Theorem 6.1 — an efficient ψ is the Shapley value on {v_S} iff the participation game Γ(ψ, c, v) is a potential game
ProvedMondererShapley.Participation.theorem_6_1Let be a finite set of players, an efficient solution on , and , i.e. is a real function on the coalitions of with . Let be the participation game, in which each player either stays out and receives or participates and receives , being the set of participants. Then
where is the Shapley value of the restriction of to the subsets of .
This is the local characterisation of the Shapley value in Section 6: the cooperative solution concept is recovered from a strategic property (existence of an exact potential) of a non-cooperative game built from it, for any outside options .
Formalization Note Players form a finite type ι; strategies are Bool (true = participate). A solution is ψ : Finset ι → (Finset ι → ℝ) → ι → ℝ with ψ S v playing the role of (see the definition Solution); this admits more solutions than the paper's, all of which are covered. The Shapley value formula is supplied (shapleyOn) since the paper does not state it. The hypothesis v ∅ = 0 is "".
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_shapleyOn import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff
namespace MondererShapley.Participation
/-- Theorem 6.1: an efficient solution `ψ` is the Shapley value on `{v_S : S ∈ 2^N}` iff the
participation game `Γ(ψ, c, v)` is a potential game. -/
theorem theorem_6_1 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι)
(hψ : IsEfficient ψ) (c : ι → ℝ) (v : Finset ι → ℝ) (hv : v ∅ = 0) :
(∀ S : Finset ι, ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S v i = shapleyOn S v i) ↔
MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame (Y := fun _ : ι => Bool) (participationPayoff ψ c v) := by sorry
end MondererShapley.Participation
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.