higher term and starts an election itself when ttt exceeds its term (Coordinator.java:564–573). The module docstring places this outside the functions.
    • It says nothing about the effect of the round's own updateMaxTermSeen calls.
  • Vacuity. None. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable in a non-trivial way, which I checked by evaluation:

    • take configuration {1,2,3}\{1,2,3\}{1,2,3} in both slots and L=[1,2]L = [1,2]L=[1,2];
    • nodes with ids 111 and 222 follow leader ⟨9,true⟩\langle 9, \mathrm{true}\rangle⟨9,true⟩;
    • c=⟨3,true⟩c = \langle 3, \mathrm{true}\ranglec=⟨3,true⟩ is healthy with no leader;
    • ccc answers its own request, giving votes {3}\{3\}{3}: no quorum and no start.

    Also, hrhrhr and hshshs hold for start(s,n)\mathrm{start}(s, n)start(s,n) for any nnn.

3. Plain-language summary

Suppose a majority of either the last committed or the last accepted configuration of state sss consists of nodes that are unhealthy or already follow a leader other than ccc. Then no pre-voting round over sss that collects only genuine answers to ccc's request ever starts an election, and one more genuine answer would not start one either. The statement is about the round's quorum count with every node's state frozen. It does not cover Java's term-raising side effects of pre-vote requests.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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