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YukonModule.VCVio.CryptoFoundations.HardnessAssumptions.DiffieHellman.part0

Definition
Yukon_c47804ec84543e90a1df6a93

by yukon · Sep 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

better-codes

Source module VCVio.CryptoFoundations.HardnessAssumptions.DiffieHellman.

Definition code
/-
Copyright (c) 2024 Devon Tuma. All rights reserved.
Released under Apache 2.0 license as described in the file LICENSE.
Authors: Devon Tuma, Quang Dao
-/

module
public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_d98d4e7e5ec3bb11cc1d90f7

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_19e49f429e40ab4a8ab6f6e7

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_3ca8dea642d23c4bd0e25cee

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_423eef2a8735822795222f49



public import Mathlib.Probability.Distributions.Uniform
public import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Card
public import Init
public import Mathlib.Data.Vector.Defs
public import Mathlib.CategoryTheory.Monad.Types
public import Mathlib.Order.CompleteLattice.Basic
public import Mathlib.Probability.ProbabilityMassFunction.Monad
public import Batteries.Control.AlternativeMonad
public import Batteries.Control.OptionT
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Multivariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Univariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Tactic.Common
public import Mathlib.Init
public import Lean.Message
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint.Basic
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint
public import Mathlib.Algebra.Polynomial.Eval.Defs
public import Mathlib.Algebra.MvPolynomial.Eval
public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Vector
public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Pi
public import Mathlib.Data.Fintype.Perm
public import Mathlib.Data.FinEnum
public import Init.Data.UInt.Lemmas
public import Mathlib.Logic.Embedding.Basic
public import Mathlib.Data.List.Sym
public import Mathlib.Topology.Algebra.InfiniteSum.ENNReal
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_d98d4e7e5ec3bb11cc1d90f7
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_423eef2a8735822795222f49
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_19e49f429e40ab4a8ab6f6e7
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_3ca8dea642d23c4bd0e25cee
set_option backward.isDefEq.respectTransparency.types false
/-!
# Discrete Logarithm Assumptions (DLog / CDH / DDH)

Standard hardness assumptions for cryptographic groups, formalized using Mathlib's
`Module F G` for scalar multiplication.

## Mathematical setup

We model a cyclic group as:
- `F` : the scalar field (exponents), e.g. `ZMod p` for a prime-order group
- `G` : the group of elements (e.g. elliptic curve points), with `[AddCommGroup G]`
- `Module F G` : scalar multiplication `a • g` (corresponds to `g^a` in multiplicative notation)
- `g : G` : a fixed generator (public system parameter)

## Notation correspondence

| Textbook (multiplicative) | This file (additive / EC-style) |
|---|---|
| `g^a`                     | `a • g`                         |
| `g^a · g^b = g^{a+b}`    | `a • g + b • g = (a + b) • g`  |
| `(g^a)^b = g^{ab}`       | `b • (a • g) = (b * a) • g`    |

## Assumptions

- **DLog**: given `(g, x • g)`, find `x`
- **CDH**: given `(g, a • g, b • g)`, find `(a * b) • g`
- **DDH**: distinguish `(g, a • g, b • g, (a * b) • g)` from `(g, a • g, b • g, c • g)`
-/

@[expose] public section


open OracleComp OracleSpec ENNReal

namespace DiffieHellman

variable {F : Type} [Field F]
variable {G : Type} [AddCommGroup G] [Module F G]

/-! ## DLog (Discrete Logarithm) -/

/-- A DLog adversary receives a generator and a group element, and tries to find the
discrete logarithm (scalar). -/
def DLogAdversary (F G : Type) := G → G → ProbComp F

section DLog

variable [DecidableEq F] [SampleableType F]

/-- DLog experiment: sample a random scalar `x`, give the adversary `(g, x • g)`,
and check whether the adversary's guess equals `x`. -/
def dlogExp (g : G) (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) : ProbComp Bool := do
  let x ← $ᵗ F
  let x' ← adversary g (x • g)
  return decide (x' = x)

end DLog

/-! ## CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) -/

/-- A CDH adversary receives `(g, a • g, b • g)` and tries to compute `(a * b) • g`.
`_F` is a phantom type parameter for the scalar field, enabling Lean to infer `F`
at call sites of `cdhExp`. -/
def CDHAdversary (_F G : Type) := G → G → G → ProbComp G

section CDH

variable [SampleableType F] [DecidableEq G]

