Theorem 6.2: the C-unit second-price auction with reserve price v* (the zero of J) is an incentive-compatible mechanism whose expected revenue is at least that of every such mechanism
ProvedRevenueManagement.reserve_price_auction_optimalIn the private-value -unit model with regular valuations and a strictly increasing virtual value with zero , the standard -unit second-price auction with reserve price , which awards the units to the highest valuations above at the larger of and the highest losing valuation, is a feasible mechanism with monotone allocations, zero surplus at zero and incentive compatibility, and its expected revenue is at least that of every feasible, incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone allocations and zero surplus at zero. It is optimal for the firm.
Formalization Note The book's Theorem 6.2 also names the first-price auction with reserve price , whose equilibrium bid (6.9) it states without proof; only the second-price form is formalized, and the first-price form would follow from its own equilibrium and Theorem 6.1 since both award the same allocation.
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem reserve_price_auction_optimal (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular)
(hJ : StrictMonoOn (virtualValue V) (Set.Icc 0 V.vbar)) (C : ℕ) (vstar : ℝ)
(hvs : vstar ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) (hJ0 : virtualValue V vstar = 0) :
((secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar).IsFeasible C V.vbar ∧
HasMonotoneAllocation V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) ∧
HasZeroSurplusAtZero V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) ∧
IsIncentiveCompatible V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar)) ∧
∀ M : Mechanism V.N, M.IsFeasible C V.vbar → HasMonotoneAllocation V M → HasZeroSurplusAtZero V M →
IsIncentiveCompatible V M → expRevenue V M ≤ expRevenue V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.