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Theorem 1 — under independence, t⋆=max⁡0≤ℓ<∣K∣θ(Sℓ)t^\star=\max_{0\le\ell<|K|}\theta(S_\ell)t⋆=max0≤ℓ<∣K∣​θ(Sℓ​) over the prefixes of the stand-alone order

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MultitaskContracts.Supplement.theorem_1

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

contract-theorymultitask-contractsp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1principal-agent

Let III be an instance of the multitask model with independent tasks on a finite nonempty task set KKK. The stand-alone payment of task kkk is ck/(1−qk/pk)c_k/(1-q_k/p_k)ck​/(1−qk​/pk​) (Definition 4), the incentive price of a strategy S⊊KS\subsetneq KS⊊K is θ(S)=c(K)−c(S)PK(K)−PS(K)\theta(S)=\dfrac{c(K)-c(S)}{P_K(K)-P_S(K)}θ(S)=PK​(K)−PS​(K)c(K)−c(S)​ (Definition 3), and t⋆=max⁡S⊊Kθ(S)t^\star=\max_{S\subsetneq K}\theta(S)t⋆=maxS⊊K​θ(S) (eq. (10)).

Let k(1),…,k(∣K∣)k_{(1)},\dots,k_{(|K|)}k(1)​,…,k(∣K∣)​ be the tasks in ascending order of stand-alone payment, with ties broken arbitrarily, and let Sℓ:={k(1),…,k(ℓ)}S_\ell:=\{k_{(1)},\dots,k_{(\ell)}\}Sℓ​:={k(1)​,…,k(ℓ)​}. Then

t⋆  =  max⁡0≤ℓ<∣K∣θ(Sℓ).t^\star\;=\;\max_{0\le\ell<|K|}\theta(S_\ell).t⋆=0≤ℓ<∣K∣max​θ(Sℓ​).

The identity holds for every such order.

Only the ∣K∣|K|∣K∣ prefixes of one sorted order need to be examined instead of all 2∣K∣−12^{|K|}-12∣K∣−1 deviations. This gives the O(∣K∣log⁡∣K∣)O(|K|\log|K|)O(∣K∣log∣K∣) algorithm for optimal Min-Pay contracts with heterogeneous independent tasks (Corollary 2).

Formalization Note The order is any bijection e:{0,…,∣K∣−1}→Ke:\{0,\dots,|K|-1\}\to Ke:{0,…,∣K∣−1}→K along which the stand-alone payment is non-decreasing, and Sℓ=e({i:i<ℓ})S_\ell=e(\{i:i<\ell\})Sℓ​=e({i:i<ℓ}), so S0=∅S_0=\emptysetS0​=∅; ℓ\ellℓ ranges over {0,…,∣K∣−1}\{0,\dots,|K|-1\}{0,…,∣K∣−1}.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: the tasks in ascending order of stand-alone payment, with ties broken arbitrarily → every bijection e : Fin |K| ≃ K with standAlone ∘ e monotone, S_ℓ = e({i : i < ℓ}), ℓ : Fin |K|; reason: an ordering of a finite set is a bijection with an initial segment of ℕ; quantifying over every monotone e is "ties broken arbitrarily"
  • encoding: §4.1 standing assumptions (independent tasks; t⋆ over the deviations of K) → hypothesis I.IsIndependent and [Nonempty K]; reason: the section title "Independent Tasks" and the proof's "By independence" make independence a standing assumption; t⋆ = max over S ⊊ K needs a deviation, so K is nonempty
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance_IsIndependent
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance_incentivePrice
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance_tStar
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance_standAlone

set_option autoImplicit false

open scoped ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace MultitaskContracts.Supplement

/-- **Theorem 1** (§4.1.2, p.14, PDF 16). Let `k(1), …, k(|K|)` be the tasks in ascending order
of stand-alone payment (Definition 4), with ties broken arbitrarily. Then
`t⋆ = max_{0≤ℓ<|K|} θ(S_ℓ)`, where `S_ℓ := {k(1), …, k(ℓ)}`.
E. Saig, I. Talgam-Cohen, Y. Tolkowsky, *Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of Bundling*,
STOC 2027 submission (held version, sha256 e991a51a…), Theorem 1, p.14.

**Formalization Note.** §4.1 assumes independent tasks (`hI`), and `t⋆` (published
`Instance.tStar`, eq. (10)) needs `K` nonempty. The order is any bijection
`e : Fin |K| ≃ K` along which the stand-alone payment (published `Instance.standAlone`) is
monotone; quantifying over every such `e` is "ties broken arbitrarily". `ℓ` ranges over
`Fin |K|`, i.e. `0 ≤ ℓ < |K|`, and `S_ℓ` is the image under `e` of `{i : i < ℓ}`
(`S_0 = ∅`). `θ` is the published `Instance.incentivePrice`. -/
theorem theorem_1 {K : Type*} [Fintype K] [DecidableEq K] [Nonempty K] (I : Instance K)
    (hI : I.IsIndependent) (e : Fin (Fintype.card K) ≃ K) (he : Monotone (I.standAlone ∘ e)) :
    I.tStar = (Finset.univ : Finset (Fin (Fintype.card K))).sup'
      (Finset.univ_nonempty_iff.2 ⟨⟨0, Fintype.card_pos⟩⟩)
      (fun ℓ => I.incentivePrice
        (((Finset.univ : Finset (Fin (Fintype.card K))).filter (fun i => i.val < ℓ.val)).map
          e.toEmbedding)) := by sorry

end MultitaskContracts.Supplement
Source
Saig, Talgam-Cohen, Tolkowsky, Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of Bundling, STOC 2027 submission (held version, sha256 e991a51a…), Theorem 1, p.14 (PDF p.16)

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