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The ConnectBlock transaction loop characterized

Proved
BitcoinBlock.connectLoop_iff

by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip30bip34bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetblock-validationconnectblockconsensusformal-verificationundo

For transactions with non-negative outputs and a non-negative fee total, the loop succeeds iff TxsSpec: each non-coinbase is admissible (TxInputsSpec) against the ledger left by its predecessors with the fee total within MAX_MONEY, and the accumulated sigop cost stays within 80,000, in order.

Deprecated. Superseded by BitcoinBlockV2.connectLoop_iff (revision 2 of the block mission): the p2shSigOpCount of this revision counted every push of scriptSig instead of only the redeem script, over-counting P2SH sigops; the V2 declarations carry the corrected definition.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinBlock
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinActivation
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinBlock.connectLoop_iff (f : BitcoinActivation.ScriptFlags) (H : Nat) (mtp : Nat → Nat) (ltf : Nat)
    (txs : List BitcoinSer.Tx) (u : Ledger) (fees : Int) (sigOps : Nat) (undo : BlockUndo)
    (hpos : ∀ tx ∈ txs, 0 ≤ BitcoinBlock.valueOut tx) (hfees : 0 ≤ fees) :
    (∃ st, BitcoinBlock.connectLoop f H mtp ltf ⟨u, fees, sigOps, undo⟩ txs = some st) ↔
      BitcoinBlock.TxsSpec f H mtp ltf u fees sigOps txs := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: AcceptBlockHeader, CheckBlockHeader, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, CheckBlock, CheckMerkleRoot, CheckWitnessMalleation, ContextualCheckBlock, ConnectBlock, GetBlockScriptFlags, IsBIP30Repeat, IsBIP30Unspendable, UpdateCoins, DisconnectBlock, ApplyTxInUndo, src/validation.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/validation.cpp; CheckTransaction (consensus/tx_check.cpp); IsFinalTx, GetLegacySigOpCount, GetP2SHSigOpCount, GetTransactionSigOpCost, CheckTxInputs (consensus/tx_verify.cpp); CScript::GetSigOpCount, IsUnspendable (script/script.cpp, script.h); CountWitnessSigOps (script/interpreter.cpp); AddCoin, SpendCoin, AddCoins (coins.cpp); GetBlockProof (chain.cpp); GetWitnessCommitmentIndex, GetBlockWeight (consensus/validation.h); CMainParams (kernel/chainparams.cpp)
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinBlock.connectLoop_iff

Binders and hypotheses

  • fff : a record of seven Boolean script flags (p2sh, witness, taproot, dersig, cltv, csv, nulldummy).
  • H∈NH \in \mathbb{N}H∈N : the block height used for maturity, coin creation and BIP68.
  • mtp:N→N\mathit{mtp} : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}mtp:N→N : a median-time-past function by height (arbitrary).
  • ltf∈N\mathit{ltf} \in \mathbb{N}ltf∈N : the lock-time flags word.
  • txs\mathit{txs}txs : a list of serialized transactions.
  • uuu : a ledger (association list from outpoints to coins).
  • fees∈Z\mathit{fees} \in \mathbb{Z}fees∈Z, sigOps∈N\mathit{sigOps} \in \mathbb{N}sigOps∈N : initial accumulators.
  • undo\mathit{undo}undo : a block undo list (list of lists of coins), the initial undo accumulator.
  • Hypothesis hposh_{pos}hpos​ : for every tx∈txstx \in \mathit{txs}tx∈txs, 0≤valueOut(tx)0 \le \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)0≤valueOut(tx) (sum of its output values).
  • Hypothesis hfeesh_{fees}hfees​ : 0≤fees0 \le \mathit{fees}0≤fees.

The hypotheses and the binder undo\mathit{undo}undo do not appear in the right-hand side of the conclusion.

