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Ex-post utility of bidder iii with values viv_ivi​ reporting vi′v'_ivi′​

Definition
DSICCompComp_Supplement_interimIntegrand

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

competition-complexitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization

Consider nnn additive bidders and mmm items, and a mechanism with ex-post allocation rule xij(⋅)x_{ij}(\cdot)xij​(⋅) (the probability that bidder iii receives item jjj) and payment rule pi(⋅)p_i(\cdot)pi​(⋅). For a bidder iii, her true value vector vi∈R≥0mv_i \in \mathbb R_{\ge 0}^mvi​∈R≥0m​, a report vi′∈R≥0mv'_i \in \mathbb R_{\ge 0}^mvi′​∈R≥0m​ and a value profile vvv whose entries other than the iii-th give the reports v−iv_{-i}v−i​ of the other bidders, the bidder's ex-post utility is

ui(vi→vi′; v−i)  =  ∑j=1mxij(vi′,v−i) vij  −  pi(vi′,v−i).u_i(v_i \to v'_i;\, v_{-i}) \;=\; \sum_{j=1}^m x_{ij}(v'_i, v_{-i})\, v_{ij} \;-\; p_i(v'_i, v_{-i}).ui​(vi​→vi′​;v−i​)=j=1∑m​xij​(vi′​,v−i​)vij​−pi​(vi′​,v−i​).

Its expectation over v−i∼Dn−1v_{-i} \sim D^{n-1}v−i​∼Dn−1 is the interim utility that appears in the Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.

Formalization Note Mechanisms are the published MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m); bidders and items are 0-based. The profile (vi′,v−i)(v'_i, v_{-i})(vi′​,v−i​) is Function.update v i vi', so the iii-th entry of v is ignored.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_MultiBuyer_Model

open scoped NNReal

namespace DSICCompComp

namespace Supplement

/-- The ex-post utility of bidder `i` with true values `v_i` (here `vi`) when she reports `v'_i`
(here `vi'`) and the other bidders report `v_{-i}`, read off a full profile `v`:
`∑_j x_ij(v'_i, v_{-i}) · v_ij − p_i(v'_i, v_{-i})` (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Section 2, BIC and BIR, pp.5–6 (pdf pp.6–7)). Its expectation over `v_{-i} ∼ D^{n-1}` is the
interim utility in the BIC/BIR constraints.

**Formalization Note** Mechanisms are the published `MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m)`
(`q v i j` = probability that bidder `i` gets item `j`, `s v i` = her payment); bidders and items
are 0-based. The deviation profile `(v'_i, v_{-i})` is `Function.update v i vi'`, so the `i`-th
coordinate of `v` is ignored; values are in `ℝ≥0`. -/
def interimIntegrand {n m : ℕ} (M : MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m)) (i : Fin n)
    (vi vi' : Fin m → ℝ≥0) (v : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ≥0) : ℝ :=
  ∑ j, M.q (Function.update v i vi') i j * (vi j : ℝ) - M.s (Function.update v i vi') i

end Supplement

end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Section 2, BIC and BIR, pp.5–6 (pdf pp.6–7)

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