Proof of Proposition 1, p. 6 — the employee's payoff from direct hiring is v_s + b if v_a ≥ v_s + b, and v_a otherwise
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.dh_payoff_employeeacquihiringmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-competition
In the baseline model with and , consider any continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies of the direct-hiring subgame. The employee's equilibrium payoff (her wage, plus the private benefit if she stays at the startup) is
This is the second step of the proof of Proposition 1: wage competition hands the employee the losing firm's full willingness to pay.
Formalization Note. At both branches equal ; the statement covers that point as well.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
/-- Proof of Proposition 1 (p. 6), second paragraph: in every continuation equilibrium of the
direct-hiring subgame the employee's payoff is `v_s + b` if `v_a ≥ v_s + b` and `v_a`
otherwise. -/
theorem dh_payoff_employee (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (σ : DHProfile)
(hσ : IsDHEquilibrium P σ) :
dhPayoffE P σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = if P.vs + P.b ≤ P.va then P.vs + P.b else P.va := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 6 (PDF 7), §3, proof of Proposition 1, second paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.