Proposition 3: strict ordering of delegation thresholds
ProvedTeamDelegation.Optimal.threshold_orderdelegationimplicit-incentivesp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1thresholds
Under the model's standing assumptions and Assumption 1, the delegation thresholds satisfy
This orders the range of A's adoption-cost difference where delegation changes its punishment equilibrium and separates the two formulas for A's delegated bonus.
Formalization Note The nonnegative probability bounds and are explicit standing assumptions; they also ensure that the defining denominators are nonzero.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TeamDelegation_Optimal_Model
Formal statement
namespace TeamDelegation.Optimal
/-- Proposition 3 and its proof, pp. 18 and 34: the delegation thresholds
are strictly ordered in the stated regime. -/
theorem threshold_order (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing)
(hA1 : P.Assumption1) :
0 < DeltaMaxA P ∧ 0 < DeltaMaxB P ∧
0 < DeltaHatA P ∧ DeltaHatA P < DeltaCritA P ∧
DeltaCritA P < DeltaMaxA P := by sorry
end TeamDelegation.Optimal
Source
Upton, Implicit Incentives and Delegation in Teams, TRR 266 Working Paper No. 67 (SSRN 3991736, 17 Dec 2021), p. 34 (PDF 35), end of proof of Proposition 3; equations (19)–(20) on p. 18 (PDF 19)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.