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Tight one-parity information bound

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QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77.tight_parity_bound

by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Fix an unrestricted joint unitary attack on the 2n2n2n ideal two-level signals and a probe initially in a fixed pure basis state. Fix the preparation/measurement bases, a balanced test/information partition, and announced test strings iT,jTi_T,j_TiT​,jT​ whose probability is positive. Symmetrize the attack coherently by Eq. (2), then condition on this test outcome using its actual probability. Write Ei,jE_{i,j}Ei,j​ for the resulting normalized information-register probe coefficients, with Alice's nnn information bits uniform. These coefficients are constructed from the unitary, rather than postulated to have any Fourier or information property. The public classical channel is unjammable and Eve has access only to the quantum channel and the public transcript.

For an information input iii, put ϕi=∑jEi,j⊗∣i⊕j⟩\phi_i=\sum_j E_{i,j}\otimes|i\oplus j\rangleϕi​=∑j​Ei,j​⊗∣i⊕j⟩, ηl=2−n∑i(−1)l⋅iϕi\eta_l=2^{-n}\sum_i(-1)^{l\cdot i}\phi_iηl​=2−n∑i​(−1)l⋅iϕi​, and dl2=∥ηl∥2d_l^2=\|\eta_l\|^2dl2​=∥ηl​∥2. Dot products are modulo two and inner products conjugate the first argument.

Let C⊆F2nC\subseteq\mathbb F_2^nC⊆F2n​ be the binary linear code and let S=C⊥S=C^\perpS=C⊥ be the span of all disclosed parity rows. Equivalently the parity check matrix is a basis of SSS, so is full rank. Fix an announced syndrome coset i0+Ci_0+Ci0​+C and use its uniform distribution, independently of the fixed public code choice. Let v∉Sv\notin Sv∈/S be the PA mask, put v^=min⁡w∈S∣v⊕w∣\widehat v=\min_{w\in S}|v\oplus w|v=minw∈S​∣v⊕w∣, and let SDvSD_vSDv​ be the supremum, over all finite POVMs, of mutual information in bits on the purified states ∣ϕi⟩⟨ϕi∣|\phi_i\rangle\langle\phi_i|∣ϕi​⟩⟨ϕi​∣ about v⋅iv\cdot iv⋅i. Thus both parity classes are nonempty and equally likely. Disclosed other PA bits, when present, are included in SSS.

For every real α>0\alpha>0α>0,

SDv≤α+1α∑2∣l∣≥v^dl2.SD_v\le\alpha+\frac1\alpha\sum_{2|l|\ge\widehat v}d_l^2.SDv​≤α+α1​2∣l∣≥v∑​dl2​.

The bound includes the announced syndrome and any other disclosed key bits. It avoids an exponential prefactor in the number of disclosed parity rows.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakenext100_P77
Formal statement
noncomputable section

namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77

open scoped BigOperators ComplexConjugate ComplexOrder

open QAlgorithms

-- The repair instruction authorizes imports of pinned accepted definitions.
-- These are definitions only; no imported paper theorem is used here.

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Dependency50.P47 (Law)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P04 (Measurement)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P27 (shannon)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P39 (pushLaw)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P16 (trivialMeasurement)

attribute [local instance] Classical.propDecidable Classical.decEq

/-- Lemma 3.3, PDF p.8, Eq.(6), restated as Lemma G.1, p.22, Eq.(28): tight
fair-parity information bound for the purified ensemble. C-perp includes every
disclosed ECC/other PA row;
i0+C is the uniform announced syndrome coset, not an arbitrary prior. -/
theorem tight_parity_bound {n d : ℕ} (hn : 1 ≤ n)
    (U : Matrix.unitaryGroup (Fin d × Qubits (n + n)) ℂ) (e0 : Fin d)
    (iT jT : Qubits n)
    (hpos : 0 < testProbability (coherentBitSymmetrize (attackProbes U e0)) iT jT (fun _ => false))
    (C : Submodule (ZMod 2) (Fin n → ZMod 2)) (i0 v : Fin n → ZMod 2)
    (hv : v ∉ binDual C) (alpha : ℝ) (ha : 0 < alpha) :
    parityInformation (conditionedSymmetric U e0 iT jT) C i0 v ≤
      alpha + fourierTail (conditionedSymmetric U e0 iT jT)
        (distanceToSpan (binDual C) v) / alpha := by sorry

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77

end
Source
A Proof of the Security of Quantum Key Distribution, arXiv:quant-ph/9912053v1, PDF p. 8, Lemma 3.3 = Lemma G.1: tight one-parity information bound
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

Let n,d∈Nn,d\in\mathbb Nn,d∈N, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, let UUU be unitary on the basis {0,…,d−1}×{0,1}2n\{0,\ldots,d-1\}\times\{0,1\}^{2n}{0,…,d−1}×{0,1}2n, choose e0<de_0<de0​<d, and choose iT,jT∈{0,1}ni_T,j_T\in\{0,1\}^niT​,jT​∈{0,1}n. Using bitwise XOR +++, concatenation ∥\Vert∥, and χr(a,b)=(−1)∑k<rakbk mod 2\chi_r(a,b)=(-1)^{\sum_{k<r}a_kb_k\bmod2}χr​(a,b)=(−1)∑k<r​ak​bk​mod2, set

