Lemma 7, p. 8876 — within each equilibrium type the platform's profit strictly decreases in the antifake effort
ProvedFakeAccounts.Platform.lemma_7comparative-staticsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformsignaling
For each equilibrium type , the platform's profit
is strictly decreasing in the antifake effort on .
Effort raises the consumers' following cost, lowering the number of real followers and so the advertising revenue, and it costs the platform . This is the first ingredient of the platform's optimal-effort result.
Formalization Note The paper reads each only on the efforts that sustain equilibrium ; the statement holds on all of , which contains each of those ranges, so it is stated there.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FakeAccounts_Platform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace FakeAccounts.Platform
/-- Lemma 7, p. 8876: π_p^pool, π_p^csep and π_p^nsep strictly decrease in d ≥ 0. -/
theorem lemma_7 (P : Params) (hP : Standing P) :
∀ r : Regime, StrictAntiOn (profit P r) (Set.Ici 0) := by sorry
end FakeAccounts.Platform
Source
Huang and Liu, Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts, Management Science 71(10), 2025, p. 8876, Lemma 7
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.