(5), App. B, PDF p. 34 — the responsive retail price is (a − q̂)/b below a/2 and a/(2b) above
ProvedYieldPostpone.Preference.eq_5p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1responsive-pricingrevenue-maximizationsupply-chain
Let and let units be available for sale. Over admissible retail prices , the revenue has a unique maximizer, namely
This is the retailer's ex post pricing rule under responsive pricing (scenarios OR and DR): with little stock the retailer prices to clear it, with ample stock it charges the monopoly price and leaves units unsold.
Formalization Note The page writes the rule with indicators of and ; at the two expressions coincide, so the boundary is assigned to the second case here. The statement asserts that the set of maximizers is exactly .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldPostpone_Preference_Setting
Formal statement
namespace YieldPostpone.Preference
/-- (5), App. B, PDF p. 34: with `x > 0` units available, the revenue `p min{a − bp, x}` over
admissible prices `0 < p < a/b` has the unique maximizer `p*(x) = (a − x)/b` if `x < a/2`
and `p*(x) = a/(2b)` if `x ≥ a/2`. -/
theorem eq_5 (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) (x : ℝ) (hx : 0 < x) :
{p : ℝ | pAdm P p ∧ ∀ p' : ℝ, pAdm P p' → salesRev P p' x ≤ salesRev P p x} =
{if x < P.a / 2 then (P.a - x) / P.b else P.a / (2 * P.b)} := by sorry
end YieldPostpone.Preference
Source
Geng, Guo, Xiao, Yang, …, SSRN 3546872 (author version), App. B, PDF p. 34 (appendix p. 2), (5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.