/-- CDH experiment: sample random scalars `a, b`, give the adversary `(g, a • g, b • g)`,
and check whether the adversary's output equals `(a * b) • g`. -/
def cdhExp (g : G) (adversary : CDHAdversary F G) : ProbComp Bool := do
  let a ← $ᵗ F; let b ← $ᵗ F
  let h ← adversary g (a • g) (b • g)
  return decide (h = (a * b) • g)

end CDH

/-! ## DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman) -/

/-- A DDH adversary receives `(g, A, B, T)` and guesses whether `T = (a * b) • g`
(real) or `T` is a random group element (random).
`_F` is a phantom type parameter for the scalar field, enabling Lean to infer `F`
at call sites of `ddhExp` and related definitions. -/
def DDHAdversary (_F G : Type) := G → G → G → G → ProbComp Bool

section DDH

variable [SampleableType F]

/-- DDH experiment: sample random scalars `a, b` and a bit. If the bit is `true`, set
`c = a * b` (the real DH scalar); otherwise sample `c ← $ᵗ F` independently. The adversary
receives `(g, a • g, b • g, c • g)` and wins by guessing the bit.

All sampling is from the scalar field `F`, so the experiment is well-defined for any
`Module F G` without requiring that `g` generates all of `G`. -/
def ddhExp (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) : ProbComp Bool := do
  let a ← $ᵗ F; let b ← $ᵗ F
  let bit ← $ᵗ Bool
  let c ← if bit then pure (a * b) else $ᵗ F
  let b' ← adversary g (a • g) (b • g) (c • g)
  return (bit == b')

/-- DDH advantage: absolute distance from random guessing (1/2).
Uses `ℝ` with absolute value rather than `ℝ≥0∞` subtraction, which would silently
saturate at zero for adversaries that guess the wrong bit more often than not. -/
noncomputable def ddhGuessAdvantage (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) : ℝ :=
  |(Pr[= true | ddhExp g adversary]).toReal - 1 / 2|

/-! ## DDH: Two-game formulation -/

/-- DDH real game: the adversary receives a genuine DH triple `(g, a • g, b • g, (a * b) • g)`. -/
def ddhExpReal (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) : ProbComp Bool := do
  let a ← $ᵗ F; let b ← $ᵗ F
  adversary g (a • g) (b • g) ((a * b) • g)

/-- DDH random game: the adversary receives `(g, a • g, b • g, c • g)` with independent
`c ← $ᵗ F`. -/
def ddhExpRand (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) : ProbComp Bool := do
  let a ← $ᵗ F; let b ← $ᵗ F; let c ← $ᵗ F
  adversary g (a • g) (b • g) (c • g)

/-- Two-game DDH advantage: `|Pr[output 1 | real] - Pr[output 1 | random]|`. -/
noncomputable def ddhDistAdvantage (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) : ℝ :=
  |(Pr[= true | ddhExpReal g adversary]).toReal -
    (Pr[= true | ddhExpRand g adversary]).toReal|

/-- Baseline success probability for matching an independently uniform DH target sampled from the
scalar space and mapped into the subgroup generated by `g`. -/
noncomputable def uniformDHTargetSuccessProb (F : Type) [Fintype F] : ℝ :=
  ((Fintype.card F : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹).toReal

end DDH

/-! ## Standard reductions among DLog / CDH / DDH -/

section Reductions

variable [DecidableEq G]

/-- Reduction from CDH solving to DDH distinguishing: compute a candidate DH share and compare it
with the target group element. This is the concrete reduction underlying the hardness implication
`DDH ⇒ CDH`. -/
def cdhToDDHReduction (adversary : CDHAdversary F G) : DDHAdversary F G := fun g A B T => do
  let h ← adversary g A B
  return decide (h = T)

/-- Reduction from DLog solving to CDH solving: recover the two exponents separately and rebuild
the shared DH value. This is the concrete reduction underlying `CDH ⇒ DLog`. -/
def dlogToCDHReduction (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) : CDHAdversary F G := fun g A B => do
  let a ← adversary g A
  let b ← adversary g B
  return (a * b) • g

/-- Direct DLog-to-DDH reduction obtained by composing the standard DLog-to-CDH and CDH-to-DDH
reductions. This is the concrete reduction underlying `DDH ⇒ DLog`. -/
def dlogToDDHReduction (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) : DDHAdversary F G :=
  cdhToDDHReduction (F := F) (dlogToCDHReduction (F := F) adversary)

end Reductions

section DDHBranch

variable [SampleableType F]

