Theorem 2, p. 1002 (parts (a)–(c) for a given contract) — any (w*, T*) set as in Theorem 2 has u*>0, b*∈(s,w*), coordinates, and splits profit κ / Π−κ
ProvedChannelRebate.Effort.theorem2_coordination_of_setchannel-coordinationchannel-rebatesales-effortsupply-chain-contracts
Let , , , , . Let solve , , and , and fix . For a wholesale price and a target the contract uses the rebate and return credit of p. 1001; , are the fixed points of and (Lemma 6), is the retailer's profit at effort and order , and her profit at effort and order . Say is set as in Theorem 2 for when , (for some fixed points ), and .
Claim. Let and let be set as in Theorem 2 for ; write , . Then
- , and ;
- is the unique maximizer of the retailer's profit over , (channel coordination);
- and the manufacturer's profit is .
This is the "for every such pair" half of Theorem 2 (the conclusions of (a), and (b), (c)); it holds for every , no smallness being needed. The manufacturer's profit is defined from the cash flows (wholesale revenue, rebate paid, units bought back at and salvaged at ), so that is the integrated-channel profit.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Effort_Setting open MeasureTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Effort
theorem theorem2_coordination_of_set
(p c s a : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p) (hsc : s < c) (ha : 0 < a)
(Qb : ℝ) (hQb : IsQbar0 p c s Qb)
(κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκPi : κ < Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb))
(ε : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) (hεκ : ε < κ) :
∀ w T : ℝ, c < w → w < p →
(∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) →
IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) → IsLbar p c s a w T κ →
(0 < uT p c s a w T ∧ s < bT p c s a w T ∧ bT p c s a w T < w ∧ 0 < T) ∧
optimalPairs (R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T) =
{(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb, ebarOf p s a Qb)} ∧
R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T
(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = κ ∧
M c s w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) T
(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb) - κ := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Effort
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 1002, Theorem 2 (with u(T), b(T), T₁, T₂ of p. 1001 and L̲, L̄ of p. 1002); proof pp. 1005–1006