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Claim 5.7 — under truthfulness, putting ∞ outside an agent's optimal tasks does not lower the chosen make-span

Proved
AlgMechDesign.NonOptimal.claim_5_7

by mikedeng1 · Sep 28, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

mechanism-designp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1scheduling

Let x(⋅)x(\cdot)x(⋅) be an allocation algorithm for task scheduling such that the Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism based on x(⋅)x(\cdot)x(⋅) is truthful. Let ttt be a positive type vector, ooo an optimal allocation for ttt (written opt(t)\mathrm{opt}(t)opt(t) in the paper), and MMM a real number with M≥tjlM \ge t^l_jM≥tjl​ for all agents lll and tasks jjj. Fix an agent iii and let

tj′i={tjiif j∈oi,Motherwise,t'^i_j = \begin{cases} t^i_j & \text{if } j \in o^i,\\ M & \text{otherwise},\end{cases}tj′i​={tji​M​if j∈oi,otherwise,​

and let t′=(t′i,t−i)t' = (t'^i, t^{-i})t′=(t′i,t−i) be the type vector in which only agent iii's type is replaced. Then

g(x(t′),t′)  ≥  g(x(t),t).g\bigl(x(t'),t'\bigr) \;\ge\; g\bigl(x(t),t\bigr).g(x(t′),t′)≥g(x(t),t).

This is the claim inside the proof of Theorem 5.6. Its content is an incentive argument: if the inequality failed, an agent of true type tit^iti would profit from declaring t′it'^it′i (a lie the mechanism cannot detect), since its bonus is the negative make-span computed from its own actual times and the others' declarations. Iterating it over the agents gives Corollary 5.8.

Formalization Note The paper states the claim for agent 1; here it is stated for an arbitrary agent iii, which is what the iteration in Corollary 5.8 uses. The paper's "∞\infty∞ (an arbitrary high value)" is the real parameter MMM, required to be at least every entry of ttt so that t′i≥tit'^i \ge t^it′i≥ti entrywise. Truthfulness is in the sense of Definition 19 for mechanisms with verification (declaration plus execution plan).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AlgMechDesign_NonOptimal_Model

open Finset
Formal statement
namespace AlgMechDesign.NonOptimal

/-- Claim 5.7 (Nisan–Ronen, p. 192). If the Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism based on `alloc` is
truthful, `t` is a positive type vector, `o` an optimal allocation for `t` and `M` at least every
entry of `t`, then replacing agent `i`'s type by `offOpt t o M i` (`tⁱ_j` on `oⁱ`, `M`
elsewhere) does not decrease the make-span of the allocation chosen by `alloc`. -/
theorem claim_5_7 {n k : ℕ} [NeZero n] (alloc : (Fin n → Fin k → ℝ) → (Fin k → Fin n))
    (htruth : Truthful alloc) (t : Fin n → Fin k → ℝ) (ht : IsType t) (o : Fin k → Fin n)
    (ho : IsOptimalFor t o) (M : ℝ) (hM : ∀ i j, t i j ≤ M) (i : Fin n) :
    makespan t (alloc t) ≤
      makespan (Function.update t i (offOpt t o M i))
        (alloc (Function.update t i (offOpt t o M i))) := by sorry

end AlgMechDesign.NonOptimal
Source
Nisan, Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001, p. 192, Claim 5.7 (in the proof of Theorem 5.6)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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