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The published oracle is the V2 oracle with the code fixed

Proved
BitcoinScriptV2.legacyOracle_eq

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetcheckmultisigcodeseparatorconsensusfindanddeleteformal-verificationinterpreterscriptsighash

legacyOracle f tx nIn amount v sc = withCodeSig (legacyOracleV2 f tx nIn amount v) v sc, by definition.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinScriptV2
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinScript
open BitcoinScriptV2 BitcoinScript BitcoinSig BitcoinVerify
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinScriptV2.legacyOracle_eq (f : BitcoinSig.SigFlags) (tx : BitcoinSer.Tx) (nIn : Nat) (amount : Int)
    (v : BitcoinSig.SigVersion) (sc : BitcoinScript.Bytes) :
    BitcoinSig.legacyOracle f tx nIn amount v sc =
      BitcoinScriptV2.withCodeSig (BitcoinScriptV2.legacyOracleV2 f tx nIn amount v) v sc := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: EvalScript (pbegincodehash, OP_CODESEPARATOR at interpreter.cpp:1058-1066, OP_CHECKSIG's scriptCode and FindAndDelete at :339-343 / the CHECKSIG case, OP_CHECKMULTISIG's deletion of every signature at :1152-1159), SignatureHash (SigVersion::BASE), VerifyScript (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); Core's script_tests.json, tx_valid.json, tx_invalid.json at the same revision
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinScriptV2.legacyOracle_eq

Statement. For all signature flags ggg (four arbitrary booleans dersig,lowS,strictenc,witnessPubkeyType\mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{lowS}, \mathrm{strictenc}, \mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}dersig,lowS,strictenc,witnessPubkeyType), every transaction tx\mathit{tx}tx, input index nin∈Nn_{\mathrm{in}} \in \mathbb Nnin​∈N, amount a∈Za \in \mathbb Za∈Z, signature version vvv (base\mathsf{base}base or witnessV0\mathsf{witnessV0}witnessV0) and byte string sc\mathit{sc}sc, the two published oracles are equal:

legacyOracle(g,tx,nin,a,v,sc)=withCodeSig(legacyOracleV2(g,tx,nin,a,v), v, sc).\mathrm{legacyOracle}(g, \mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v, \mathit{sc}) = \mathrm{withCodeSig}\big(\mathrm{legacyOracleV2}(g, \mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v),\ v,\ \mathit{sc}\big).legacyOracle(g,tx,nin​,a,v,sc)=withCodeSig(legacyOracleV2(g,tx,nin​,a,v), v, sc).

This is equality of the whole eight-component structures, with function components equal as functions. Unfolded, the components are: the same five hash functions and lock-time/sequence checks on both sides, and signature checks which for every (sig,pk)(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk})(sig,pk) are, on the left, "none\mathsf{none}none if the signature- or public-key-encoding check fails, else some\mathsf{some}some of the ECDSA check with script code sc′\mathit{sc}'sc′", where sc′=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig))\mathit{sc}' = \mathrm{FD}(\mathit{sc}, \mathrm{pushBytes}(\mathit{sig}))sc′=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig)) for base\mathsf{base}base and sc\mathit{sc}sc for witnessV0\mathsf{witnessV0}witnessV0; on the right, legacyOracleV2\mathrm{legacyOracleV2}legacyOracleV2's check applied to the script code fadSig(v,sc,sig)\mathrm{fadSig}(v, \mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig})fadSig(v,sc,sig), which is the same encoding tests followed by the same ECDSA check on that script code. No hypotheses.