Sa,b(h,q)=2−nχ2n(a+b,h)U(q,b+h),(e0,a+h),β=∑j,h,q∣SiT∥0,jT∥j(h,q)∣2,Ei,j=β−1/2SiT∥i,jT∥j,S_{a,b}(h,q)=2^{-n}\chi_{2n}(a+b,h)U_{(q,b+h),(e_0,a+h)},\quad \beta=\sum_{j,h,q}|S_{i_T\Vert0,j_T\Vert j}(h,q)|^2,\quad E_{i,j}=\beta^{-1/2}S_{i_T\Vert i,j_T\Vert j},Sa,b​(h,q)=2−nχ2n​(a+b,h)U(q,b+h),(e0​,a+h)​,β=j,h,q∑​∣SiT​∥0,jT​∥j​(h,q)∣2,Ei,j​=β−1/2SiT​∥i,jT​∥j​,

where i,ji,ji,j are nnn-bit strings, a,b,ha,b,ha,b,h are 2n2n2n-bit strings, and q<dq<dq<d; assume β>0\beta>0β>0. Let C≤F2nC\le\mathbb F_2^nC≤F2n​ be a linear subspace, let i0,v∈F2ni_0,v\in\mathbb F_2^ni0​,v∈F2n​, and assume v∉C⊥v\notin C^\perpv∈/C⊥, where C⊥={w:∑kukwk=0 in F2 for every u∈C}C^\perp=\{w:\sum_k u_kw_k=0\text{ in }\mathbb F_2\text{ for every }u\in C\}C⊥={w:∑k​uk​wk​=0 in F2​ for every u∈C}. For u∈Cu\in Cu∈C, let bub_ubu​ be the bit string corresponding to i0+ui_0+ui0​+u, define ρu=∑jEbu,jEbu,j∗\rho_u=\sum_jE_{b_u,j}E_{b_u,j}^{*}ρu​=∑j​Ebu​,j​Ebu​,j∗​, and let K(u)K(u)K(u) be true exactly when ∑k(i0+u)kvk=1\sum_k(i_0+u)_kv_k=1∑k​(i0​+u)k​vk​=1 in F2\mathbb F_2F2​. Define IaccI_{\mathrm{acc}}Iacc​ as the real supremum, over every positive integer kkk and every family of positive semidefinite matrices M0,…,Mk−1M_0,\ldots,M_{k-1}M0​,…,Mk−1​ on the probe space satisfying ∑xMx=I\sum_xM_x=I∑x​Mx​=I, of the classical mutual information of the joint weights

rb,x=∣C∣−1∑u∈CK(u)=bRe⁡tr⁡(Mxρu).r_{b,x}=|C|^{-1}\sum_{\substack{u\in C\\K(u)=b}}\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(M_x\rho_u).rb,x​=∣C∣−1u∈CK(u)=b​∑​Retr(Mx​ρu​).

Here mutual information means H(rfirst)+H(rsecond)−H(r)H(r_{\mathrm{first}})+H(r_{\mathrm{second}})-H(r)H(rfirst​)+H(rsecond​)−H(r), with H(p)=−∑plog⁡2pH(p)=-\sum p\log_2pH(p)=−∑plog2​p and 0log⁡20=00\log_2 0=00log2​0=0. Put

D=min⁡w∈C⊥∣{k:vk+wk≠0}∣,Fl(h,q,z)=2−n∑iχn(l,i)Ei,i+z(h,q).D=\min_{w\in C^\perp}|\{k:v_k+w_k\ne0\}|,\qquad F_l(h,q,z)=2^{-n}\sum_i\chi_n(l,i)E_{i,i+z}(h,q).D=w∈C⊥min​∣{k:vk​+wk​=0}∣,Fl​(h,q,z)=2−ni∑​χn​(l,i)Ei,i+z​(h,q).

For every real α>0\alpha>0α>0, with no upper restriction on α\alphaα,

Iacc≤α+1α∑l∈{0,1}nD≤2∣{k:lk=1}∣∑h,q,z∣Fl(h,q,z)∣2.I_{\mathrm{acc}}\le \alpha+\frac1\alpha \sum_{\substack{l\in\{0,1\}^n\\D\le2|\{k:l_k=1\}|}} \sum_{h,q,z}|F_l(h,q,z)|^2.Iacc​≤α+α1​l∈{0,1}nD≤2∣{k:lk​=1}∣​∑​h,q,z∑​∣Fl​(h,q,z)∣2.

The tail includes equality at its threshold; the hypothesis v∉C⊥v\notin C^\perpv∈/C⊥ excludes the zero code and makes D>0D>0D>0.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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