Conclusion

(∃st, connectLoop(f,H,mtp,ltf,⟨u,fees,sigOps,undo⟩,txs)=some st)  ⟺  TxsSpec(f,H,mtp,ltf,u,fees,sigOps,txs).\big(\exists \mathit{st},\ \mathrm{connectLoop}(f, H, \mathit{mtp}, \mathit{ltf}, \langle u, \mathit{fees}, \mathit{sigOps}, \mathit{undo}\rangle, \mathit{txs}) = \mathrm{some}\,\mathit{st}\big) \iff \mathrm{TxsSpec}(f, H, \mathit{mtp}, \mathit{ltf}, u, \mathit{fees}, \mathit{sigOps}, \mathit{txs}).(∃st, connectLoop(f,H,mtp,ltf,⟨u,fees,sigOps,undo⟩,txs)=somest)⟺TxsSpec(f,H,mtp,ltf,u,fees,sigOps,txs).

Left side, unfolded

connectLoop\mathrm{connectLoop}connectLoop on the empty list returns some\mathrm{some}some of the current state. On tx::resttx :: \mathit{rest}tx::rest from state ⟨v,F,Σ,U⟩\langle v, F, \Sigma, U\rangle⟨v,F,Σ,U⟩:

  1. Fee/undo step. If isCoinBase(tx)\mathrm{isCoinBase}(tx)isCoinBase(tx) (exactly one input whose prevout is 32 zero bytes with index 232−12^{32}-1232−1): (F,U)(F, U)(F,U) unchanged. Otherwise checkTxInputs(v,tx,H)\mathrm{checkTxInputs}(v, tx, H)checkTxInputs(v,tx,H) must return some fee\mathrm{some}\,\mathit{fee}somefee (every prevout present in vvv; for each input's coin ccc: not [coinbase and H−c.height<100H - c.\mathrm{height} < 100H−c.height<100 in natural subtraction], c.out.nValue∈[0,M]c.\mathrm{out.nValue} \in [0,M]c.out.nValue∈[0,M], running sum in [0,M][0,M][0,M]; final valueIn≥valueOut(tx)\mathit{valueIn} \ge \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)valueIn≥valueOut(tx); valueIn−valueOut(tx)∈[0,M]\mathit{valueIn} - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx) \in [0,M]valueIn−valueOut(tx)∈[0,M]; fee=valueIn−valueOut(tx)\mathit{fee} = \mathit{valueIn} - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)fee=valueIn−valueOut(tx); M=2.1⋅1015M = 2.1\cdot10^{15}M=2.1⋅1015), else fail; then F+fee∈[0,M]F + \mathit{fee} \in [0,M]F+fee∈[0,M] else fail; then sequenceLocksOk(v,H,mtp,ltf,tx)\mathrm{sequenceLocksOk}(v, H, \mathit{mtp}, \mathit{ltf}, tx)sequenceLocksOk(v,H,mtp,ltf,tx) else fail; new F:=F+feeF := F+\mathit{fee}F:=F+fee, U:=U+ ⁣ ⁣+[ [accessCoin(v,i.prevout)∣i∈tx.vin] ]U := U \mathbin{+\!\!+} [\,[\mathrm{accessCoin}(v, i.\mathrm{prevout}) \mid i \in tx.\mathrm{vin}]\,]U:=U++[[accessCoin(v,i.prevout)∣i∈tx.vin]].
  2. Σ′:=Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)\Sigma' := \Sigma + \mathrm{txSigOpCost}(f, v, tx)Σ′:=Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx); fail if Σ′>80 000\Sigma' > 80\,000Σ′>80000.
  3. If not coinbase and inputScriptsOk(f,v,tx)\mathrm{inputScriptsOk}(f, v, tx)inputScriptsOk(f,v,tx) is false, fail.
  4. Continue on rest\mathit{rest}rest from ⟨updateCoins(v,tx,H),F′,Σ′,U′⟩\langle \mathrm{updateCoins}(v, tx, H), F', \Sigma', U'\rangle⟨updateCoins(v,tx,H),F′,Σ′,U′⟩.

