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Instance classes of Theorems 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2

Definition
FixpReciprocal_Supplement_Classes

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsautobiddingcomputational-complexityfixpp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

This item fixes the instance classes of the paper's three auction theorems, on top of the published market models.

  1. ROI pacing (Theorem 5.2). A pacing market with nnn bidders, mmm items and nonnegative rational values vℓ,sv_{\ell,s}vℓ,s​ belongs to the class when n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, m≥1m\ge 1m≥1, and every item has a positive value to at least one bidder: max⁡ℓ∈[n]vℓ,s>0\max_{\ell\in[n]}v_{\ell,s}>0maxℓ∈[n]​vℓ,s​>0 for every s∈[m]s\in[m]s∈[m].
  2. GSP autobidding (Theorem 6.2). A GSP sponsored-shopping auction belongs to the class when there is one advertising slot per item (K=∣J∣K=|\mathcal J|K=∣J∣, the number of items) and every click-through rate equals 111.
  3. Throttling, fixed priority (Theorem 7.2). Ties between equal bids are broken by a fixed priority order, here the bidder index order: bidder 000 has the highest priority, then bidder 111, and so on.
  4. Throttling, sparse class (Theorem 7.2, hardness clause). Every item has at most three positive bids, and the positive bids on the same item are pairwise distinct.

Restricting the published search problems to these classes gives exactly the problems stated in Theorems 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2.

Formalization Note Each class is a predicate passed as the restriction argument of the published roiPacingProblemOn, budgetGSPProblemOn and throttlingProblemOn. The input of Theorem 7.2 is only the bids and budgets, so the priority is fixed rather than given; any fixed order becomes the index order after relabelling the bidders.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_ROIPacing
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_GSP
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_Throttling

namespace FixpReciprocal.Supplement

open ExactAutobid.Equilibria AutobiddingGSP.Approximation

/-- **The instances of Theorem 5.2**: `n ≥ 2` bidders, `m ≥ 1` items, and every item has a positive
value to at least one bidder (`max_ℓ v_{ℓ,s} > 0` for every `s`).

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), §5.1, p.16 and Theorem 5.2, p.17.

**Formalization Note.** Used as the restriction `R` of the published
`ExactAutobid.Equilibria.roiPacingProblemOn`, whose `WellFormed` already gives `n` rows of `m`
nonnegative rational values. -/
def ShimizuPacing (d : PacingData) : Prop :=
  2 ≤ d.nb ∧ 1 ≤ d.ng ∧ ∀ j : Fin d.ng, ∃ i : Fin d.nb, 0 < d.val i j

/-- **The instances of Theorem 6.2**: one advertising slot per item (`K = M`, the total number of
items) and click-through rate one at every slot.

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), §6.1, p.21 and Theorem 6.2, p.22.

**Formalization Note.** Used as the restriction `R` of the published
`ExactAutobid.Equilibria.budgetGSPProblemOn`. No bound on the number of items per bidder is
imposed. -/
def OneSlotUnitCTR (Au : Auction) : Prop :=
  Au.K = Au.vals.flatten.length ∧ ∀ q ∈ Au.ctr, q = 1

/-- **The fixed tie-breaking priority of Theorem 7.2**: bidders in index order, a lower index
having higher priority (`prio = [0, 1, …, n − 1]`).

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), §7.1, p.30 ("Ties are resolved by a fixed priority order").

**Formalization Note.** The input of Theorem 7.2 is only the bids and the budgets, so the priority is
not instance data: it is fixed to the index order (any fixed order is this one after relabelling the
bidders). -/
def IndexPriority (d : ThrottleData) : Prop :=
  d.prio = List.range d.nb

/-- **The sparse class of Theorem 7.2's hardness clause**: each item has at most three positive bids,
and the positive bids on the same item are pairwise distinct.

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 7.2, p.31. -/
def ThreeDistinctBids (d : ThrottleData) : Prop :=
  ∀ j : Fin d.ng, (Finset.univ.filter (fun i : Fin d.nb => 0 < d.bid i j)).card ≤ 3 ∧
    ∀ i k : Fin d.nb, 0 < d.bid i j → 0 < d.bid k j → d.bid i j = d.bid k j → i = k

end FixpReciprocal.Supplement
Source
Shimizu, FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions (STOC 2027 submission, sha256 ffcad4a7…), §5.1, p.16 (PDF p.18) and Theorem 5.2, p.17 (PDF p.19); §6.1, p.21 (PDF p.23) and Theorem 6.2, p.22 (PDF p.24); §7.1, p.30 (PDF p.32) and Theorem 7.2, p.31 (PDF p.33)

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