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Lemma 9 (first sentence) — a regular tie-breaker followed by a strict strategy-proof procedure is strategy-proof

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.lemma_9_i

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofnesstie-breakingvoting

Consider a committee of n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 individuals and a finite set SmS_mSm​ of m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 alternatives, with indifference admissible on ballots. Let ν:ρmn→Sm\nu:\rho_m^n\to S_mν:ρmn​→Sm​ be a strict voting procedure that is strategy-proof (against substitutions of strong ballots), and let γ:πmn→ρmn\gamma:\pi_m^n\to\rho_m^nγ:πmn​→ρmn​ be a regular tie-breaking function. If the voting procedure v:πmn→Smv:\pi_m^n\to S_mv:πmn​→Sm​ satisfies

v(B)=ν[γ(B)]for all B∈πmn,v(B)=\nu[\gamma(B)]\qquad\text{for all } B\in\pi_m^n,v(B)=ν[γ(B)]for all B∈πmn​,

then vvv is strategy-proof (against substitutions of arbitrary weak ballots).

Together with the second sentence of Lemma 9 it shows that regular composition with a tie-breaker relates strategy-proofness in strict and non-strict committees; it is one of the three lemmas on which the paper's §6 generalizations (Theorems 1′, 2′, 3′) rest.

Formalization Note The page prints the composition as vnm(B)=vnm[γ(B)]v^{nm}(B)=v^{nm}[\gamma(B)]vnm(B)=vnm[γ(B)] with a Latin vvv on the right, while the same sentence says "where νnm\nu^{nm}νnm is a strict strategy-proof voting procedure" and the proof composes νnm\nu^{nm}νnm with γ\gammaγ; we read the right-hand side as νnm[γ(B)]\nu^{nm}[\gamma(B)]νnm[γ(B)]. The hypotheses n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 and m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 are the paper's standing assumptions on a committee (p. 6).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakGS_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS

/-- **Lemma 9, first sentence** (Satterthwaite, p. 41). In a committee (`n ≥ 1`, `m ≥ 3`), if
`v(B) = ν[γ(B)]` for all `B ∈ π^n_m`, where `ν` is a strict strategy-proof voting procedure and `γ`
is a regular tie-breaking function, then `v` is strategy-proof. -/
theorem lemma_9_i {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
    (hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (v : VotingProcedure ι A) (ν : StrictVotingProcedure ι A)
    (γ : WeakProfile ι A → StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.StrongProfile ι A)
    (hν : StrictStrategyProof ν) (hγ : IsRegularTieBreaking γ)
    (hv : ∀ B : WeakProfile ι A, v B = ν (γ B)) :
    StrategyProof v := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 9 (first sentence), p. 41
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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