Auxiliary meanings: sequenceLocksOk\mathrm{sequenceLocksOk}sequenceLocksOk runs the BIP68 core calculation with version tx.version mod 232tx.\mathrm{version} \bmod 2^{32}tx.versionmod232, flags ltf mod 232\mathit{ltf} \bmod 2^{32}ltfmod232, context ⟨H,mtp⟩\langle H, \mathit{mtp}\rangle⟨H,mtp⟩ and inputs ⟨i.nSequence mod 232,accessCoin(v,i.prevout).height⟩\langle i.\mathrm{nSequence} \bmod 2^{32}, \mathrm{accessCoin}(v, i.\mathrm{prevout}).\mathrm{height}\rangle⟨i.nSequencemod232,accessCoin(v,i.prevout).height⟩ (height 000 for a missing coin), returning whether the accumulated minimum height is <H< H<H and the accumulated minimum time is <mtp(H−1)< \mathit{mtp}(H-1)<mtp(H−1). txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)=4⋅legacySigOpCount(tx)+\mathrm{txSigOpCost}(f,v,tx) = 4\cdot\mathrm{legacySigOpCount}(tx) + txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)=4⋅legacySigOpCount(tx)+ (for non-coinbase) 4⋅∑ip2shSigOpCount4\cdot\sum_i \mathrm{p2shSigOpCount}4⋅∑i​p2shSigOpCount if f.p2shf.\mathrm{p2sh}f.p2sh, plus ∑icountWitnessSigOps\sum_i \mathrm{countWitnessSigOps}∑i​countWitnessSigOps, all against the spent scriptPubKeys from accessCoin\mathrm{accessCoin}accessCoin. inputScriptsOk(f,v,tx)\mathrm{inputScriptsOk}(f,v,tx)inputScriptsOk(f,v,tx): for every index n<∣tx.vin∣n < |tx.\mathrm{vin}|n<∣tx.vin∣, the full VerifyScript (with the Taproot handler) succeeds for input nnn, with the spent-outputs list [accessCoin(v,j.prevout).out∣j∈tx.vin][\mathrm{accessCoin}(v, j.\mathrm{prevout}).\mathrm{out} \mid j \in tx.\mathrm{vin}][accessCoin(v,j.prevout).out∣j∈tx.vin], context ⟨f,tx,n,spent value⟩\langle f, tx, n, \text{spent value}\rangle⟨f,tx,n,spent value⟩, the input's scriptSig, the coin's scriptPubKey and the input's witness. updateCoins(v,tx,H)\mathrm{updateCoins}(v,tx,H)updateCoins(v,tx,H): remove the entries keyed by txtxtx's prevouts (none for a coinbase), then add each spendable output iii as ⟨tx.vouti,H,isCoinBase(tx)⟩\langle tx.\mathrm{vout}_i, H, \mathrm{isCoinBase}(tx)\rangle⟨tx.vouti​,H,isCoinBase(tx)⟩ under ⟨txid(tx),i⟩\langle\mathrm{txid}(tx), i\rangle⟨txid(tx),i⟩, replacing an existing entry.

Right side, unfolded

TxsSpec(f,H,mtp,ltf,u,fees,sigOps,txs)\mathrm{TxsSpec}(f,H,\mathit{mtp},\mathit{ltf},u,\mathit{fees},\mathit{sigOps},\mathit{txs})TxsSpec(f,H,mtp,ltf,u,fees,sigOps,txs): true for [ ][\,][]; for tx::resttx :: \mathit{rest}tx::rest from (v,F,Σ)(v, F, \Sigma)(v,F,Σ):

