Proposition 4(a), p. 8877 — a purely profit-driven platform's equilibrium profit is uniquely maximized at zero antifake effort
ProvedFakeAccounts.Platform.proposition_4aLet be the platform's profit in the equilibrium that its antifake effort induces, where is the globally undefeated equilibrium type of Proposition 1 and is the profit (6). Under the standing parameter ranges, zero effort is optimal among all feasible efforts , and it is the unique optimum:
This is Proposition 4(a): a purely profit-driven platform () optimally chooses zero antifake effort. It shows that antifake effort by a platform must be motivated by consumer welfare, not by advertising profit.
Formalization Note With the platform's objective (3), , is , so consumer welfare does not enter. Assumption 3 is not needed and not assumed; Assumptions 1–2 are not imposed. The equilibrium type at each is Proposition 1, taken as a definition (see the Setting).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FakeAccounts_Platform_Setting
namespace FakeAccounts.Platform
/-- Proposition 4(a), p. 8877: a purely profit-driven platform (w = 0) optimally chooses zero
antifake effort; zero is the unique maximizer of its equilibrium profit over d ≥ 0. -/
theorem proposition_4a (P : Params) (hP : Standing P) :
IsMaxOn (eqProfit P) (Set.Ici 0) 0 ∧ ∀ d, 0 < d → eqProfit P d < eqProfit P 0 := by sorry
end FakeAccounts.Platform
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.