Unfolded definitions used above

Basic objects and notation

  • A byte is an 8-bit word, identified with its value in {0,…,255}\{0,\dots,255\}{0,…,255} and written in hexadecimal (e.g. 0xab\texttt{0xab}0xab). B∗\mathcal B^*B∗ is the set of finite byte strings (lists of bytes); ∣x∣|x|∣x∣ is the length, x+ ⁣ ⁣+yx \mathbin{+\!\!+} yx++y concatenation, ε\varepsilonε the empty string.
  • takek(x)\mathrm{take}_k(x)takek​(x) is the first min⁡(k,∣x∣)\min(k,|x|)min(k,∣x∣) entries of a list xxx; dropk(x)\mathrm{drop}_k(x)dropk​(x) is what is left after removing the first kkk entries, which is the empty list when k≥∣x∣k \ge |x|k≥∣x∣.
  • For a 0-based index ppp, the statement "x[p]=cx[p] = cx[p]=c" means: p<∣x∣p < |x|p<∣x∣ and the entry of xxx at index ppp is ccc. Indexing out of range yields no value, so such an equation can only hold with p<∣x∣p<|x|p<∣x∣.
  • A partial result is either none\mathsf{none}none or some(y)\mathsf{some}(y)some(y). Applying a function ggg "under some\mathsf{some}some" (mapg\mathrm{map}_gmapg​) sends none↦none\mathsf{none}\mapsto\mathsf{none}none↦none and some(y)↦some(g(y))\mathsf{some}(y)\mapsto\mathsf{some}(g(y))some(y)↦some(g(y)).
  • An instruction is either push(d)\mathrm{push}(d)push(d), carrying a data string d∈B∗d\in\mathcal B^*d∈B∗, or op(c)\mathrm{op}(c)op(c), carrying an opcode byte ccc. A script (parsed) is a finite list of instructions.
  • Opcode bytes named below: OP_16=0x60\texttt{OP\_16}=\texttt{0x60}OP_16=0x60, OP_IF=0x63\texttt{OP\_IF}=\texttt{0x63}OP_IF=0x63, OP_ENDIF=0x68\texttt{OP\_ENDIF}=\texttt{0x68}OP_ENDIF=0x68, OP_CODESEPARATOR=0xab\texttt{OP\_CODESEPARATOR}=\texttt{0xab}OP_CODESEPARATOR=0xab, OP_CHECKSIG=0xac\texttt{OP\_CHECKSIG}=\texttt{0xac}OP_CHECKSIG=0xac, OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY=0xad\texttt{OP\_CHECKSIGVERIFY}=\texttt{0xad}OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY=0xad, OP_CHECKMULTISIG=0xae\texttt{OP\_CHECKMULTISIG}=\texttt{0xae}OP_CHECKMULTISIG=0xae, OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY=0xaf\texttt{OP\_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY}=\texttt{0xaf}OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY=0xaf.
  • A signature version vvv is one of exactly two values: base\mathsf{base}base (legacy) or witnessV0\mathsf{witnessV0}witnessV0.

Reading one instruction from bytes: getOp\mathrm{getOp}getOp

getOp(x)\mathrm{getOp}(x)getOp(x) returns either none\mathsf{none}none or some(i,y)\mathsf{some}(i, y)some(i,y) with iii an instruction and yyy the remaining bytes:

  • x=εx = \varepsilonx=ε: none\mathsf{none}none.
  • Otherwise let bbb be the first byte and y0y_0y0​ the rest.
    • If b≤0x4eb \le \texttt{0x4e}b≤0x4e (a push opcode), a data length nnn and a position are determined: if b<0x4cb < \texttt{0x4c}b<0x4c, n=bn = bn=b and the data starts right after bbb; if b=0x4cb = \texttt{0x4c}b=0x4c, nnn is the next byte (none\mathsf{none}none if there is none); if b=0x4db = \texttt{0x4d}b=0x4d, nnn is the little-endian value of the next 2 bytes (none\mathsf{none}none if fewer than 2 remain); if b=0x4eb=\texttt{0x4e}b=0x4e, nnn is the little-endian value of the next 4 bytes (none\mathsf{none}none if fewer than 4 remain). Then, if fewer than nnn bytes remain, none\mathsf{none}none; otherwise some(push(next n bytes), the bytes after them)\mathsf{some}(\mathrm{push}(\text{next } n \text{ bytes}),\ \text{the bytes after them})some(push(next n bytes), the bytes after them). (So b=0x00b=\texttt{0x00}b=0x00 gives push(ε)\mathrm{push}(\varepsilon)push(ε).)
    • If b>0x4eb > \texttt{0x4e}b>0x4e: some(op(b),y0)\mathsf{some}(\mathrm{op}(b), y_0)some(op(b),y0​).

