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Proposition 8, p. 22 — for δ ≤ δ2 the platform's optimal loan rate is r_f if c ≤ a(1−φ)²/(1+r_f) and below r_f otherwise

Proved
PlatformFinance.EndogRate.proposition_8

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

endogenous-interest-ratep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-financingstackelberg-gamesupply-chain-finance

The platform first sets the interest rate rrr of its loan; then the supplier and the seller play the platform-financing game at rate rrr. The platform maximizes its equilibrium profit

ΠpP(r)=E[φ(a~−qP)qP+min⁡{(1−φ)(a~−qP)qP,  wPqP(1+r)}]−wPqP(1+rf)\Pi^P_p(r) = \mathbb E\big[\varphi(\tilde a-q^P)q^P + \min\{(1-\varphi)(\tilde a-q^P)q^P,\; w^Pq^P(1+r)\}\big] - w^Pq^P(1+r_f)ΠpP​(r)=E[φ(a~−qP)qP+min{(1−φ)(a~−qP)qP,wPqP(1+r)}]−wPqP(1+rf​)

over the rates −1<r≤r^1(δ)-1<r\le \hat r_1(\delta)−1<r≤r^1​(δ) that keep the seller willing to participate.

Assume 0<δ<a0<\delta<a0<δ<a, 0≤φ<10\le\varphi<10≤φ<1, c>0c>0c>0, rf≥0r_f\ge0rf​≥0, (1−φ)a>c(1+rf)(1-\varphi)a>c(1+r_f)(1−φ)a>c(1+rf​) and low uncertainty, δ≤δ2\delta\le\delta_2δ≤δ2​. Fix, for every feasible rrr, a subgame-perfect equilibrium (wP(r),qP(r))(w^P(r), q^P(r))(wP(r),qP(r)) of the stage game, and let ΠpP(r)\Pi^P_p(r)ΠpP​(r) be the platform's profit in it. Then:

  1. If c≤a(1−φ)21+rfc \le \dfrac{a(1-\varphi)^2}{1+r_f}c≤1+rf​a(1−φ)2​, the rate r∗=rfr^*=r_fr∗=rf​ is feasible and is the unique optimal rate: ΠpP(r)<ΠpP(rf)\Pi^P_p(r) < \Pi^P_p(r_f)ΠpP​(r)<ΠpP​(rf​) for every feasible r≠rfr\ne r_fr=rf​.
  2. If c>a(1−φ)21+rfc > \dfrac{a(1-\varphi)^2}{1+r_f}c>1+rf​a(1−φ)2​, an optimal rate exists, and every optimal rate r∗r^*r∗ satisfies r∗<rfr^* < r_fr∗<rf​.

At low market uncertainty, then, the platform subsidizes the loan below its own capital cost exactly when the product's production cost is high.

Formalization Note The page's "the platform sets r∗=rfr^*=r_fr∗=rf​" is read as rfr_frf​ being the unique maximizer, and "r∗<rfr^*<r_fr∗<rf​" as existence of a maximizer plus every maximizer lying below rfr_frf​ (without existence the second clause would hold vacuously). The feasible set keeps the page's constraint r≤r^1(δ)r\le\hat r_1(\delta)r≤r^1​(δ) (p. 22) and adds r>−1r>-1r>−1, condition (iii) of p. 36. The page states δ≤δ2\delta\le\delta_2δ≤δ2​ while its proof writes δ<δ2\delta<\delta_2δ<δ2​; the statement follows the page. δ<a\delta<aδ<a is the reading of p. 8's assumption that the market clearing price is always positive.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PlatformFinance_EndogRate_Model
Formal statement
namespace PlatformFinance.EndogRate

/-- Proposition 8 (p. 22): for `δ ≤ δ2`, the platform choosing its loan rate `r` subject to the
seller's participation `r ≤ r̂1(δ)` (and `r > -1`), with the stage-2 game played in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium `σP r` at every feasible `r`, sets `r* = rf` (the unique optimum)
if `c ≤ a(1 - φ)²/(1 + rf)`, and an optimal rate exists and every optimal rate is `< rf` if
`c > a(1 - φ)²/(1 + rf)`. -/
theorem proposition_8 (a δ φ c rf : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hδa : δ < a) (hφ0 : 0 ≤ φ) (hφ1 : φ < 1)
    (hc : 0 < c) (hrf : 0 ≤ rf) (hprof : c * (1 + rf) < (1 - φ) * a)
    (hδ2 : δ ≤ delta2 a φ c rf)
    (σP : ℝ → Profile)
    (hP : ∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf → IsSPEP a δ φ c rf r (σP r)) :
    (c ≤ cbar a φ rf →
      -1 < rf ∧ rf ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf ∧
        ∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf → r ≠ rf →
          platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) < platformProfitP a δ φ rf rf (σP rf)) ∧
    (cbar a φ rf < c →
      (∃ rs : ℝ, -1 < rs ∧ rs ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf ∧
        ∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
          platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) ≤ platformProfitP a δ φ rf rs (σP rs)) ∧
      ∀ rs : ℝ, -1 < rs → rs ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
        (∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
          platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) ≤ platformProfitP a δ φ rf rs (σP rs)) →
        rs < rf) := by sorry

end PlatformFinance.EndogRate
Source
Huang, Lai, Wang & Xiao, Lending to Third-party Sellers with Platform Loan, SSRN 4014045, p. 22, Proposition 8 (problem formulated pp. 21–22); proof p. 43
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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