Proof of Corollary 1, Online Appendix p. 4 — subsidy increments
ProvedAgriSubsidy.Combined.cor1_proof_incrementscomparative-staticscournot-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1subsidy
Fix a market and a subsidy increase . Suppose the equilibria at , , , and have every farmer active. The farmer-level changes obey
These identities describe the output and profit changes used in Proposition 4, with each change computed from the relevant equilibria.
Formalization Note All four equilibria are explicit best-response profiles, not formula-defined vectors. Activity at the planting-shifted subsidy is an added condition needed to retain the same active set. Activity at the harvesting-shifted and midpoint subsidies is stated explicitly; the paper's model implies it from baseline activity, but no uniqueness theorem is assumed here.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AgriSubsidy_Combined_Setting
Formal statement
namespace AgriSubsidy.Combined
theorem cor1_proof_increments {N : ℕ} (P : Params) (z : Fin N → ℝ)
(h : Standing P z) (sP sH δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ)
(q qP qH qMid : Fin N → ℝ)
(eq : IsEquilibrium P z (combined z sP sH) q)
(eqP : IsEquilibrium P z (combined z (sP + δ) sH) qP)
(eqH : IsEquilibrium P z (combined z sP (sH + δ)) qH)
(eqMid : IsEquilibrium P z (combined z sP (sH + δ / 2)) qMid)
(hpos : ∀ j, 0 < q j ∧ 0 < qP j ∧ 0 < qH j ∧ 0 < qMid j) :
(∀ j, qP j - q j = (δ / P.β) *
(z j - ((N : ℝ) / ((N : ℝ) + 1)) * zbar z)) ∧
(∀ j, qH j - q j = δ / (P.β * ((N : ℝ) + 1))) ∧
(∀ j, profit P z (combined z sP (sH + δ)) qH j -
profit P z (combined z sP sH) q j =
(2 * δ / ((N : ℝ) + 1)) * qMid j) := by sorry
end AgriSubsidy.Combined
Source
Fan, Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, Wu, Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design, SSRN 4378693 (version of 2023-03-18), Online Appendix p. 4, Proof of Corollary 1, first and final displayed equations
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.