, the optimal BIC/BIR revenue
DefinitionDSICCompComp_Supplement_optRevBICcompetition-complexitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization
For additive bidders whose value vectors are drawn iid from the product distribution , the optimal BIC/BIR revenue is
It is the benchmark that Theorem 4.1 compares with the optimal DSIC revenue .
Formalization Note Built exactly like the published RevDS and the base mission's optRevDSIC, so the two benchmarks are comparable in : the supremum over IsAdmissibleBIC D mechanisms of the published expected revenue expRevenueN (an extended real, ), truncated at per mechanism. The truncation does not change the supremum since the zero mechanism is admissible with revenue .
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_MultiBuyer_Model
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_IsAdmissibleBIC
open MeasureTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal
namespace DSICCompComp
namespace Supplement
/-- `Rev^B_n(D)`, the revenue of the optimal BIC/BIR mechanism for `n` bidders with values drawn
iid from the product distribution `D` (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Section 2, p.6 (pdf p.7)): `Rev^B_n(D) := sup_{M ∈ B(D)} Rev^M_n(D)`, where
`Rev^M_n(D) = E_{v∼D^n}[∑_i p_i(v)]`.
**Formalization Note** Built exactly like the published `RevDS` (and the base mission's
`optRevDSIC`), so the two benchmarks are comparable in `ℝ≥0∞`: the supremum, over `IsAdmissibleBIC D`
mechanisms, of the published `expRevenueN (profileLaw n D) M` (an `EReal`, `∫⁺ − ∫⁻`) truncated at
`0`, which is harmless since the zero mechanism is admissible with revenue `0`. -/
noncomputable def optRevBIC (n : ℕ) {m : ℕ} (D : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0) : ℝ≥0∞ :=
⨆ (M : MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m)) (_ : IsAdmissibleBIC D M),
(MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.expRevenueN (profileLaw n D) M).toENNReal
end Supplement
end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Section 2, p.6 (pdf p.7)