§4.1, p. 11 (PDF 13) — minimum cost under pure monetary incentives
ProvedLeaderStyle.WageFloor.cost_noneincentive-contractsleadershipmoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-floor
For a worker with reservation utility , a base-salary floor , high-effort cost , and a selfish leader with reservation utility , let be the least expected total wage cost of a feasible pure monetary contract. Then
The least-cost bonus is , and the base salary is . The formal result asserts that this cost is attained and bounds every feasible contract from below.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LeaderStyle_WageFloor_Model
Formal statement
namespace LeaderStyle.WageFloor
theorem cost_none (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
IsLeast (cost P '' {x : Contract | Feasible P .none x})
(P.c + max P.ur P.wf + P.ul) := by sorry
end LeaderStyle.WageFloor
Source
Dur, Kvaløy & Schöttner, Leadership Styles and Labor-Market Conditions, CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 278 (26 Feb 2021), p. 11 (PDF 13), §4.1, p. 11 (PDF 13)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.