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Theorem 5.1 — in the message-dependent model randomized menus do no better than a posted price

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LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement.theorem_5_1

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1 bidders have independent regular values satisfying vPr⁡[V>v]→0v\Pr[V>v]\to0vPr[V>v]→0, with OPT>0\mathrm{OPT}>0OPT>0. Let O\mathcal OO be any seller menu — possibly infinite, containing (0,0)(0,0)(0,0), with a utility-maximizing option for every type. In the message-dependent model the intermediary may choose both which bidder to forward and which option (or lottery of options) to forward. Then there is a posted price p≥0p\ge0p≥0 such that

RandMD(O) ≤ DET(p),\mathrm{RandMD}(\mathcal O)\ \le\ \mathrm{DET}(p),RandMD(O) ≤ DET(p),

where RandMD(O)\mathrm{RandMD}(\mathcal O)RandMD(O) is the seller's revenue against the intermediary's best responses (worst case, as for RandMI\mathrm{RandMI}RandMI) and DET(p)\mathrm{DET}(p)DET(p) is the seller's revenue from posting ppp.

This contrasts with the message-independent model of the published mission, where two-price lotteries strictly help the seller.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a menu {(alpha_j, beta_j) : j in J}, J any index set, each buyer having a utility-maximizing choice → GenMenu: a set of options in [0,1] x [0, infinity) containing (0,0) with a maximizer for every real type; reason: the proviso of p.15; for negative types the outside option is always a maximizer, so the extra types add no condition
  • encoding: the message-dependent intermediary auction (y, q) forwarding bidder i's message → per bidder: selection probability y_i, (allocation, seller payment) = y_i times a point of the convex hull of the options, and a fee q_i, BIC and interim IR; reason: revelation principle; the mean of a lottery over options lies in the convex hull of the options and every hull point is a finite lottery
  • reading: 'given that the revenue-maximizing intermediary always best responds', RandMD(MS) → RandMD is the infimum of the seller's revenue over every message-dependent best response, minus infinity if none exists; reason: Assumption 3.2 resolves intermediary ties against the seller, as for the published RandMI; the inequality holds trivially exactly when the source's hypothesis that a best response exists fails
  • encoding: DET(p) for the posted price p → the published message-independent RandMI at postedPrice p; reason: §2.2: for a posted price the two models coincide
  • encoding: independent nonnegative bidder values and expected revenues → Fin n, product probability measures, EReal optima, and measurable mechanisms with integrable payments and all report sections; reason: these represent the same stochastic auction; unbounded optima and undefined real integrals cannot default to zero
  • encoding: Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality → truthful inequalities for almost every original value against every real report; reason: null types do not affect revenue; reports outside the support extend the mechanism without changing its attainable revenues
  • encoding: regular distribution with a PDF on its support [a, b] (Definition A.2 with alpha = 0) → the published ValueDist (density positive on (a, b), optional terminal atom, phi(b) = b) with Regular asking phi nondecreasing on (a, b]; reason: the density value at the single point a does not change the law; the two classes of laws coincide (same encoding as the published mission)
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_MessageDependent

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- Theorem 5.1: in the message-dependent model randomization does not help the
seller: for every (possibly infinite) menu some posted price does at least as well. -/
theorem theorem_5_1 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (D : Fin n → ValueDist)
    (hreg : ∀ i, Regular (D i)) (htail : ∀ i, VanishingTail (D i))
    (hopt : 0 < OPT D) (O : GenMenu) :
    ∃ (p : ℝ) (hp : 0 ≤ p), RandMD D O ≤ RandMI D (postedPrice p hp) := by sorry

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), Theorem 5.1, p.15 (PDF p.16); Lemma 5.2 and proofs, pp.15–16 (PDF pp.16–17); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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