On success the remainder is a suffix of xxx that is at least one byte shorter than xxx. getOp\mathrm{getOp}getOp never returns op(c)\mathrm{op}(c)op(c) with c≤0x4ec \le \texttt{0x4e}c≤0x4e.

Signature-push deletion: pushBytes\mathrm{pushBytes}pushBytes, findAndDelete\mathrm{findAndDelete}findAndDelete, fadSig\mathrm{fadSig}fadSig, fadAll\mathrm{fadAll}fadAll

  • pushBytes(d)\mathrm{pushBytes}(d)pushBytes(d), the canonical push of ddd: if ∣d∣<0x4c|d| < \texttt{0x4c}∣d∣<0x4c it is the byte ∣d∣|d|∣d∣ followed by ddd; else if ∣d∣≤255|d| \le 255∣d∣≤255 it is 0x4c\texttt{0x4c}0x4c, the byte ∣d∣|d|∣d∣, then ddd; else if ∣d∣≤65535|d| \le 65535∣d∣≤65535 it is 0x4d\texttt{0x4d}0x4d, ∣d∣|d|∣d∣ as 2 little-endian bytes, then ddd; otherwise 0x4e\texttt{0x4e}0x4e, ∣d∣ mod 232|d| \bmod 2^{32}∣d∣mod232 as 4 little-endian bytes, then ddd. It is never empty (pushBytes(ε)=[0x00]\mathrm{pushBytes}(\varepsilon) = [\texttt{0x00}]pushBytes(ε)=[0x00]).
  • findAndDelete(x,b)\mathrm{findAndDelete}(x, b)findAndDelete(x,b) returns a pair (resulting string, count); only the first component (written FD(x,b)\mathrm{FD}(x,b)FD(x,b)) is used here. If b=εb = \varepsilonb=ε the result is (x,0)(x, 0)(x,0). Otherwise xxx is scanned from the start: at the current instruction boundary, copies of bbb are removed as long as the remaining string begins with bbb (each removal counted); then one instruction is read with getOp\mathrm{getOp}getOp: if that fails, the whole remaining string is kept verbatim and the scan stops; if it succeeds, that instruction's bytes are kept and the scan continues right after it. The result is the concatenation of the kept bytes. (The recursion carries fuel ∣x∣+1|x|+1∣x∣+1, and when fuel is exhausted the remaining bytes are kept verbatim; every iteration of the scan consumes at least one byte.)
  • fadSig(v,sc,sig)\mathrm{fadSig}(v, \mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig})fadSig(v,sc,sig):
fadSig(base,sc,sig)=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig)),fadSig(witnessV0,sc,sig)=sc.\mathrm{fadSig}(\mathsf{base}, \mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}) = \mathrm{FD}\big(\mathit{sc}, \mathrm{pushBytes}(\mathit{sig})\big), \qquad \mathrm{fadSig}(\mathsf{witnessV0}, \mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}) = \mathit{sc}.fadSig(base,sc,sig)=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig)),fadSig(witnessV0,sc,sig)=sc.
  • fadAll(v,sc,[σ1,…,σm])\mathrm{fadAll}(v, \mathit{sc}, [\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_m])fadAll(v,sc,[σ1​,…,σm​]) is the left fold of fadSig(v,⋅,⋅)\mathrm{fadSig}(v,\cdot,\cdot)fadSig(v,⋅,⋅) over the list, in list order:
fadAll(v,sc,[σ1,…,σm])=fadSig(v,⋯fadSig(v,fadSig(v,sc,σ1),σ2)⋯ ,σm),\mathrm{fadAll}(v, \mathit{sc}, [\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_m]) = \mathrm{fadSig}\big(v, \cdots \mathrm{fadSig}(v, \mathrm{fadSig}(v, \mathit{sc}, \sigma_1), \sigma_2) \cdots, \sigma_m\big),fadAll(v,sc,[σ1​,…,σm​])=fadSig(v,⋯fadSig(v,fadSig(v,sc,σ1​),σ2​)⋯,σm​),

and fadAll(v,sc,[ ])=sc\mathrm{fadAll}(v, \mathit{sc}, [\,]) = \mathit{sc}fadAll(v,sc,[])=sc.

