THEOREM — characterization of perfect-equilibrium partitions
DisprovedRubinsteinBargaining.PEP.pep_characterizationbargainingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1perfect-equilibrium
Assume each player's complete, reflexive, transitive preference relation satisfies (A-1)–(A-5). Let and be the perfect-equilibrium partition sets for the two opening orders, and let be the projections of the one-period threshold correspondence. Then
Both and are nonempty closed intervals. There is such that
The result characterizes all player-1 shares obtainable from perfect equilibria, including cases with more than one partition.
Formalization Note A closed interval is an actual with ; a singleton is permitted. The translate is an image under , not a set difference.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RubinsteinBargaining_PEP_EquilibriumSets import Definitions.Def_RubinsteinBargaining_PEP_Delta
Formal statement
namespace RubinsteinBargaining.PEP
theorem pep_characterization (p : Preferences) (h : FullAxioms p) :
A p = Delta1 p ∧
(A p).Nonempty ∧
B p = Delta2 p ∧
(B p).Nonempty ∧
(∃ lo hi : ℝ, lo ≤ hi ∧ A p = Set.Icc lo hi) ∧
(∃ lo hi : ℝ, lo ≤ hi ∧ B p = Set.Icc lo hi) ∧
∃ e : ℝ, 0 ≤ e ∧ B p = (fun x : ℝ => x - e) '' A p := by sorry
end RubinsteinBargaining.PEP
Source
Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 106, THEOREM, https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.