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Theorem 6.5 (corrected: syntax for ccc with h↦⌈(3h)1/c⌉h\mapsto\lceil(3h)^{1/c}\rceilh↦⌈(3h)1/c⌉ polynomial-time computable) — Construction 6.4 satisfies syntax, correctness and certifiable min-entropy

Open
CertRandQROM.Supplement.theorem_6_5

by iris · Nov 22, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

certified-randomnesscryptographyp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1quantum-informationquery-complexityrandom-oracle-model

Let c∈(0,12)c\in(0,\tfrac12)c∈(0,21​). Construction 6.4 (complexity leveraging) runs Construction 6.2 at the enlarged security parameter

λ=λ(λ′,h∞′)=max⁡{λ′, ⌈(3h∞′)1/c⌉}:\lambda=\lambda(\lambda',h'_\infty)=\max\Big\{\lambda',\ \big\lceil(3h'_\infty)^{1/c}\big\rceil\Big\}:λ=λ(λ′,h∞′​)=max{λ′, ⌈(3h∞′​)1/c⌉}:

Prove′H(1λ′,1h∞′)\mathrm{Prove}'^H(1^{\lambda'},1^{h'_\infty})Prove′H(1λ′,1h∞′​) outputs ProveH(1λ,1h∞)\mathrm{Prove}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty})ProveH(1λ,1h∞​) and Verify′H(1λ′,1h∞′,π)\mathrm{Verify}'^H(1^{\lambda'},1^{h'_\infty},\pi)Verify′H(1λ′,1h∞′​,π) outputs VerifyH(1λ,1h∞,π)\mathrm{Verify}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty},\pi)VerifyH(1λ,1h∞​,π), where H∼HλH\sim\mathcal H_\lambdaH∼Hλ​ is the biased oracle on [n(λ)]×Σλ[n(\lambda)]\times\Sigma_\lambda[n(λ)]×Σλ​ with bias p(λ)p(\lambda)p(λ) and the code is CλC_\lambdaCλ​.

Theorem. Construction 6.4 satisfies syntax, correctness, and certifiable min-entropy as in Definition 6.1:

  1. Syntax. If h↦⌈(3h)1/c⌉h\mapsto\lceil(3h)^{1/c}\rceilh↦⌈(3h)1/c⌉ is computable in polynomial time (in unary), then Prove′\mathrm{Prove}'Prove′ is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm and Verify′\mathrm{Verify}'Verify′ a deterministic classical polynomial-time algorithm, each making polynomially many queries in (λ′,h∞′)(\lambda',h'_\infty)(λ′,h∞′​).
  2. Correctness. For every function h∞′(λ′)h'_\infty(\lambda')h∞′​(λ′),
Pr⁡H∼Hλ[Verify′H(1λ′,1h∞′,π)=⊥: π←Prove′H(1λ′,1h∞′)]≤negl(λ′).\Pr_{H\sim\mathcal H_\lambda}\big[\mathrm{Verify}'^H(1^{\lambda'},1^{h'_\infty},\pi)=\bot:\ \pi\leftarrow\mathrm{Prove}'^H(1^{\lambda'},1^{h'_\infty})\big]\le\mathrm{negl}(\lambda').H∼Hλ​Pr​[Verify′H(1λ′,1h∞′​,π)=⊥: π←Prove′H(1λ′,1h∞′​)]≤negl(λ′).
  1. Certifiable min-entropy. For every integer d≥1d\ge1d≥1, every polynomial query bound Q′(λ′)Q'(\lambda')Q′(λ′), every adversary A′\mathcal A'A′ making at most Q′(λ′)Q'(\lambda')Q′(λ′) quantum queries and every t∈Nt\in\mathbb Nt∈N, there is a negligible ν\nuν such that for all λ′\lambda'λ′, with λ=λ(λ′,(λ′)d)\lambda=\lambda(\lambda',(\lambda')^d)λ=λ(λ′,(λ′)d),
Pr⁡H∼Hλ[Pr⁡[Verify′H(A′H)≠⊥]≥(λ′)−t ∧ H∞(A⊤′H)≤(λ′)d]≤ν(λ′).\Pr_{H\sim\mathcal H_\lambda}\Big[\Pr\big[\mathrm{Verify}'^H(\mathcal A'^H)\ne\bot\big]\ge(\lambda')^{-t}\ \wedge\ H_\infty\big(\mathcal A'^H_\top\big)\le(\lambda')^d\Big]\le\nu(\lambda').H∼Hλ​Pr​[Pr[Verify′H(A′H)=⊥]≥(λ′)−t ∧ H∞​(A⊤′H​)≤(λ′)d]≤ν(λ′).

This upgrades the ⌈λc/3⌉\lceil\lambda^c/3\rceil⌈λc/3⌉ bits of Construction 6.2 to any polynomial number of certified bits against every polynomial-query adversary.

