Section 5 — an implementation of a bargaining solution is incentive-efficient
ProvedMyersonBargaining.NashSolution.implementation_incentive_efficientbargainingincentive-efficiencymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Fix a Bayesian collective choice problem and a conflict choice . Suppose a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism generates a bargaining solution, meaning that its interim vector maximizes the generalized Nash product over . Then is incentive-efficient:
The claim concerns every implementing mechanism; it does not assert that the mechanism realizing the unique payoff vector is itself unique.
Formalization Note "Implementation" is read as: is a choice mechanism satisfying (2′) and (6), and maximizes (18) over . The statement does not assume Theorem 3's hypothesis, as the paper's paragraph does not; it holds for any conflict choice .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
/-- Section 5, p. 69: an implementation of a bargaining solution is incentive-efficient. -/
theorem implementation_incentive_efficient
(G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C) (π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ)
(hπ : IsChoiceMechanism π ∧ IsBIC G π)
(hx : IsBargainingSolution G cstar (V G π)) :
IsIncentiveEfficient G π := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 69, final paragraph of Section 5
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.