  • isCoinBase(tx)=false⇒[TxInputsSpec(f,v,H,mtp,ltf,tx)∧F+feeOf(v,tx)≤M]\mathrm{isCoinBase}(tx) = \mathrm{false} \Rightarrow \big[\mathrm{TxInputsSpec}(f, v, H, \mathit{mtp}, \mathit{ltf}, tx) \wedge F + \mathrm{feeOf}(v,tx) \le M\big]isCoinBase(tx)=false⇒[TxInputsSpec(f,v,H,mtp,ltf,tx)∧F+feeOf(v,tx)≤M], where feeOf(v,tx)=valueIn(v,tx.vin)−valueOut(tx)\mathrm{feeOf}(v,tx) = \mathrm{valueIn}(v, tx.\mathrm{vin}) - \mathrm{valueOut}(tx)feeOf(v,tx)=valueIn(v,tx.vin)−valueOut(tx) with valueIn\mathrm{valueIn}valueIn summing accessCoin\mathrm{accessCoin}accessCoin values (dummy −1-1−1 if missing), and TxInputsSpec\mathrm{TxInputsSpec}TxInputsSpec is: ∀i∈tx.vin,∃c,getCoin(v,i.prevout)=some c∧(c.isCoinbase=true⇒c.height+100≤H)∧0≤c.out.nValue≤M\forall i \in tx.\mathrm{vin}, \exists c, \mathrm{getCoin}(v, i.\mathrm{prevout}) = \mathrm{some}\,c \wedge (c.\mathrm{isCoinbase} = \mathrm{true} \Rightarrow c.\mathrm{height} + 100 \le H) \wedge 0 \le c.\mathrm{out.nValue} \le M∀i∈tx.vin,∃c,getCoin(v,i.prevout)=somec∧(c.isCoinbase=true⇒c.height+100≤H)∧0≤c.out.nValue≤M; valueIn(v,tx.vin)≤M\mathrm{valueIn}(v, tx.\mathrm{vin}) \le MvalueIn(v,tx.vin)≤M; valueOut(tx)≤valueIn(v,tx.vin)\mathrm{valueOut}(tx) \le \mathrm{valueIn}(v,tx.\mathrm{vin})valueOut(tx)≤valueIn(v,tx.vin); satisfiesBIP68\mathrm{satisfiesBIP68}satisfiesBIP68 (specification form: BIP68 not enabled, i.e. version  mod 232<2\bmod 2^{32} < 2mod232<2 or ltf mod 232\mathit{ltf} \bmod 2^{32}ltfmod232 even, or every input is disabled (bit 31) or — time-based (bit 22): mtp(c.height−1)+512⋅(seq mod 216)≤mtp(H−1)\mathit{mtp}(c.\mathrm{height}-1) + 512\cdot(\text{seq} \bmod 2^{16}) \le \mathit{mtp}(H-1)mtp(c.height−1)+512⋅(seqmod216)≤mtp(H−1); height-based: c.height+(seq mod 216)≤Hc.\mathrm{height} + (\text{seq} \bmod 2^{16}) \le Hc.height+(seqmod216)≤H — with natural subtraction in c.height−1c.\mathrm{height}-1c.height−1 and H−1H-1H−1); and ∀n<∣tx.vin∣\forall n < |tx.\mathrm{vin}|∀n<∣tx.vin∣, the same full script verification as in inputScriptsOk\mathrm{inputScriptsOk}inputScriptsOk equals true;
  • Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)≤80 000\Sigma + \mathrm{txSigOpCost}(f, v, tx) \le 80\,000Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)≤80000;
  • TxsSpec\mathrm{TxsSpec}TxsSpec on rest\mathit{rest}rest from (updateCoins(v,tx,H), F if coinbase else F+feeOf(v,tx), Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx))(\mathrm{updateCoins}(v,tx,H),\ F \text{ if coinbase else } F + \mathrm{feeOf}(v,tx),\ \Sigma + \mathrm{txSigOpCost}(f,v,tx))(updateCoins(v,tx,H), F if coinbase else F+feeOf(v,tx), Σ+txSigOpCost(f,v,tx)).

Note that the right side imposes no lower bound on F+feeOfF + \mathrm{feeOf}F+feeOf (the left requires F+fee≥0F+\mathit{fee} \ge 0F+fee≥0), which is where hfeesh_{fees}hfees​ and hposh_{pos}hpos​ enter.

Edge cases silently included

Empty txs\mathit{txs}txs (both sides trivially true); coinbase-shaped transactions anywhere in the list (no input checks either side); undo\mathit{undo}undo arbitrary and irrelevant to the right side; mtp\mathit{mtp}mtp arbitrary (e.g. non-monotone); 32-bit truncation of version, sequence and ltf\mathit{ltf}ltf; natural subtraction in maturity and in mtp(⋅−1)\mathit{mtp}(\cdot - 1)mtp(⋅−1); missing coins give value −1-1−1 and height 000 via accessCoin\mathrm{accessCoin}accessCoin on both sides where it is used; duplicate keys in uuu (first match wins).

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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