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Theorem 6.1 — an efficient ψ is the Shapley value on {v_S} iff the participation game Γ(ψ, c, v) is a potential game

Proved
MondererShapley.Participation.theorem_6_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperative-gamesgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-gamesshapley-value

Let NNN be a finite set of players, ψ\psiψ an efficient solution on G=⋃S∈2NG(S)G = \bigcup_{S \in 2^N} G(S)G=⋃S∈2N​G(S), c∈RNc \in \mathbb R^Nc∈RN and v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N), i.e. vvv is a real function on the coalitions of NNN with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset) = 0v(∅)=0. Let Γ=Γ(ψ,c,v)\Gamma = \Gamma(\psi, c, v)Γ=Γ(ψ,c,v) be the participation game, in which each player either stays out and receives cic^ici or participates and receives ψ(vS)(i)\psi(v_{S})(i)ψ(vS​)(i), SSS being the set of participants. Then

ψ(vS)(i)=φi(vS)  for every S⊆N and i∈S⟺Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game,\psi(v_S)(i) = \varphi_i(v_S)\ \ \text{for every } S \subseteq N \text{ and } i \in S \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \Gamma(\psi, c, v) \text{ is a potential game},ψ(vS​)(i)=φi​(vS​)  for every S⊆N and i∈S⟺Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game,

where φ(vS)\varphi(v_S)φ(vS​) is the Shapley value of the restriction vSv_SvS​ of vvv to the subsets of SSS.

This is the local characterisation of the Shapley value in Section 6: the cooperative solution concept is recovered from a strategic property (existence of an exact potential) of a non-cooperative game built from it, for any outside options ccc.

Formalization Note Players form a finite type ι; strategies are Bool (true = participate). A solution is ψ : Finset ι → (Finset ι → ℝ) → ι → ℝ with ψ S v playing the role of ψ(vS)\psi(v_S)ψ(vS​) (see the definition Solution); this admits more solutions than the paper's, all of which are covered. The Shapley value formula is supplied (shapleyOn) since the paper does not state it. The hypothesis v ∅ = 0 is "v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N)".

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_shapleyOn
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation

/-- Theorem 6.1: an efficient solution `ψ` is the Shapley value on `{v_S : S ∈ 2^N}` iff the
participation game `Γ(ψ, c, v)` is a potential game. -/
theorem theorem_6_1 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι)
    (hψ : IsEfficient ψ) (c : ι → ℝ) (v : Finset ι → ℝ) (hv : v ∅ = 0) :
    (∀ S : Finset ι, ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S v i = shapleyOn S v i) ↔
      MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame (Y := fun _ : ι => Bool) (participationPayoff ψ c v) := by sorry

end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), Theorem 6.1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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