Equation (13), p. 21 (PDF 23) — at p∗ each firm's two-period profit is δπ^{S∗}
ProvedSpilloverDuopoly.Switchers.eq_13_profitduopolyexperience-goodsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1switching-consumers
In the two-period experience-goods duopoly, let , and assume consumers buy at , i.e. . When both firms charge , firm has share , firm has share , and each firm's two-period profit equals
whatever the tie share .
So each firm earns exactly the discounted second-period profit it would have earned with zero first-period market share, the profit from switching consumers.
Formalization Note The identity is stated for both firms, and .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SpilloverDuopoly_Switchers_Model
Formal statement
namespace SpilloverDuopoly.Switchers
/-- Equation (13), p. 21: at the symmetric profile `(p∗, p∗)` each firm's two-period profit is
`λ_i (p∗ - c) + δ (λ_i π^{R∗} + λ_{-i} π^{S∗}) = δ π^{S∗}`. -/
theorem eq_13_profit (G : Params) (hS : G.Standing) (hcov : G.u0 ≤ G.CS G.pStar) :
G.profitA G.pStar G.pStar = G.delta * G.piS ∧
G.profitB G.pStar G.pStar = G.delta * G.piS := by sorry
end SpilloverDuopoly.Switchers
Source
Chen, Stanton & Thomas, Information spillovers in experience goods competition, accepted manuscript (Management Science 70(6), 2024; LSE Research Online eprint 120790, version of June 18, 2023), p. 21 (PDF 23), eq. (13)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.