Proof of Theorem 3, p. 24 — contributions to the grand coalition: and for
ProvedSeqLoss.LiabilityGame.marginal_contributionscooperative-gameliabilityp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let with , total loss , and liability game . The contributions of the agents to the grand coalition are
These are the quantities in Muto et al.'s (1988) formula for the nucleolus of a big boss game, which gives the non-initiators half of their contribution.
Formalization Note. The initiator is index 0. The hypothesis is the paper's standing one and is kept, although the identities do not need it.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SeqLoss_FixedFraction_Setting import Definitions.Def_SeqLoss_LiabilityGame_Game
Formal statement
namespace SeqLoss.LiabilityGame
theorem marginal_contributions {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] (ℓ : Fin n → ℝ) (hℓ : SeqLoss.FixedFraction.IsLoss ℓ) :
marginalContribution (liabilityGame ℓ) 0 = SeqLoss.FixedFraction.total ℓ ∧
∀ i : Fin n, i ≠ 0 → marginalContribution (liabilityGame ℓ) i = ℓ i := by sorry
end SeqLoss.LiabilityGame
Source
Gudmundsson, Hougaard & Ko, Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses, accepted manuscript (2023), p. 24, Appendix A, proof of Theorem 3, second paragraph, first sentence
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.