Proposition 2.3, proof — player 1's condition (2.2) is equivalent to (2.4)
ProvedAumann1987.TwoPerson.player1_iff_ineq_2_4correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a distribution on and player 1's payoff. Player 1's equilibrium condition (2.2) written on — for every , — holds if and only if
which is condition (2.4) of Proposition 2.3. For an impossible suggestion (all ) the inequality reads .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_TwoPerson_Model open Finset
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.TwoPerson
/-- **Player 1 gives (2.4)** (Aumann 1987, Proposition 2.3, proof, p. 6, PDF p. 7). For a
distribution `p`, player 1's equilibrium condition (2.2) written on `p` holds iff
`∑_k (h¹_{jk} − h¹_{qk}) p_{jk} ≥ 0` for all `j, q ∈ S¹`, which is (2.4).
Formalization Note: the paper says "multiply through by `Σⱼ pⱼₖ`"; the factor is `Σₖ pⱼₖ`
(misprint). For an impossible `j` all `p_{jk} = 0` and (2.4) reads `0 ≥ 0`. -/
theorem player1_iff_ineq_2_4 {S₁ S₂ : Type*} [Fintype S₁] [Fintype S₂]
(h₁ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (p : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (hp : IsDistribution p) :
DevCond₁ h₁ p ↔ ∀ j q : S₁, 0 ≤ ∑ k, (h₁ j k - h₁ q k) * p j k := by sorry
end Aumann1987.TwoPerson
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 6 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 2.3, proof (player 1 gives (2.4))
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.