Sect. 2 — a correlated strategy pair is a c.e. iff its distribution satisfies (2.2)
ProvedAumann1987.TwoPerson.ce_iff_distr_devCondcorrelated-equilibriumgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be finite action sets with payoffs , let be a finite probability space, and let be a correlated strategy pair with distribution . Then is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if and only if
This makes precise the paper's remark that correlated strategy -tuples "can for most practical purposes be identified with their distributions": whether is an equilibrium depends on only through its distribution.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_TwoPerson_Model open Finset
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.TwoPerson
/-- **Identification with distributions** (Aumann 1987, Sect. 2, p. 4, PDF p. 5: "Much like mixed
strategies, correlated strategy n-tuples can for most practical purposes be identified with their
distributions"). A correlated strategy pair `(f₁, f₂)` on the finite probability space `(Γ, μ)` is
a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1, (2.2)) if and only if its distribution `p = distr μ f₁ f₂`
satisfies both players' equilibrium conditions written on distributions.
Formalization Note: two players (the case of Proposition 2.3); deviations are `φ ∘ fⁱ`. -/
theorem ce_iff_distr_devCond {S₁ S₂ : Type*} [Fintype S₁] [Fintype S₂]
[DecidableEq S₁] [DecidableEq S₂] (h₁ h₂ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ)
{Γ : Type*} [Fintype Γ] (μ : Γ → ℝ) (hμ : IsProbVec μ) (f₁ : Γ → S₁) (f₂ : Γ → S₂) :
IsCE h₁ h₂ μ f₁ f₂ ↔
DevCond₁ h₁ (distr μ f₁ f₂) ∧ DevCond₂ h₂ (distr μ f₁ f₂) := by sorry
end Aumann1987.TwoPerson
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 4 (PDF p. 5), Sect. 2, identification of correlated strategy n-tuples with their distributions
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.