Step (iii): the best layer has welfare at least OPT*/(3k)
ProvedComplementFreeCA.CFRounding.best_layer_boundapproximation-algorithmscombinatorial-auctionsp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1subadditive-valuations
Let be normalized, complement-free valuations, let be any point with LP value , and let . Let be a preallocation in which every item appears in at most bundles and
If with maximizes over , then
With optimal, , and this is the bound of step (iii) of the proof of Theorem 3.1: the best layer is a feasible allocation within a factor of the fractional optimum.
Formalization Note The statement holds for any whose value satisfies the displayed hypothesis; optimality of is not needed for this step.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_CFRounding_Auction import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_CFRounding_LP import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_CFRounding_Algorithm
Formal statement
namespace ComplementFreeCA.CFRounding
theorem best_layer_bound {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
(hnorm : ∀ i, IsNormalized (v i)) (hsub : ∀ i, IsSubadditive (v i))
(x : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (σ : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) (k : ℕ) (hk : 1 ≤ k)
(hcount : ∀ j, count σ j ≤ k) (hval : lpValue v x / 3 ≤ welfare v σ)
(r : ℕ) (hr : IsBestLayer v σ k r) :
lpValue v x / (3 * k) ≤ welfare v (fun i => layer σ i r) := by sorry
end ComplementFreeCA.CFRounding
Source
Dobzinski, Nisan, Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010, p. 6, §3.1, proof of Theorem 3.1, step (iii)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.