Revenue-optimal DSIC/IR mechanism on a finite support
DefinitionDSICCompComp_Supplement_IsRevenueOptimallp-dualitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization
is a revenue-optimal DSIC/IR mechanism if it is an optimal solution of the DSIC revenue LP: and
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_InPPlus
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_lpRevenue
namespace DSICCompComp
namespace Supplement
/-- `(x*, p*)` is a revenue-optimal DSIC/IR mechanism on the finite support
(Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Theorem C.4, p.36 (pdf p.37)): an optimal solution of the DSIC revenue LP, i.e. `(x*, p*) ∈ P⁺(D)`
and its revenue is at least that of every `(x, p) ∈ P⁺(D)`. -/
def IsRevenueOptimal {n m : ℕ} (E : FiniteSetting n m) (sol : LPSolution E) : Prop :=
InPPlus E sol ∧ ∀ sol' : LPSolution E, InPPlus E sol' → lpRevenue E sol' ≤ lpRevenue E sol
end Supplement
end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Theorem C.4, p.36 (pdf p.37)