Oracles

  • A published oracle OOO consists of five functions B∗→B∗\mathcal B^*\to\mathcal B^*B∗→B∗ (RIPEMD-160, SHA-1, SHA-256, HASH160, HASH256), a function O.checkSig(sig,pk)∈{none,some(true),some(false)}O.\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) \in \{\mathsf{none}, \mathsf{some}(\mathrm{true}), \mathsf{some}(\mathrm{false})\}O.checkSig(sig,pk)∈{none,some(true),some(false)}, and two predicates checkLockTime,checkSequence:Z→{true,false}\mathrm{checkLockTime}, \mathrm{checkSequence} : \mathbb Z \to \{\mathrm{true},\mathrm{false}\}checkLockTime,checkSequence:Z→{true,false}.
  • A V2 oracle ooo has the same five hash functions and two predicates, but its signature check takes a script code as an extra first argument: o.checkSig(sc,sig,pk)∈{none,some(true),some(false)}o.\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) \in \{\mathsf{none}, \mathsf{some}(\mathrm{true}), \mathsf{some}(\mathrm{false})\}o.checkSig(sc,sig,pk)∈{none,some(true),some(false)}. All components are arbitrary functions.
  • toOracle(o)\mathrm{toOracle}(o)toOracle(o): the published oracle with ooo's hashes and predicates and the signature check that always returns none\mathsf{none}none.
  • withCode(o,sc)\mathrm{withCode}(o, \mathit{sc})withCode(o,sc): toOracle(o)\mathrm{toOracle}(o)toOracle(o) with signature check (sig,pk)↦o.checkSig(sc,sig,pk)(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) \mapsto o.\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk})(sig,pk)↦o.checkSig(sc,sig,pk).
  • withCodeSig(o,v,sc)\mathrm{withCodeSig}(o, v, \mathit{sc})withCodeSig(o,v,sc): toOracle(o)\mathrm{toOracle}(o)toOracle(o) with signature check (sig,pk)↦o.checkSig(fadSig(v,sc,sig),sig,pk)(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) \mapsto o.\mathrm{checkSig}\big(\mathrm{fadSig}(v, \mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}), \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}\big)(sig,pk)↦o.checkSig(fadSig(v,sc,sig),sig,pk).

