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Passive secure AND from password identification

Proved
QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P14.passive_and_reduction

by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

Let an identification execution have correctness error at most δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 and passive statistical privacy error at most ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0. A local view includes the publicly announced accept/reject decision. Privacy means that at a fixed local password, the views for any two different, unequal other passwords have trace distance at most ε\varepsilonε. Choose three distinct passwords w0,w0′,w1w_0,w'_0,w_1w0​,w0′​,w1​. Alice encodes input aaa by w0w_0w0​ or w1w_1w1​; Bob encodes bbb by w0′w'_0w0′​ or w1w_1w1​, respectively. Both output the identification decision DDD. Then

Pr⁡[D=a∧b]≥1−δ.\Pr[D=a\land b]\ge1-\delta.Pr[D=a∧b]≥1−δ.

The two players have the same output law. For Alice, any two input pairs with the same aaa and the same ideal AND output have local views at trace distance at most ε\varepsilonε; the corresponding statement holds for Bob at fixed bbb. Thus the executed reduction preserves passive correctness and statistical privacy. The input maps are prescribed; this statement makes no claim about malicious deviations.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakenext100_P14
Formal statement
noncomputable section

namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P14

open scoped Matrix ComplexConjugate

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Dependency50.P47 (Law)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Gap48.P11 (blockMatrix cqDistance)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Claimed50.P31 (bb84Vector)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Advance50.P05 (RectangularInstrument)

attribute [local instance] Classical.propDecidable

attribute [local instance] Classical.decEq

/-- Positive list length and inhabited fibers supply the tagged union's inhabitant.
This derived instance adds no hypothesis to Lemma 2.2. -/
local instance {m : ℕ} [NeZero m] {A : Fin m → Type*}
    [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] : Nonempty (Sigma A) :=
  ⟨⟨0, Classical.choice (inferInstance : Nonempty (A 0))⟩⟩

/-- PDF p.3, unnumbered passive AND reduction. Both parties receive the
identification decision. Correctness and full-view privacy are preserved for
the prescribed maps; no malicious-security claim is made. -/
theorem passive_and_reduction
    {W EA EB : Type*} [Fintype EA] [Fintype EB]
    (P : PassiveExecution W EA EB) (wzero wzeroOther wone : W)
    (hzero : wzero ≠ wzeroOther) (hleft : wzero ≠ wone)
    (hright : wzeroOther ≠ wone) (delta epsilon : ℝ)
    (hsecurity : PassiveEqualitySecurity P delta epsilon) :
    (∀ a b : Bool,
      blockMass (P.bob (andPassword wzero wone a)
        (andPassword wzeroOther wone b)) (a && b) ≥ 1 - delta ∧
      ∀ t, blockMass (P.alice (andPassword wzero wone a)
        (andPassword wzeroOther wone b)) t =
        blockMass (P.bob (andPassword wzero wone a)
          (andPassword wzeroOther wone b)) t) ∧
    (∀ a b c : Bool, (a && b) = (a && c) →
      cqDistance (P.alice (andPassword wzero wone a) (andPassword wzeroOther wone b))
        (P.alice (andPassword wzero wone a) (andPassword wzeroOther wone c)) ≤ epsilon) ∧
    (∀ b a c : Bool, (a && b) = (c && b) →
      cqDistance (P.bob (andPassword wzero wone a) (andPassword wzeroOther wone b))
        (P.bob (andPassword wzero wone c) (andPassword wzeroOther wone b)) ≤ epsilon) := by sorry

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P14

end
Source
Secure Identification and QKD in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model, arXiv:0708.2557v3, PDF p. 3, §1, unnumbered: passive-secure AND reduction
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

Let WWW be any type, let EA,EBE_A,E_BEA​,EB​ be finite types, and let PPP supply Boolean-indexed matrix families Au,vA_{u,v}Au,v​ and Bu,vB_{u,v}Bu,v​ on these respective spaces. For such a family RRR, let R^\widehat RR be the block diagonal matrix with blocks RtR^tRt, let mR(t)=Re⁡tr⁡Rtm_R(t)=\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}R^tmR​(t)=RetrRt, and let D(R,S)=12Re⁡tr⁡(R^−S^)†(R^−S^)D(R,S)=\frac12\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}\sqrt{(\widehat R-\widehat S)^\dagger(\widehat R-\widehat S)}D(R,S)=21​Retr(R−S)†(R−S)​. Choose three pairwise distinct elements w0,w0′,w1∈Ww_0,w'_0,w_1\in Ww0​,w0′​,w1​∈W, and real numbers δ,ϵ\delta,\epsilonδ,ϵ. Assume δ,ϵ≥0\delta,\epsilon\ge0δ,ϵ≥0; every A^u,v,B^u,v\widehat A_{u,v},\widehat B_{u,v}Au,v​,Bu,v​ is positive semidefinite of trace 111; their Boolean masses agree; mBu,v(1u=v)≥1−δm_{B_{u,v}}(\mathbf1_{u=v})\ge1-\deltamBu,v​​(1u=v​)≥1−δ; D(Au,v,Au,z)≤ϵD(A_{u,v},A_{u,z})\le\epsilonD(Au,v​,Au,z​)≤ϵ whenever v,z≠uv,z\ne uv,z=u; and D(Bu,v,Bz,v)≤ϵD(B_{u,v},B_{z,v})\le\epsilonD(Bu,v​,Bz,v​)≤ϵ whenever u,z≠vu,z\ne vu,z=v. Define u(a)=w1u(a)=w_1u(a)=w1​ if aaa is true and w0w_0w0​ otherwise, and v(b)=w1v(b)=w_1v(b)=w1​ if bbb is true and w0′w'_0w0′​ otherwise. Then, for all Boolean a,ba,ba,b,

mBu(a),v(b)(a∧b)≥1−δ,mAu(a),v(b)(t)=mBu(a),v(b)(t)for every Boolean t.m_{B_{u(a),v(b)}}(a\land b)\ge1-\delta, \qquad m_{A_{u(a),v(b)}}(t)=m_{B_{u(a),v(b)}}(t)\quad\text{for every Boolean }t.mBu(a),v(b)​​(a∧b)≥1−δ,mAu(a),v(b)​​(t)=mBu(a),v(b)​​(t)for every Boolean t.

Moreover, for all Boolean a,b,ca,b,ca,b,c, equality a∧b=a∧ca\land b=a\land ca∧b=a∧c implies D(Au(a),v(b),Au(a),v(c))≤ϵD(A_{u(a),v(b)},A_{u(a),v(c)})\le\epsilonD(Au(a),v(b)​,Au(a),v(c)​)≤ϵ; and for all Boolean b,a,cb,a,cb,a,c, equality a∧b=c∧ba\land b=c\land ba∧b=c∧b implies D(Bu(a),v(b),Bu(c),v(b))≤ϵD(B_{u(a),v(b)},B_{u(c),v(b)})\le\epsilonD(Bu(a),v(b)​,Bu(c),v(b)​)≤ϵ. These implications include cases where the two compared input pairs are identical.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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