Formalization Note λ(λ′,h′)\lambda(\lambda',h')λ(λ′,h′) is leverLam c λ′ h′. Clause 1 is stated for every polynomial-time presentation of the fields and generators, with ProveSyntax / VerifySyntax at par = leverLam c on the inputs (1λ′,1h∞′)(1^{\lambda'},1^{h'_\infty})(1λ′,1h∞′​). In clause 3 the adversary at λ′\lambda'λ′ is a query algorithm on the oracle domain at λ\lambdaλ; negligibility, the query bound and δ=(λ′)−t\delta=(\lambda')^{-t}δ=(λ′)−t are in λ′\lambda'λ′. The fields and generators are parameters, as in the published goal.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: the field F_{q(λ)} with q(λ) = 2^{2⌊log λ⌋} and an arbitrary generator γ(λ) of F_q^* → any field family F with |F λ| = 2^{2⌊log₂ λ⌋} and any γ λ of order |F λ| − 1, for λ ≥ 2; reason: every field with q elements is isomorphic to F_q; the paper's choice is one instance (same parameters as the published goal)
  • encoding: FRS evaluation points γ^{jm+1}, …, γ^{jm+m}; log λ → the published CertRandQROM.code (TFNPRom.foldedRS, points γ^{jm}, …, γ^{jm+m−1}); Nat.log 2; reason: the two codes are equal as sets (proved in the base sanity file); logarithms are base 2
  • correction: Construction 6.4 "satisfies syntax" for the constant c ∈ (0, 1/2), with no condition on c → the syntax clause carries the hypothesis that h ↦ ⌈(3h)^{1/c}⌉ is polynomial-time computable in unary (PvsNP.PolyTimeComputable f with f(1^h) = 1^{⌈(3h)^{1/c}⌉}); correctness and certifiable min-entropy are stated for every c ∈ (0, 1/2); reason: counterexample: an uncomputable c ∈ (0, 1/2). Prove′ runs Prove at λ = max{λ′, ⌈(3h′)^{1/c}⌉} and its output law determines λ (the step-1 abort probability 1 − Π_i(1 − (1 − |T_i|/|Σ|)^λ) is strictly monotone in λ for an oracle with 0 < |T_i| < |Σ|), so a uniform prover would compute h ↦ ⌈(3h)^{1/c}⌉ and hence c. The hypothesis holds for every rational c, and the paper's proof (“Both λ and h∞ are polynomially bounded”) uses exactly this computation
  • reading: no representation of F_q is fixed and γ(λ) is "an arbitrary generator"; the syntax property is asserted outright → the syntax clause is stated for every FieldPres F γ: bijections F λ ≅ {0,1}^{2⌊log₂ λ⌋} (λ ≥ 2) with polynomial-time addition, multiplication and code of γ(λ); reason: a uniform algorithm needs field arithmetic and γ(λ) in computable form; the clause is asserted for every such presentation (the strong reading), and is empty only for families (F, γ) admitting none, e.g. an uncomputable choice of generators, for which no uniform prover exists
  • reading: "QPT algorithm … makes poly(λ, h∞) quantum queries … outputs a classical proof π" (no model named) → ProveSyntax: a polynomial-time computable generator (PvsNP.PolyTimeComputable) maps 1^λ 0 1^{h∞} to the unary description of a well-formed circuit over {H, S, T, X, CNOT} with XOR-oracle gates (published QStateSearch.Supplement circuit model), whose measured output wires have exactly the law of Prove^h for every oracle h; reason: the standard uniform-circuit meaning of QPT; unary descriptions bound gates and queries polynomially; exact equality is the strongest reading and is attainable since all amplitudes of Construction 6.2 lie in ℤ[1/√2]
  • reading: "deterministic classical polynomial-time algorithm … makes poly(λ, h∞) queries" (no model named) → VerifySyntax: one published BQPNotInIP.OracleSep.OracleMachine (polynomial-time step function, polynomial clock) that on 1^λ 0 1^{h∞} 0 π with the string oracle of h outputs the string of Verify^h(π), for every string π; reason: a standard deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine; the clock bounds steps, queries and configuration size