Concrete oracles

  • Signature flags g=(g.dersig,g.lowS,g.strictenc,g.witnessPubkeyType)g = (g.\mathrm{dersig}, g.\mathrm{lowS}, g.\mathrm{strictenc}, g.\mathrm{witnessPubkeyType})g=(g.dersig,g.lowS,g.strictenc,g.witnessPubkeyType), four booleans. SigEncg(sig)\mathrm{SigEnc}_g(\mathit{sig})SigEncg​(sig) (signature-encoding check): true if sig=ε\mathit{sig} = \varepsilonsig=ε; false if one of dersig,lowS,strictenc\mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{lowS}, \mathrm{strictenc}dersig,lowS,strictenc is set and sig\mathit{sig}sig is not strict DER plus a hash-type byte; false if lowS\mathrm{lowS}lowS is set and the signature does not have low SSS; false if strictenc\mathrm{strictenc}strictenc is set and the hash type is undefined; true otherwise. PkEncg,v(pk)\mathrm{PkEnc}_{g,v}(\mathit{pk})PkEncg,v​(pk) (public-key encoding check): false if strictenc\mathrm{strictenc}strictenc is set and pk\mathit{pk}pk is not a 33-byte compressed (02/03\texttt{02}/\texttt{03}02/03) or 65-byte uncompressed (04\texttt{04}04) key; false if witnessPubkeyType\mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}witnessPubkeyType is set, v=witnessV0v=\mathsf{witnessV0}v=witnessV0 and pk\mathit{pk}pk is not compressed; true otherwise.
  • ECDSA(tx,nin,a,v,sig,pk,sc)\mathrm{ECDSA}(\mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}, \mathit{sc})ECDSA(tx,nin​,a,v,sig,pk,sc) (the transaction checker's ECDSA check, with tx\mathit{tx}tx a transaction, nin∈Nn_{\mathrm{in}}\in\mathbb Nnin​∈N an input index, a∈Za\in\mathbb Za∈Z an amount): false if pk\mathit{pk}pk's length does not match its header byte or sig=ε\mathit{sig} = \varepsilonsig=ε; otherwise the last byte of sig\mathit{sig}sig is the hash type, the signature hash of tx\mathit{tx}tx for input ninn_{\mathrm{in}}nin​ with script code sc\mathit{sc}sc is computed (legacy algorithm for base\mathsf{base}base, BIP143 algorithm with amount aaa for witnessV0\mathsf{witnessV0}witnessV0), the result is false if v=witnessV0v = \mathsf{witnessV0}v=witnessV0 and a<0a < 0a<0, and otherwise it is the secp256k1 ECDSA verification of sig\mathit{sig}sig without its last byte against pk\mathit{pk}pk and that hash.
  • legacyOracleV2(g,tx,nin,a,v)\mathrm{legacyOracleV2}(g, \mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v)legacyOracleV2(g,tx,nin​,a,v) is the V2 oracle with Bitcoin Core's RIPEMD-160, SHA-1, SHA-256, HASH160, HASH256, the lock-time and sequence checks of tx\mathit{tx}tx at input ninn_{\mathrm{in}}nin​, and
checkSig(sc,sig,pk)=noneif ¬SigEncg(sig) or ¬PkEncg,v(pk),\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) = \mathsf{none} \quad \text{if } \neg\mathrm{SigEnc}_g(\mathit{sig}) \text{ or } \neg\mathrm{PkEnc}_{g,v}(\mathit{pk}),checkSig(sc,sig,pk)=noneif ¬SigEncg​(sig) or ¬PkEncg,v​(pk),

and otherwise

checkSig(sc,sig,pk)=some(ECDSA(tx,nin,a,v,sig,pk,sc)).\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sc}, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}) = \mathsf{some}\big(\mathrm{ECDSA}(\mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}, \mathit{sc})\big).checkSig(sc,sig,pk)=some(ECDSA(tx,nin​,a,v,sig,pk,sc)).

The script code sc\mathit{sc}sc is used as given (no deletion inside the oracle).

  • legacyOracle(g,tx,nin,a,v,sc)\mathrm{legacyOracle}(g, \mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v, \mathit{sc})legacyOracle(g,tx,nin​,a,v,sc) is the published oracle with the same hashes and lock-time/sequence checks and signature check checkSigPreTapscript\mathrm{checkSigPreTapscript}checkSigPreTapscript: for (sig,pk)(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk})(sig,pk), let sc′=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig))\mathit{sc}' = \mathrm{FD}(\mathit{sc}, \mathrm{pushBytes}(\mathit{sig}))sc′=FD(sc,pushBytes(sig)) if v=basev=\mathsf{base}v=base and sc′=sc\mathit{sc}' = \mathit{sc}sc′=sc if v=witnessV0v = \mathsf{witnessV0}v=witnessV0; the result is none\mathsf{none}none if ¬SigEncg(sig)\neg\mathrm{SigEnc}_g(\mathit{sig})¬SigEncg​(sig) or ¬PkEncg,v(pk)\neg\mathrm{PkEnc}_{g,v}(\mathit{pk})¬PkEncg,v​(pk), and some(ECDSA(tx,nin,a,v,sig,pk,sc′))\mathsf{some}(\mathrm{ECDSA}(\mathit{tx}, n_{\mathrm{in}}, a, v, \mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk}, \mathit{sc}'))some(ECDSA(tx,nin​,a,v,sig,pk,sc′)) otherwise.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 30, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 30, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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