Lemma 3 — the process converges to an individually rational allocation
ProvedKelsoCrawford.Process.lemma3_individually_rationalLet a job-matching market with at least one firm satisfy regularity of utilities, (MP), (NFL), and (GS) for the discrete market with salary unit . Let a run of the salary-adjustment process R1–R5 issue no rejections in round , and let be the allocation at that round: each worker goes to the firm whose offer he or she holds, at the permitted salary . Then this allocation is individually rational:
where is the set of workers assigned to .
This is Lemma 3 of the paper, the first half of the core property in Lemma 4.
Formalization Note "The process converges to" is read as: at every round at which no rejections are issued, the allocation read off by R5 has the property. The paper's is such a round.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_Process_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_Process_Process
namespace KelsoCrawford.Process
/-- Lemma 3, p. 1489: the allocation at any round where the process stops is individually rational. -/
theorem lemma3_individually_rational
{W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hGS : ∀ j, GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) (M.gridVectors δ j)) :
∀ ρ : Run W F, M.IsRun δ ρ → ∀ T : ℕ, ρ.Stopped T → M.IsIR (ρ.outcome T) := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.Process
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.