  • encoding: proofs π ∈ Σ^n ∪ {⊥}, oracle inputs (i, x) ∈ [n] × Σ, inputs 1^λ, 1^{h∞} → bit strings: a flag bit (1 = ⊥) followed by the n·m·e bits of the word; the index in binary on Nat.size n bits followed by the m·e bits of the symbol; unary numerals 1^a 0; any string that is not the code of a word is parsed as ⊥, and the oracle answers 0 outside codes of inputs; reason: fixed-width codes through the presentation; Verify, step 1, rejects what it cannot parse
  • encoding: the construction is defined "for all sufficiently large λ" (§5.2) → the syntax equalities are required for λ ≥ 2; for λ < 2 only a well-formed circuit is asked; reason: for λ ≥ 2 the parameters q, m, n, k of §5.2 are defined (n ≥ 1); this is the widest range
  • encoding: λ(λ′, h′∞) = max{λ′, ⌈(3h′∞)^{1/c}⌉}, h∞(λ′, h′∞) = ⌈λ(λ′, h′∞)^c/3⌉; H sampled from H_λ at the enlarged parameter → leverLam c λ′ h′ (real power, natural ceiling); oracle domain Dom F λ, bias biasP (n(λ)) and code C_λ at λ = leverLam c λ′ h′; h∞(λ′, h′∞) does not appear; reason: Prove and Verify of Construction 6.2 ignore 1^{h∞}; everything else is evaluated at the enlarged parameter as Construction 6.4 prescribes
  • encoding: the probability over H and over the prover's internal randomness (step-1 trials, final measurement) → ErasureQTanner.noisyExp (biasP n) of honestRejProb, the exact rejection probability given H = h; reason: finite sums; given that step 1 succeeds the state is |φ⟩ whatever the trial history, so the abort probability is 1 − Π_i (1 − (1 − |T_i|/|Σ|)^λ) and the Born rule gives the rest
  • encoding: QFT_Σ "given in [YZ24, Section 2.2]" (footnote 6) → the transform |x⟩ ↦ q^{−nm/2} Σ_y (−1)^{Tr(x·y)} |y⟩ with Tr(a) = Σ_{i<log₂ q} a^{2^i} the absolute trace F_q → F_2 and x·y the unfolded dot product; reason: this is the cited definition in characteristic 2 (q = 2^{2⌊log λ⌋}); the n-fold tensor power of the blockwise transform is the transform over Σ^n because Tr is additive
  • encoding: Decode_{C⊥}: run GRSUniqueDecode with decoding radius τ = ⌊(k+1)/2⌋; return its codeword, or 0 on ⊥ (p.25) → decodeDual C τ z: a dual codeword within unfolded Hamming distance τ of z if one exists (Classical.choose), else 0; reason: the specification of GRSUniqueDecode on p.22; the codeword is unique for C_λ since d_min(C⊥) = k + 2 > 2τ (p.26), so no hypothesis on the decoder is assumed
  • encoding: negl(λ) → CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible (∀ c, eventually |ν(λ)| ≤ λ^{−c}); reason: standard definition, the one used by the published goal
  • encoding: every polynomial query bound Q′(λ′); every h′∞(λ′) = (λ′)^d, d ≥ 1 an integer; any inverse-polynomial δ; "for any h∞ = h∞(λ)" in correctness → ∃ C k, ∀ λ′, Q′(λ′) ≤ C·(λ′)^k + C; ∀ d ≥ 1 with threshold (λ′)^d; ∀ t : ℕ, δ = ((λ′)^t)⁻¹; ∀ hp : ℕ → ℕ; reason: Definition 6.1 with footnote 5; a function is polynomially bounded iff it is below such a C·x^k + C
  • generalization: an unbounded-time adversary A′ making at most Q′(λ′) quantum queries to H → a family A′{λ′} of QueryAlg on the oracle domain at λ = leverLam c λ′ (λ′)^d, with any finite work register, any POVM, and Qa(λ′) ≤ Q′(λ′) queries; acceptance and A′⊤ through the published accProb, condOut, Event1 for the code C_λ; reason: same adversary model as the published goal, at the enlarged parameter; a POVM includes every projective measurement
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CommitOpen_Benign_Model
import Definitions.Def_ErasureQTanner_noisyProb
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_biasP
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_code
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Event1
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_honestRejProb
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_ProveSyntax
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_VerifySyntax
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_leverLam

