Section 2, pp. 5–6 — a sole positive Kelly signal is not an equilibrium
ProvedLiquidPoA.Kelly.kelly_not_eq_one_positivebudgetskelly-mechanismliquid-welfarep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchyresource-allocation
In an admissible Kelly game, a signal vector with exactly one positive entry is not a pure Nash equilibrium:
The sole positive player can lower her payment while retaining the entire resource. This removes the nonzero signal profiles outside from the full price-of-anarchy goal.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LiquidPoA_Kelly_Setting
Formal statement
namespace LiquidPoA.Kelly
/-- Section 2, pp. 5–6: a sole positive Kelly signal cannot be an equilibrium. -/
theorem kelly_not_eq_one_positive {n : ℕ} (G : RAGame n)
(hG : G.IsAdmissible) (s : Fin n → ℝ) (hs : IsSignal s)
(i : Fin n) (hi : 0 < s i)
(hothers : ∀ j, j ≠ i → s j = 0) :
¬ IsEquilibrium (kelly n) G s := by sorry
end LiquidPoA.Kelly
Source
Caragiannis, Voudouris, The efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget-constrained users, arXiv:1707.03551v3, pp. 5–6, paragraph preceding the definition of X_n
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.