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§4, p. 31 — CS, NNR and IIA imply Pareto optimality (strict social welfare functions)

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.po_of_cs_nnr_iia

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

arrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1paretosocial-choice

Let InI_nIn​ be a committee of n≥2n\ge2n≥2 individuals and SmS_mSm​ a set of m≥3m\ge3m≥3 alternatives, and let u:ρmn→ρmu:\rho_m^n\to\rho_mu:ρmn​→ρm​ be a strict social welfare function. If uuu satisfies citizens' sovereignty (CS), non-negative response (NNR) and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), then uuu is Pareto optimal: for every strict ballot set BBB and alternatives x,yx,yx,y,

x Bˉi y  for all i∈In⟹x Aˉ y,A=u(B).x\,\bar B_i\,y\ \text{ for all } i\in I_n\quad\Longrightarrow\quad x\,\bar A\,y,\qquad A=u(B).xBˉi​y  for all i∈In​⟹xAˉy,A=u(B).

The paper attributes this to Arrow [1, p. 97]. It is the first step of Lemma 7: Pareto optimality is what guarantees that the voting procedure derived from uuu reaches every alternative.

Formalization Note The paper states the claim without cardinality conditions; we state it under the standing hypotheses n≥2n\ge2n≥2, m≥3m\ge3m≥3 of §4 (Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Theorem 2). Some hypothesis is needed: with n=0n=0n=0 and m=1m=1m=1 CS, NNR and IIA hold vacuously but PO fails. CS is read for x≠yx\ne yx=y. Definitions and conventions as in StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.Basic.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence

theorem po_of_cs_nnr_iia {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hcs : CS u) (hnnr : NNR u) (hiia : IIA u) :
    PO u := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), §4, p. 31 (citing Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, p. 97)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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