The feasible set of the DSIC revenue LP
DefinitionDSICCompComp_Supplement_InPPluslp-dualitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization
is the set of feasible solutions of the DSIC revenue LP: the solutions in that also satisfy every DSIC constraint
for all bidders , values , reports and profiles . These are the DSIC/IR mechanisms on the finite support (IR is the case ).
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_InP
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_dsicSlack
namespace DSICCompComp
namespace Supplement
/-- Membership in `P⁺(D)`, the feasible set of the DSIC revenue LP of Appendix C
(Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Appendix C, p.35 (pdf p.36)): `P(D)` together with every DSIC constraint
`∑_j x_ij(v)·v_ij − p_i(v) ≥ ∑_j x_ij(v'_i, v_{-i})·v_ij − p_i(v'_i, v_{-i})` for all `i`,
`v_i ∈ supp(D_i)`, `v'_i ∈ supp(D_i) ∪ {∅}` and `v_{-i} ∈ supp(D_{-i})`, i.e. the DSIC/IR mechanisms
on the finite support. -/
def InPPlus {n m : ℕ} (E : FiniteSetting n m) (sol : LPSolution E) : Prop :=
InP E sol ∧ ∀ (v : (i : Fin n) → E.S i) (i : Fin n) (w : Option (E.S i)), 0 ≤ dsicSlack E sol v i w
end Supplement
end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Appendix C, p.35 (pdf p.36)