Theorem 2, p. 13 — R_PP/R_SP is at most the low/medium/high-heterogeneity bound in S, M, D, and each bound is tight (corrected: for D > 0)
ProvedValuePersPricing.Deviation.theorem_2Let be a market: a valuation with almost surely and finite mean , so that the margin lies in . Let be the coefficient of deviation and, for a scale , write for the thresholds of §3.2 at .
Upper bounds. If has scale , then
- if ,
- if ,
- if ,
If has unbounded support (), the Low Heterogeneity bound holds for every .
Tightness. For every mean , cost with , scale and , writing : in each regime that contains (on its closed interval), there is a valuation law with mean , scale and coefficient of deviation for which that regime's bound holds with equality.
The theorem gives a closed-form, tight upper bound on the value of idealized personalized pricing over single pricing from three summary statistics of the valuation distribution; equivalently, the reciprocal of the bound is a tight guarantee on the share of the personalized-pricing profit that one optimal posted price earns.
Formalization Note Ratios are stated multiplicatively, . is a supremum over all real prices and is not assumed attained or positive.
Differences from the source:
- correction: "for any S, M, D there exists a valuation distribution F … such that the corresponding bound is tight" → for every D > 0 in the regime's closed interval; reason: S = 2, c = 0, µ = 1, D = 0 meets every printed assumption, but D = 0 forces V = µ almost surely, whose scale is 1, so no such law exists.
- reading: "For any F with scale S > 1" → S ∈ (1, ∞) plus a separate clause for unbounded support (S = ∞) with the Low Heterogeneity bound; reason: p. 8 says S may be infinite and all bounds remain valid, and p. 13 says that for S = ∞ the low heterogeneity bound always pertains.
- generalization: "there exists F with scale S, margin M and coefficient of deviation D" → for every mean µ and cost c with 0 ≤ c < µ (hence every M ∈ (0,1]) a law with mean µ, cost c, scale S and deviation D; reason: the proof on p. ec3 constructs it "given S, M, D, and µ"; choosing any µ, c with 1 − c/µ = M gives the printed claim.
- encoding: R_PP/R_SP ≤ B and "tight" → R_PP ≤ B·R_SP and R_PP = B·R_SP; reason: R_SP > 0 under the hypotheses, and the product form cannot hold vacuously through a zero denominator.
- encoding: a nonnegative random variable V ∼ F with V ≥ c a.s. → a probability measure ν on ℝ with Market ν c (0 ≤ c, V ≥ c a.s., E|V| < ∞); reason: standing assumptions of §2.
- encoding: S := inf{k | F(k) = 1}/µ → the predicate IsScale ν S (Sµ is the essential supremum of V); reason: the same quantity, without an extended-real infimum.
- encoding: W₋₁ → lambertWm1, defined by choice with the junk value 0 off [−1/e, 0); reason: every argument of W₋₁ in the statement lies in [−1/e, 0) under its hypotheses.
- encoding: margin M > 0 and 0 ≤ D → hypothesis c < µ, and no hypothesis 0 ≤ D; reason: M > 0 ⇔ c < µ, and D ≥ 0 holds for every law.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ValuePersPricing_Deviation_Model open MeasureTheory Set Filter Topology
namespace ValuePersPricing.Deviation
/-- Theorem 2 (Elmachtoub–Gupta–Hamilton, p. 13): the three-regime upper bound on `R_PP / R_SP` in
terms of scale `S`, margin `M` and coefficient of deviation `D`, stated multiplicatively, with the
unbounded-support case (`S = ∞`, pp. 8 and 13), and tightness of each regime's bound on its closed
interval for every `D > 0` (corrected: at `D = 0` no law has scale `S > 1`). -/
theorem theorem_2 :
(∀ (ν : Measure ℝ) (c : ℝ), Market ν c → c < mean ν →
(∀ S : ℝ, 1 < S → IsScale ν S →
(coefDev ν ≤ deltaL (margin ν c) S →
ppProfit ν c ≤ lowBound (margin ν c) (coefDev ν) * spProfit ν c) ∧
(deltaL (margin ν c) S ≤ coefDev ν → coefDev ν ≤ deltaM (margin ν c) S →
ppProfit ν c ≤ medBound (margin ν c) S (coefDev ν) * spProfit ν c) ∧
(deltaM (margin ν c) S ≤ coefDev ν → coefDev ν ≤ deltaH (margin ν c) S →
ppProfit ν c ≤ highBound (margin ν c) S (coefDev ν) * spProfit ν c)) ∧
(Unbounded ν →
ppProfit ν c ≤ lowBound (margin ν c) (coefDev ν) * spProfit ν c)) ∧
(∀ μ c S D : ℝ, 0 ≤ c → c < μ → 1 < S → 0 < D →
(D ≤ deltaL (1 - c / μ) S →
∃ ν : Measure ℝ, Market ν c ∧ mean ν = μ ∧ IsScale ν S ∧ coefDev ν = D ∧
ppProfit ν c = lowBound (1 - c / μ) D * spProfit ν c) ∧
(deltaL (1 - c / μ) S ≤ D → D ≤ deltaM (1 - c / μ) S →
∃ ν : Measure ℝ, Market ν c ∧ mean ν = μ ∧ IsScale ν S ∧ coefDev ν = D ∧
ppProfit ν c = medBound (1 - c / μ) S D * spProfit ν c) ∧
(deltaM (1 - c / μ) S ≤ D → D ≤ deltaH (1 - c / μ) S →
∃ ν : Measure ℝ, Market ν c ∧ mean ν = μ ∧ IsScale ν S ∧ coefDev ν = D ∧
ppProfit ν c = highBound (1 - c / μ) S D * spProfit ν c)) := by sorry
end ValuePersPricing.Deviation
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.