Proposition 3, p. 18 (corrected: c > 0) — surge pricing lowers customer and raises driver utility, and for surges up to Λ(λ, γ) beats keeping the old price for both
ProvedCongestedPlatforms.Surge.proposition_3Take , a commission , a congestion sensitivity and a market size such that lies in Region (a) or Region (d) of Proposition 1 (the supply-unconstrained regions). Write for a symmetric equilibrium price at market size , and for a common price write
for the utilities of a customer at location and of a driver with cost , where is the utilization at market size . Then:
- a symmetric equilibrium exists at ;
- (i) for every with in Region (a) or (d), a symmetric equilibrium exists at , and for all such equilibrium prices, all , and ,
- (ii) there is such that for every with in Region (a) or (d), for all equilibrium prices, all , and ,
Part (i) says that when demand surges and the platforms re-optimize, customers lose and drivers gain relative to the old market. Part (ii) says that for moderate surges, re-optimizing ("surge pricing") makes both customers and drivers better off than keeping the old price in the new market, because the higher price attracts drivers and relieves congestion.
Formalization Note The symmetric equilibrium is that of the Setting (action set , supply constraint (3.6) on the deviations and on the equilibrium price). is an extended real, so is allowed. At a symmetric profile both platforms have the same utilization, so one driver utility covers .
Differences from the source:
- correction: → ; reason: at the profit is identically when , so every price satisfying (3.6) is an equilibrium; counterexample , , (both in Region (a)) with , where the strict inequalities become equalities.
- generalization: a purchasing customer's location and a driver's cost (suppressed in , ) → all ; reason: the inequalities hold for each fixed , , whose terms cancel, so the statement specializes to .
- encoding: ", the equilibrium price characterized in Theorem 1" → a symmetric equilibrium exists at (and at each ), and the inequalities hold for every symmetric equilibrium price; reason: with Theorem 1's uniqueness this is the same statement, and the existence clauses keep it from being vacuous.
- encoding: and → an extended real with , and , ; reason: same instances.
- encoding: "for " for drivers → one driver utility; reason: at a symmetric profile .
- reading: action set and → and ; reason: the natural bounds of pp. 11, 13 at .
- reading: the supply constraint (3.6) restricts the deviations → it also holds at the equilibrium price; reason: "The prices selected by the platforms must also satisfy the following supply constraint" (p. 14).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CongestedPlatforms_Surge_Setting
namespace CongestedPlatforms.Surge
theorem proposition_3 (lam γ c : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hc0 : 0 < c) (hc1 : c < 1)
(hR : RegionA lam γ c ∨ RegionD lam γ c) :
(∃ p : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p) ∧
(∀ lamHat : ℝ, lam < lamHat → (RegionA lamHat γ c ∨ RegionD lamHat γ c) →
(∃ q : ℝ, IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q) ∧
∀ p q : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p → IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q → ∀ v k : ℝ,
uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v q < uD0 lam γ 1 c v p ∧
uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v q < uD1 lam γ 1 c v p ∧
uS lam γ 1 c k p < uS lamHat γ 1 c k q) ∧
(∃ Λ : EReal, (lam : EReal) < Λ ∧
∀ lamHat : ℝ, lam < lamHat → (lamHat : EReal) ≤ Λ →
(RegionA lamHat γ c ∨ RegionD lamHat γ c) →
∀ p q : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p → IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q → ∀ v k : ℝ,
uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v p < uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v q ∧
uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v p < uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v q ∧
uS lamHat γ 1 c k p < uS lamHat γ 1 c k q) := by sorry
end CongestedPlatforms.Surge
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.