Eq. (EC.6), p. ec2 — for c = 0, µ = 1 and scale S: R_PP/R_SP ≤ log(S)/D
ProvedValuePersPricing.Deviation.eq_EC_6p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1personalized-pricing
Let satisfy almost surely, with mean and scale , take cost , and let . Then
which for is the bound . It coincides with the Medium Heterogeneity bound of Theorem 2 when , .
Differences from the source:
- generalization: (EC.6) inside the proof of Theorem 2, for F with scale S > 1 → every scale S (S ≥ 1 holds automatically); reason: the derivation uses only the first identity of Lemma 3 and the Pricing Inequality; the added case S = 1 is V = 1 a.s., where both sides are 0; for S > 1 it is the printed claim.
- encoding: R_PP/R_SP ≤ log(S)/D → D·R_PP ≤ log(S)·R_SP; reason: equivalent for D > 0 (R_SP > 0); at D = 0, where log(S)/D is undefined, the product form is still true; this removes only the undefined case.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ValuePersPricing_Deviation_Model open MeasureTheory Set Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ValuePersPricing.Deviation
/-- Eq. (EC.6) (p. ec2), for `c = 0`, `µ = 1` and a law of scale `S`: `R_PP/R_SP ≤ log(S)/D`,
stated multiplicatively as `D · R_PP ≤ log(S) · R_SP`. -/
theorem eq_EC_6 (ν : Measure ℝ) (S : ℝ) (hm : Market ν 0) (hμ : mean ν = 1)
(hS : IsScale ν S) :
coefDev ν * ppProfit ν 0 ≤ Real.log S * spProfit ν 0 := by sorry
end ValuePersPricing.Deviation
Source
Elmachtoub, Gupta & Hamilton, The Value of Personalized Pricing, SSRN 3127719 (review version, PDF sha256 635e22eb…), p. ec2 (PDF 34), Eq. (EC.6)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.