/-- The single-game DDH experiment can be decomposed as a uniform-bit branch over
the real and random DDH games. -/
private lemma ddhExp_probOutput_eq_branch (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) :
    Pr[= true | ddhExp g adversary] =
    Pr[= true | do
      let bit ← ($ᵗ Bool)
      let z ← if bit then ddhExpReal g adversary
               else ddhExpRand g adversary
      pure (bit == z)] := by
  unfold ddhExp
  rw [probOutput_bind_congr fun a _ => probOutput_bind_bind_swap _ _ _ _,
      probOutput_bind_bind_swap]
  refine probOutput_bind_congr' ($ᵗ Bool) true fun bit => ?_
  cases bit <;> simp [ddhExpReal, ddhExpRand]

/-- The single-game DDH decomposes: `Pr[win] - 1/2 = (Pr[real=1] - Pr[rand=1]) / 2`. -/
lemma ddhExp_probOutput_sub_half (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) :
    (Pr[= true | ddhExp g adversary]).toReal - 1 / 2 =
    ((Pr[= true | ddhExpReal g adversary]).toReal -
      (Pr[= true | ddhExpRand g adversary]).toReal) / 2 := by
  rw [ddhExp_probOutput_eq_branch]
  exact probOutput_uniformBool_branch_toReal_sub_half _ _

/-- The two DDH advantage formulations are related by a factor of 2:
`ddhDistAdvantage = 2 * ddhGuessAdvantage`. -/
theorem ddhDistAdvantage_eq_two_mul_ddhGuessAdvantage (g : G) (adversary : DDHAdversary F G) :
    ddhDistAdvantage g adversary = 2 * ddhGuessAdvantage g adversary := by
  unfold ddhDistAdvantage ddhGuessAdvantage
  rw [ddhExp_probOutput_sub_half (F := F) g adversary, abs_div, abs_two]
  ring

end DDHBranch

section CDHToDDH

variable [SampleableType F] [DecidableEq G]

/-- In the real DDH game, the CDH-to-DDH reduction succeeds exactly when the underlying CDH
adversary computed the correct shared DH value. -/
theorem probOutput_ddhExpReal_cdhToDDHReduction_eq_cdhExp (g : G) (adversary : CDHAdversary F G) :
    Pr[= true | ddhExpReal g (cdhToDDHReduction (F := F) adversary)] =
      Pr[= true | cdhExp g adversary] := rfl

private lemma probOutput_decide_smul_eq_inv_card
    [Fintype F] (g : G) (hg : Function.Bijective (· • g : F → G)) (h : G) :
    Pr[= true | ($ᵗ F) >>= fun c => pure (decide (h = c • g))] =
      (Fintype.card F : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ := by
  obtain ⟨c₀, rfl⟩ := hg.surjective h
  simp only [probOutput_bind_eq_tsum, probOutput_uniformSample, probOutput_pure]
  rw [tsum_fintype, Finset.sum_eq_single c₀]
  · simp
  · intro c _ hne
    simp [show c₀ • g ≠ c • g from fun heq => hne (hg.injective heq).symm]
  · exact absurd (Finset.mem_univ c₀)

/-- In the random DDH game, the CDH-to-DDH reduction only matches the target with the uniform
baseline probability. The bijectivity assumption identifies scalar samples with uniformly sampled
group elements in the subgroup generated by `g`. -/
theorem probOutput_ddhExpRand_cdhToDDHReduction_eq_uniformScalar
    [Fintype F] (g : G) (hg : Function.Bijective (· • g : F → G))
    (adversary : CDHAdversary F G) :
    Pr[= true | ddhExpRand g (cdhToDDHReduction (F := F) adversary)] =
      (Fintype.card F : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ := by
  simp only [ddhExpRand, cdhToDDHReduction]
  have key : ∀ a b : F,
      Pr[= true | ($ᵗ F) >>= fun c =>
        adversary g (a • g) (b • g) >>= fun h =>
          pure (decide (h = c • g))] =
        (Fintype.card F : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ := by
    intro a b
    rw [probOutput_bind_bind_swap, probOutput_bind_of_const _ fun h _ =>
      probOutput_decide_smul_eq_inv_card g hg h]
    simp [probFailure_of_liftM_PMF]
  rw [probOutput_bind_of_const _ fun a _ =>
    probOutput_bind_of_const _ fun b _ => key a b]
  simp [probFailure_of_liftM_PMF]

