Proposition 8, p. 22 — for δ ≤ δ2 the platform's optimal loan rate is r_f if c ≤ a(1−φ)²/(1+r_f) and below r_f otherwise
ProvedPlatformFinance.EndogRate.proposition_8The platform first sets the interest rate of its loan; then the supplier and the seller play the platform-financing game at rate . The platform maximizes its equilibrium profit
over the rates that keep the seller willing to participate.
Assume , , , , and low uncertainty, . Fix, for every feasible , a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game, and let be the platform's profit in it. Then:
- If , the rate is feasible and is the unique optimal rate: for every feasible .
- If , an optimal rate exists, and every optimal rate satisfies .
At low market uncertainty, then, the platform subsidizes the loan below its own capital cost exactly when the product's production cost is high.
Formalization Note The page's "the platform sets " is read as being the unique maximizer, and "" as existence of a maximizer plus every maximizer lying below (without existence the second clause would hold vacuously). The feasible set keeps the page's constraint (p. 22) and adds , condition (iii) of p. 36. The page states while its proof writes ; the statement follows the page. is the reading of p. 8's assumption that the market clearing price is always positive.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PlatformFinance_EndogRate_Model
namespace PlatformFinance.EndogRate
/-- Proposition 8 (p. 22): for `δ ≤ δ2`, the platform choosing its loan rate `r` subject to the
seller's participation `r ≤ r̂1(δ)` (and `r > -1`), with the stage-2 game played in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium `σP r` at every feasible `r`, sets `r* = rf` (the unique optimum)
if `c ≤ a(1 - φ)²/(1 + rf)`, and an optimal rate exists and every optimal rate is `< rf` if
`c > a(1 - φ)²/(1 + rf)`. -/
theorem proposition_8 (a δ φ c rf : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hδa : δ < a) (hφ0 : 0 ≤ φ) (hφ1 : φ < 1)
(hc : 0 < c) (hrf : 0 ≤ rf) (hprof : c * (1 + rf) < (1 - φ) * a)
(hδ2 : δ ≤ delta2 a φ c rf)
(σP : ℝ → Profile)
(hP : ∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf → IsSPEP a δ φ c rf r (σP r)) :
(c ≤ cbar a φ rf →
-1 < rf ∧ rf ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf ∧
∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf → r ≠ rf →
platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) < platformProfitP a δ φ rf rf (σP rf)) ∧
(cbar a φ rf < c →
(∃ rs : ℝ, -1 < rs ∧ rs ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf ∧
∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) ≤ platformProfitP a δ φ rf rs (σP rs)) ∧
∀ rs : ℝ, -1 < rs → rs ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
(∀ r : ℝ, -1 < r → r ≤ rhat1 a δ φ c rf →
platformProfitP a δ φ rf r (σP r) ≤ platformProfitP a δ φ rf rs (σP rs)) →
rs < rf) := by sorry
end PlatformFinance.EndogRate
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.