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace CertRandQROM.Supplement

/-- **Theorem 6.5** (Coladangelo, Khurana, Mutreja, Roberts, Slote, Tal, *Unconditional
Certified Randomness without Structure*, arXiv:2608.31112 (sha256 b75095a2…), p.30):
Construction 6.4 satisfies syntax, correctness, and certifiable min-entropy as in
Definition 6.1 (pp.27–28); in particular `(Q′, h′∞)`-certifiable min-entropy for every polynomial
query bound `Q′(λ′)` and every `h′∞(λ′) = (λ′)^d`, `d ≥ 1` an integer.

Construction 6.4 runs Construction 6.2 at the enlarged parameter
`λ = leverLam c λ′ h′∞ = max{λ′, ⌈(3h′∞)^{1/c}⌉}`; the oracle is the biased oracle at `λ`
(domain `[n(λ)] × Σ_λ`, bias `p(n(λ))`), the code is `C_λ`.

1. **Syntax** (corrected): for every polynomial-time presentation `P`, *if* `h ↦ ⌈(3h)^{1/c}⌉`
   is polynomial-time computable in unary, then `Prove′` and `Verify′` satisfy `ProveSyntax` /
   `VerifySyntax` with `par = leverLam c` on inputs `(1^{λ′}, 1^{h′∞})`.
2. **Correctness**: for every function `h′∞(λ′)`, the rejection probability of the honest
   prover at `λ(λ′, h′∞(λ′))` is negligible in `λ′`.
3. **Certifiable min-entropy** (Definition 6.1, unspecified `(Q, h∞)`): for every integer
   `d ≥ 1`, every polynomially bounded `Q′`, every adversary family `A′` (at `λ′` a `QueryAlg`
   on the oracle domain at `λ = leverLam c λ′ (λ′)^d` with at most `Q′(λ′)` queries) and every
   `t ∈ ℕ`, there is a negligible `ν` with
   `Pr_{H ∼ H_λ}[Pr[Verify^H(A′^H) ≠ ⊥] ≥ (λ′)^{−t} ∧ H∞(A′_⊤^H) ≤ (λ′)^d] ≤ ν(λ′)` for all `λ′`.

**Formalization Note** `F`, `γ`, `hF`, `hγ`, `c` are as in the published goal. "Polynomial
`Q′`" is `Q′(λ′) ≤ C·(λ′)^k + C`. The extra hypothesis of clause 1 is needed: the output law of
`Prove′` determines `λ(λ′, h′∞)` (through the abort probability of step 1), so for an
uncomputable `c` no uniform prover exists; it holds for every rational `c`. Clauses 2 and 3 are
for every `c ∈ (0, 1/2)`. Negligibility, the query bound and `δ = (λ′)^{−t}` are in `λ′`. -/
theorem theorem_6_5 (F : ℕ → Type) [∀ l, Field (F l)]
    [∀ l, Fintype (F l)] [∀ l, DecidableEq (F l)]
    (hF : ∀ l, 2 ≤ l → Fintype.card (F l) = 2 ^ (2 * Nat.log 2 l))
    (γ : ∀ l, F l) (hγ : ∀ l, 2 ≤ l → orderOf (γ l) = Fintype.card (F l) - 1)
    (c : ℝ) (hc₀ : 0 < c) (hc₁ : c < 1 / 2) :
    (∀ P : FieldPres F γ,
        (∃ f : PvsNP.Str → PvsNP.Str, PvsNP.PolyTimeComputable f ∧
          ∀ h : ℕ, f (List.replicate h true) =
            List.replicate ⌈((3 * h : ℕ) : ℝ) ^ (1 / c)⌉₊ true) →
        ProveSyntax F γ P (leverLam c) ∧ VerifySyntax F γ P (leverLam c)) ∧
    (∀ hp : ℕ → ℕ, CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible (fun l' =>
      ErasureQTanner.noisyExp
        (CertRandQROM.biasP (CertRandQROM.nPar F (leverLam c l' (hp l'))))
        (fun h => honestRejProb F γ (leverLam c l' (hp l')) h))) ∧
    (∀ d : ℕ, 1 ≤ d → ∀ Q' : ℕ → ℕ, (∃ C k : ℕ, ∀ l', Q' l' ≤ C * l' ^ k + C) →
      ∀ (W : ℕ → Type) [∀ l', Fintype (W l')] [∀ l', DecidableEq (W l')] (Qa : ℕ → ℕ)
        (_hQa : ∀ l', Qa l' ≤ Q' l')
        (A : ∀ l', CertRandQROM.QueryAlg (CertRandQROM.Dom F (leverLam c l' (l' ^ d))) (W l')
          (Option (Fin (CertRandQROM.nPar F (leverLam c l' (l' ^ d))) →
            CertRandQROM.Alph F (leverLam c l' (l' ^ d)))) (Qa l')) (t : ℕ),
      ∃ ν : ℕ → ℝ, CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible ν ∧ ∀ l' : ℕ,
        ErasureQTanner.noisyProb
            (CertRandQROM.biasP (CertRandQROM.nPar F (leverLam c l' (l' ^ d))))
            (fun h => CertRandQROM.Event1 (CertRandQROM.code F γ (leverLam c l' (l' ^ d)))
              (A l') ((l' : ℝ) ^ t)⁻¹ (l' ^ d) h) ≤ ν l') := by sorry

end CertRandQROM.Supplement
Source
Coladangelo, Khurana, Mutreja, Roberts, Slote, Tal, Unconditional Certified Randomness without Structure, arXiv:2608.31112 (sha256 b75095a2…), Theorem 6.5, p.30 (PDF p.32); Construction 6.4, p.30 (PDF p.32); Definition 6.1, pp.27–28 (PDF pp.29–30)

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