Proposition 1.2, p. 5 — SBT: in a subgame perfect equilibrium M steers to T, T charges p_T = v and earns (1 − f)v − c, M earns fv
ProvedRetailerMarketplace.Entry.proposition_1_sbtconsumer-steeringmarketplacep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing-gamesubgame-perfect-equilibrium
Let , the ad valorem fee, , and let be a product market in which the third-party seller is viable, , supplied by alone (configuration SBT). quotes a price ; observes it and steers inattentive consumers to or not, collecting the fee on 's revenue.
Then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game with
This is the second case of Proposition 1: 's fee revenue from a marketplace product he does not enter.
Formalization Note The statement is existence of an equilibrium with this outcome. Uniqueness is not claimed: at is indifferent between steering choices, and the steering choice affects 's optimal profit.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_Model import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_PricingGame
Formal statement
namespace RetailerMarketplace.Entry
/-- Proposition 1.2 (SBT): when only T supplies a viable product `v` (`v(1 - f) ≥ c`), there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium in which T charges `p_T = v`, M steers inattentive consumers to T,
T earns `π_T^SBT = (1 - f) v - c` and M earns `π_M^SBT = f v`. -/
theorem proposition_1_sbt (c f lam v : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hf : f ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hv : c ≤ v * (1 - f)) :
∃ σ : ℝ → Steer, IsSPNE_SBT c f lam v v σ ∧ σ v = Steer.T ∧
uT_SBT c f lam v v Steer.T = piSBT_T c f v ∧ uM_SBT f lam v v Steer.T = piSBT_M f v := by sorry
end RetailerMarketplace.Entry
Source
Hervas-Drane & Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science (2025), Articles in Advance, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315, p. 5 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 1, item 2, and the restriction to viable markets v(1 − f) ≥ c stated before it
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.