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Theorem 2, p. 1002 (parts (a)–(c) for a given contract) — any (w*, T*) set as in Theorem 2 has u*>0, b*∈(s,w*), coordinates, and splits profit κ / Π−κ

Proved
ChannelRebate.Effort.theorem2_coordination_of_set

by tianyipeng · Nov 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-coordinationchannel-rebatesales-effortsupply-chain-contracts

Let 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, s<cs<cs<c, a>0a>0a>0, ξ∼Uniform(0,1)\xi\sim\mathrm{Uniform}(0,1)ξ∼Uniform(0,1), V(e)=ae2/2V(e)=ae^2/2V(e)=ae2/2. Let Qˉ0\bar Q_0Qˉ​0​ solve Φ(Qˉ0)=p−cp−s\Phi(\bar Q_0)=\frac{p-c}{p-s}Φ(Qˉ​0​)=p−sp−c​, eˉ=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ0)/a\bar e=(p-s)\Gamma(\bar Q_0)/aeˉ=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ​0​)/a, Qˉ=eˉQˉ0\bar Q=\bar e\bar Q_0Qˉ​=eˉQˉ​0​ and Π=Λ(eˉ)\Pi=\Lambda(\bar e)Π=Λ(eˉ), and fix κ∈(0,Π)\kappa\in(0,\Pi)κ∈(0,Π). For a wholesale price www and a target TTT the contract (w,u(T),b(T),T)(w,u(T),b(T),T)(w,u(T),b(T),T) uses the rebate u(T)u(T)u(T) and return credit b(T)b(T)b(T) of p. 1001; T1(w)T_1(w)T1​(w), T2(w)T_2(w)T2​(w) are the fixed points of m1(T)=e‾τm_1(T)=\underline e\taum1​(T)=e​τ and m2(T)=eˉτm_2(T)=\bar e\taum2​(T)=eˉτ (Lemma 6), L‾(T,w)\underline L(T,w)L​(T,w) is the retailer's profit at effort e‾\underline ee​ and order e‾ Q‾0\underline e\,\underline Q_0e​Q​0​, and Lˉ(T)\bar L(T)Lˉ(T) her profit at effort eˉ\bar eeˉ and order eˉ Q‾1\bar e\,\underline Q_1eˉQ​1​. Say (w∗,T∗)(w^*,T^*)(w∗,T∗) is set as in Theorem 2 for ε\varepsilonε when w∗∈(c,p)w^*\in(c,p)w∗∈(c,p), T∗∈(T1(w∗),T2(w∗))T^*\in(T_1(w^*),T_2(w^*))T∗∈(T1​(w∗),T2​(w∗)) (for some fixed points T1,T2T_1,T_2T1​,T2​), L‾(T∗,w∗)=κ−ε\underline L(T^*,w^*)=\kappa-\varepsilonL​(T∗,w∗)=κ−ε and Lˉ(T∗)=κ\bar L(T^*)=\kappaLˉ(T∗)=κ.

Claim. Let ε∈(0,κ)\varepsilon\in(0,\kappa)ε∈(0,κ) and let (w∗,T∗)(w^*,T^*)(w∗,T∗) be set as in Theorem 2 for ε\varepsilonε; write u∗=u(T∗)u^*=u(T^*)u∗=u(T∗), b∗=b(T∗)b^*=b(T^*)b∗=b(T∗). Then

  1. u∗>0u^*>0u∗>0, s<b∗<w∗s<b^*<w^*s<b∗<w∗ and T∗>0T^*>0T∗>0;
  2. (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q,\bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) is the unique maximizer of the retailer's profit R(Q,e∣T∗)R(Q,e\mid T^*)R(Q,e∣T∗) over Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0, e≥0e\ge 0e≥0 (channel coordination);
  3. R(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=κR(\bar Q,\bar e\mid T^*)=\kappaR(Qˉ​,eˉ∣T∗)=κ and the manufacturer's profit is M(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=Π−κM(\bar Q,\bar e\mid T^*)=\Pi-\kappaM(Qˉ​,eˉ∣T∗)=Π−κ.

This is the "for every such pair" half of Theorem 2 (the conclusions of (a), and (b), (c)); it holds for every ε∈(0,κ)\varepsilon\in(0,\kappa)ε∈(0,κ), no smallness being needed. The manufacturer's profit MMM is defined from the cash flows (wholesale revenue, rebate paid, units bought back at bbb and salvaged at sss), so that R+MR+MR+M is the integrated-channel profit.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Effort_Setting

open MeasureTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Effort

theorem theorem2_coordination_of_set
    (p c s a : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p) (hsc : s < c) (ha : 0 < a)
    (Qb : ℝ) (hQb : IsQbar0 p c s Qb)
    (κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκPi : κ < Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb))
    (ε : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) (hεκ : ε < κ) :
    ∀ w T : ℝ, c < w → w < p →
      (∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) →
      IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) → IsLbar p c s a w T κ →
        (0 < uT p c s a w T ∧ s < bT p c s a w T ∧ bT p c s a w T < w ∧ 0 < T) ∧
        optimalPairs (R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T) =
          {(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb, ebarOf p s a Qb)} ∧
        R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T
            (ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = κ ∧
        M c s w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) T
            (ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb) - κ := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.Effort
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 1002, Theorem 2 (with u(T), b(T), T₁, T₂ of p. 1001 and L̲, L̄ of p. 1002); proof pp. 1005–1006

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