The combinatorial auction's value is a coalitional value function: zero without the auctioneer and monotone in the coalition
ProvedSupplyChainTheory.cap_value_is_coalitionalauctionscombinatorial-auctionscooperative-gamesoperations-research
For any valuations of the bidders for the bundles of objects, the function , the optimal value of the auctioneer's allocation problem restricted to the bidders of (and when the auctioneer is not in ), is a coalitional value function: it vanishes on coalitions without the auctioneer and is monotone, since an allocation among the bidders of is an allocation among those of any larger coalition. These are the two properties of that Lemma 15.1 and Theorems 15.2 and 15.3 use.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_auctions
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory
theorem cap_value_is_coalitional {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) :
IsCoalitionalValue (capValue v) := by sorry
end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, pp. 605-606, Sect. 15.4.3, the definition of the coalitional value function V(T) ('In other words, V(T) is the optimal objective function value of the auctioneer's problem in the VCG auction, with N replaced by T \ 0')
Human review
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