§3.2, p. 995 — r(·|T) is piecewise, with derivative p−w−(p−s)Φ(Q) below T and p+u−w−(p+u−s)Φ(Q) above; strictly concave on [0,T) and (T,∞); kink up at T
ProvedChannelRebate.Quantity.sec32_retailer_profit_shapechannel-rebatenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contracts
In the setting of the mission (demand density positive on and zero on , , ), let and , and let be the retailer's profit under the target rebate . Then:
- for ,
- for ,
- is differentiable at every with derivative , and at every with derivative ;
- is strictly concave on and on ;
- is continuous;
- the derivative tends to as and to as , and the left limit is strictly smaller than the right limit.
The upward kink at the target is what makes the retailer's problem non-concave and produces the two candidate orders of Lemma 1.
Formalization Note No continuity of is assumed; the derivatives exist because is continuous. The derivative used in item 6 is Lean's deriv, which agrees with the formulas of item 3 near .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting open MeasureTheory open Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity
/-- Taylor (2002), §3.2, p. 995. The piecewise form of `r(Q|T)`, its derivative on each
piece, strict concavity on `[0, T)` and on `(T, ∞)`, continuity, and the upward kink of the
derivative at the target `T`. -/
theorem sec32_retailer_profit_shape (p c s w u T : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
(hsc : s < c) (hu : 0 < u) (hT : 0 ≤ T) (D : Demand) :
-- the two closed forms
(∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q → Q ≤ T →
retailerProfit p s w u T D Q =
(p - w) * Q - (p - s) * ∫ x in (0 : ℝ)..Q, (Q - x) * D.φ x) ∧
(∀ Q : ℝ, T < Q →
retailerProfit p s w u T D Q =
(p - w) * Q - (p - s) * (∫ x in (0 : ℝ)..Q, (Q - x) * D.φ x)
+ u * ((∫ x in T..Q, (x - T) * D.φ x) + (Q - T) * (1 - Phi D Q))) ∧
-- the derivative on each piece
(∀ Q : ℝ, 0 < Q → Q < T →
HasDerivAt (retailerProfit p s w u T D) (p - w - (p - s) * Phi D Q) Q) ∧
(∀ Q : ℝ, T < Q →
HasDerivAt (retailerProfit p s w u T D) (p + u - w - (p + u - s) * Phi D Q) Q) ∧
-- strict concavity on each piece
StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ico 0 T) (retailerProfit p s w u T D) ∧
StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ioi T) (retailerProfit p s w u T D) ∧
-- continuity
Continuous (retailerProfit p s w u T D) ∧
-- the kink: the left limit of the derivative at T is below the right limit
Tendsto (deriv (retailerProfit p s w u T D)) (𝓝[<] T)
(𝓝 (p - w - (p - s) * Phi D T)) ∧
Tendsto (deriv (retailerProfit p s w u T D)) (𝓝[>] T)
(𝓝 (p + u - w - (p + u - s) * Phi D T)) ∧
p - w - (p - s) * Phi D T < p + u - w - (p + u - s) * Phi D T := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 995, §3.2 (display of r(Q|T), its derivative, and the following paragraph)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.