/-- Concrete form of the hardness implication `DDH ⇒ CDH`: a CDH solver can only beat the uniform
DH-target baseline by the DDH distinguishing advantage of the associated adversary-map reduction. -/
theorem cdhSuccess_toReal_le_uniform_add_ddhDistAdvantage
    [Fintype F] (g : G) (hg : Function.Bijective (· • g : F → G))
    (adversary : CDHAdversary F G) :
    (Pr[= true | cdhExp g adversary]).toReal ≤
      uniformDHTargetSuccessProb F +
        ddhDistAdvantage g (cdhToDDHReduction (F := F) adversary) := by
  unfold ddhDistAdvantage uniformDHTargetSuccessProb
  rw [← probOutput_ddhExpReal_cdhToDDHReduction_eq_cdhExp g adversary,
      probOutput_ddhExpRand_cdhToDDHReduction_eq_uniformScalar g hg adversary]
  exact le_add_of_sub_left_le (le_abs_self _)

end CDHToDDH

section DLogToCDH

variable [DecidableEq F] [SampleableType F] [DecidableEq G]

omit [DecidableEq G] in
private lemma dlogExp_probOutput_eq_tsum (g : G) (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) :
    Pr[= true | dlogExp g adversary] =
      ∑' x : F, Pr[= x | $ᵗ F] * Pr[= x | adversary g (x • g)] := by
  unfold dlogExp
  rw [probOutput_bind_eq_tsum]
  refine tsum_congr fun x => ?_
  congr 1
  rw [probOutput_bind_eq_tsum]
  refine (tsum_eq_single x fun x' hx' => ?_).trans (by simp)
  simp [show (decide (x' = x) : Bool) = false by simp [hx']]

omit [DecidableEq F] in
private lemma cdhExp_dlogToCDHReduction_probOutput_eq_tsum (g : G) (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) :
    Pr[= true | cdhExp g (dlogToCDHReduction (F := F) adversary)] =
      ∑' (a : F) (b : F) (a' : F) (b' : F),
        Pr[= a | $ᵗ F] * (Pr[= b | $ᵗ F] * (Pr[= a' | adversary g (a • g)] *
          (Pr[= b' | adversary g (b • g)] *
            (if (a' * b') • g = (a * b) • g then 1 else 0)))) := by
  unfold cdhExp dlogToCDHReduction
  simp only [monad_norm, probOutput_bind_eq_tsum, ← ENNReal.tsum_mul_left]
  refine tsum_congr fun a => tsum_congr fun b => tsum_congr fun a' => tsum_congr fun b' => ?_
  simp [probOutput_pure]

/-- Concrete form of the hardness implication `CDH ⇒ DLog`: if a DLog adversary succeeds with
probability `p`, the induced CDH adversary succeeds with probability at least `p^2`. -/
theorem dlogSuccess_sq_le_cdhSuccess_dlogToCDHReduction
    (g : G) (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) :
    (Pr[= true | dlogExp g adversary]).toReal ^ 2 ≤
      (Pr[= true | cdhExp g (dlogToCDHReduction (F := F) adversary)]).toReal := by
  rw [← ENNReal.toReal_pow]
  refine ENNReal.toReal_mono probOutput_ne_top ?_
  set w : F → ℝ≥0∞ := fun x => Pr[= x | $ᵗ F]
  set f : F → ℝ≥0∞ := fun x => Pr[= x | adversary g (x • g)]
  rw [sq, dlogExp_probOutput_eq_tsum, ← ENNReal.tsum_mul_right,
    cdhExp_dlogToCDHReduction_probOutput_eq_tsum]
  refine ENNReal.tsum_le_tsum fun a => ?_
  rw [← ENNReal.tsum_mul_left]
  refine ENNReal.tsum_le_tsum fun b => ?_
  calc w a * f a * (w b * f b)
      = w a * (w b * (f a * (f b * (if (a * b) • g = (a * b) • g then 1 else 0)))) := by
        simp only [if_true, mul_one]
        ring
    _ ≤ ∑' (b' : F), w a * (w b * (f a *
          (Pr[= b' | adversary g (b • g)] *
            (if (a * b') • g = (a * b) • g then 1 else 0)))) := ENNReal.le_tsum b
    _ ≤ ∑' (a' : F) (b' : F), w a * (w b * (Pr[= a' | adversary g (a • g)] *
          (Pr[= b' | adversary g (b • g)] *
            (if (a' * b') • g = (a * b) • g then 1 else 0)))) := ENNReal.le_tsum a

