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RevnB(D)\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal B}_n(D)RevnB​(D), the optimal BIC/BIR revenue

Definition
DSICCompComp_Supplement_optRevBIC

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

competition-complexitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization

For nnn additive bidders whose value vectors are drawn iid from the product distribution D=D1×⋯×DmD = D_1 \times \cdots \times D_mD=D1​×⋯×Dm​, the optimal BIC/BIR revenue is

RevnB(D)  :=  sup⁡M∈B(D)RevnM(D),RevnM(D)=Ev∼Dn[∑i=1npi(v)].\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal B}_n(D) \;:=\; \sup_{M \in \mathcal B(D)} \mathrm{Rev}^M_n(D), \qquad \mathrm{Rev}^M_n(D) = \mathbb E_{v \sim D^n}\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n p_i(v)\Big].RevnB​(D):=M∈B(D)sup​RevnM​(D),RevnM​(D)=Ev∼Dn​[i=1∑n​pi​(v)].

It is the benchmark that Theorem 4.1 compares with the optimal DSIC revenue Revn+cD(D)\mathrm{Rev}^{\mathcal D}_{n+c}(D)Revn+cD​(D).

Formalization Note Built exactly like the published RevDS and the base mission's optRevDSIC, so the two benchmarks are comparable in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]: the supremum over IsAdmissibleBIC D mechanisms of the published expected revenue expRevenueN (an extended real, ∫+−∫−\int^+ - \int^-∫+−∫−), truncated at 000 per mechanism. The truncation does not change the supremum since the zero mechanism is admissible with revenue 000.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_MultiBuyer_Model
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_IsAdmissibleBIC

open MeasureTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal

namespace DSICCompComp

namespace Supplement

/-- `Rev^B_n(D)`, the revenue of the optimal BIC/BIR mechanism for `n` bidders with values drawn
iid from the product distribution `D` (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Section 2, p.6 (pdf p.7)): `Rev^B_n(D) := sup_{M ∈ B(D)} Rev^M_n(D)`, where
`Rev^M_n(D) = E_{v∼D^n}[∑_i p_i(v)]`.

**Formalization Note** Built exactly like the published `RevDS` (and the base mission's
`optRevDSIC`), so the two benchmarks are comparable in `ℝ≥0∞`: the supremum, over `IsAdmissibleBIC D`
mechanisms, of the published `expRevenueN (profileLaw n D) M` (an `EReal`, `∫⁺ − ∫⁻`) truncated at
`0`, which is harmless since the zero mechanism is admissible with revenue `0`. -/
noncomputable def optRevBIC (n : ℕ) {m : ℕ} (D : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
  ⨆ (M : MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m)) (_ : IsAdmissibleBIC D M),
    (MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.expRevenueN (profileLaw n D) M).toENNReal

end Supplement

end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Section 2, p.6 (pdf p.7)

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