(A:E) — properties of : monotone, and linear toward either endpoint
ProvedTheoryOfGames.Utility.intervalMap_propertiesdecision-theoryp2o-batch-b23ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1utility-theory
Let be a system of utilities satisfying (3:A)–(3:C), fix , and let be the function of (A:D) on the interval . Then, for utilities in that interval:
- (i') is monotone: implies ;
- (ii') for and ,
- (iii') for and ,
These properties say that is the correct numerical scale on the interval: combinations with either endpoint are carried into the corresponding numerical combinations.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TheoryOfGames_Utility_UtilitySystem import Definitions.Def_TheoryOfGames_Utility_intervalMap
Formal statement
namespace TheoryOfGames.Utility
/-- (A:E): for fixed `u₀ < v₀` the function `f = f_{u₀,v₀}` of (A:D), on the interval
`u₀ ≦ w ≦ v₀`, is (i') monotone, and satisfies
(ii') `f((1 − β)u₀ + βw) = βf(w)` for `0 < β < 1` and `w ≠ u₀`,
(iii') `f((1 − β)v₀ + βw) = 1 − β + βf(w)` for `0 < β < 1` and `w ≠ v₀`. -/
theorem intervalMap_properties {U : Type*} (S : UtilitySystem U) {u₀ v₀ : U}
(h : S.lt u₀ v₀) :
(∀ w w' : U, S.le u₀ w → S.le w v₀ → S.le u₀ w' → S.le w' v₀ → S.lt w w' →
intervalMap S u₀ v₀ w < intervalMap S u₀ v₀ w') ∧
(∀ (β : OpenUnit) (w : U), S.le u₀ w → S.le w v₀ → w ≠ u₀ →
intervalMap S u₀ v₀ (S.cmb β u₀ w) = (β : ℝ) * intervalMap S u₀ v₀ w) ∧
∀ (β : OpenUnit) (w : U), S.le u₀ w → S.le w v₀ → w ≠ v₀ →
intervalMap S u₀ v₀ (S.cmb β v₀ w) = 1 - (β : ℝ) + (β : ℝ) * intervalMap S u₀ v₀ w := by sorry
end TheoryOfGames.Utility
Source
von Neumann & Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th-anniversary ed., Princeton 2007), p. 620, (A:E)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.