/-- Concrete form of the hardness implication `DDH ⇒ DLog`, obtained by composing the previous two
adversary-map reductions. -/
theorem dlogSuccess_sq_le_uniform_add_ddhDistAdvantage
    [Fintype F] (g : G) (hg : Function.Bijective (· • g : F → G))
    (adversary : DLogAdversary F G) :
    (Pr[= true | dlogExp g adversary]).toReal ^ 2 ≤
      uniformDHTargetSuccessProb F +
        ddhDistAdvantage g (dlogToDDHReduction (F := F) adversary) :=
  (dlogSuccess_sq_le_cdhSuccess_dlogToCDHReduction g adversary).trans
    (cdhSuccess_toReal_le_uniform_add_ddhDistAdvantage g hg (dlogToCDHReduction (F := F) adversary))

end DLogToCDH

/-! ## Generable relation for discrete log -/

section DLogGenerable

variable {F : Type} [Field F] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [SampleableType F]
variable {G : Type} [AddCommGroup G] [Module F G] [Fintype G] [SampleableType G] [DecidableEq G]
variable (g : G)

/-- The discrete log relation is generable by sampling `sk ← $ᵗ F` and returning
`(sk • g, sk)`. -/
def dlogGenerable :
    GenerableRelation G F (fun pk sk => decide (sk • g = pk)) where
  gen := do let sk ← $ᵗ F; return (sk • g, sk)
  gen_sound := fun _ _ _ => by grind

end DLogGenerable

/-! ## Cyclic group instantiation helpers -/

section CyclicInstantiation

variable {G : Type} [AddCommGroup G] [Fintype G]

/-- A generator `g` is nondegenerate if `fun a => a.val • g` surjects onto `G`,
ruling out the trivial case. Uses additive notation consistent with `Module F G`. -/
def NondegenerateGenerator (g : G) : Prop :=
  Function.Surjective fun a : Fin (Fintype.card G) => a.val • g

/-- A nondegenerate generator of a nontrivial group is nonzero. -/
lemma NondegenerateGenerator.ne_zero [Nontrivial G] {g : G}
    (hg : NondegenerateGenerator (G := G) g) : g ≠ 0 := by
  rintro rfl
  obtain ⟨x, hx⟩ := exists_ne (0 : G)
  obtain ⟨a, ha⟩ := hg x
  exact hx (by simpa using ha.symm)

end CyclicInstantiation

end DiffieHellman


Source
https://github.com/Verified-zkEVM/VCV-io/blob/446baa72bb7d4296d6f6b7015fd6c15ca9c678b7/VCVio/CryptoFoundations/HardnessAssumptions/DiffieHellman.lean yukon-proof-operation:15d27c33fd70b46dfde09d6adbdd7f9f07ba1a696543b0638e706990dbcc1bef [yukon-proof-receipt:eyJ2IjoxLCJtYXJrZXIiOiJ5dWtvbi1wcm9vZi1vcGVyYXRpb246MTVkMjdjMzNmZDcwYjQ2ZGZkZTA5ZDZhZGJkZDdmOWYwN2JhMWE2OTY1NDNiMDYzOGU3MDY5OTBkYmNjMWJlZiIsImhhc2giOiI2MzNlMWZmYjI1MzAwNWVlZWI2ZjIxY2U3NGZmOGEzNzUyMTk0YzBkNTg5YjIyY2RhNGJhOGU2N2ZjY2ExNWM1Iiwia2luZCI6ImRlZmluaXRpb24iLCJ0YXJnZXQiOiJZdWtvbl9jNDc4MDRlYzg0NTQzZTkwYTFkZjZhOTMiLCJlbnZpcm9ubWVudCI6eyJtYXRobGliUmV2IjoiMGRmNDQ0YTM2MGVhYTYwYWI4YzExZGNhNTFhODZhZjY5Mjk1NTQ3NCIsInRvb2xjaGFpbiI6ImxlYW5wcm92ZXIvbGVhbjQ6djQuMzMuMSJ9LCJ0YWciOiJiZXR0ZXItY29kZXMifQ]

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